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**Nationalism and Identity Policy in Slovenia towards  
the Second Generation of Migrants from Former  
Yugoslav States**

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## Summary

### Nationalism and Identity Policies of the Second Generation of Migrants from Former Yugoslav States

Doctoral dissertation **Nationalism and Identity Policies of the Second Generation of Migrants from Former Yugoslav States** explores the connection between nationalism and identity policies in Slovenia between two ethnically different groups, namely, ethnic Slovenes and descendants of migrants of FYR.

Based on a constructivist interpretation of nationalism, the dissertation follows Michael Billig's (1995) theory of banal nationalism, while focusing on everyday aspects of nationalism, respectively, how nationalism is reproduced and represented in everyday life and in (popular) culture in Slovenia, regarding the second generation of migrants from former Yugoslav countries. The research examines the relationship between the cultural and political Europeanization of Slovenia after 1991 and nationalism regarding migrants from FYR. The main hypothesis is that Slovenia, in order to detach from "Balkan" and "post-Yugoslav" connotations, and to integrate as easily as possible into European society, needed to rediscover its "European cultural identity". The key research question of the dissertation is the following: to what extent do territory, culture, myths, and national symbols play a role in creating national identity and in the consequent discrimination against other ethnic groups living in the same area?

The theoretical part of the dissertation follows Michael Skey's (2011) five dimensions of everyday nationalism: *spatial*, *temporal*, *cultural*, *political* and *self/other*. The spatial and temporal dimension are primarily observed through the lens of migrations to Slovenia, while the political dimension of Slovenian domestic and foreign policy regarding the migrants from FYR is mostly observed through the minority issues and the case of Erased people<sup>1</sup>. In the cultural dimension, the relationship between Slovenian / European culture and the "non-Slovenian / Balkan" culture is demarcated, as well as how FYR migrants are treated in Slovenian popular culture and media. The last dimension focuses on everyday situations and discrimination encountered by members of the second generation of migrants. The emphasis is put on 'name and surname' issues, the 'čefur' subculture in Slovenia and further negative stereotypes about members of other former Yugoslav nations.

The theoretical part of the dissertation has additionally focused on the primary elements of the concept of everyday nationalism, such as the role of national and political myths, symbols, celebrations and holidays, and analyzed them in the Slovenian context. On the other hand, the empirical part of the dissertation, through the answers received from the respondents, tried to see to what extent their answers coincide or differ from the theoretical part of the dissertation.

The results of the research obtained show that the concept of everyday nationalism can certainly be applied to the case of Slovenia. With critical analysis of discourse used in the empirical part of the dissertation, through semi-structured interviews on a sample of 16 persons, it is evident that everyday nationalism in Slovenia exists, and is primarily created by the state and media with

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<sup>1</sup> Erased is the name for the inhabitants of Slovenia, who were illegally deleted from the register of permanent

the use of national myths, symbols, and by emphasizing their own culture in comparison with other neighboring states. Also, by creating interviews with two ethnically diverse groups (ethnic Slovenes and descendants of migrants from former Yugoslav states), it seems that the concept of everyday nationalism also affects the self-identification of certain groups, and that identification with national myths, symbols and cultural space is much stronger in group consisted of members of ethnic Slovenes.

Keywords: nationalism, national identity, Slovenia, Yugoslavia, migrants, Others

## Contents

|                                                                                |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1. Foreword .....                                                              | i   |
| 2. Introduction.....                                                           | 1   |
| 3. Historical Background .....                                                 | 8   |
| 3.1. Slovenia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia .....            | 8   |
| 3.2. Attitudes of the Slovenian population towards immigration processes ..... | 15  |
| 4. What is nationalism? .....                                                  | 27  |
| 5. Constructivism, nationalism and national identity.....                      | 30  |
| 5.1. Banal nationalism.....                                                    | 34  |
| 5.2. Everyday Nationalism.....                                                 | 37  |
| 5.2.1. The Political Dimension and the Role of the State .....                 | 42  |
| 5.2.2. The Cultural Dimension.....                                             | 45  |
| 5.2.3. The Dimension of “Self and Other” .....                                 | 50  |
| 5.2.4. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions .....                                   | 55  |
| 6. The Empirical Case Study.....                                               | 58  |
| 6.1. Purpose, goals and methods .....                                          | 58  |
| 6.2. Population and sample .....                                               | 59  |
| 6.3. Data processing methodology .....                                         | 61  |
| 7. Myths and symbols in Slovenian narrative .....                              | 63  |
| 7.1. National and Public Holidays .....                                        | 66  |
| 7.2. Political Myths .....                                                     | 67  |
| 8. Yugoslavism and Slovene National Identity.....                              | 74  |
| 9. European versus Balkan Culture.....                                         | 83  |
| 10. The Construction of the Other: Non-Slovenes.....                           | 90  |
| 10.1. Non-Slovenes in culture and media .....                                  | 96  |
| 10.2. From the Balkan scene to turbofolk music .....                           | 100 |
| 10.3. Non-Slovenes and the language.....                                       | 107 |
| 11. Minorities in Slovenia.....                                                | 110 |
| 11.1. The Erasure in Slovenia .....                                            | 113 |
| 12. Preliminary summary of literary research on case study .....               | 123 |
| 13. The Analysis of the Interviews .....                                       | 126 |
| 13.1. Spatial and temporal dimensions .....                                    | 126 |

|                                                          |     |
|----------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 13.2. The Political Dimension.....                       | 135 |
| 13.3. The Cultural Dimension.....                        | 139 |
| 13.4. The Self/Other Dimension .....                     | 149 |
| 14. Interpretation and Critical Discourse Analysis ..... | 159 |
| 14.1. Ethnicity and territory .....                      | 160 |
| 14.2. Symbols and myths .....                            | 165 |
| 14.3. State and political institutions .....             | 168 |
| 14.4. Elements of culture .....                          | 170 |
| 14.5. Discrimination.....                                | 177 |
| 15. Conclusion .....                                     | 183 |
| 16. Bibliography .....                                   | 189 |
| 17. Annex.....                                           | 210 |

## List of tables

|                                                                                                        |     |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Table 1 - Nationalities in Slovenia.....                                                               | 14  |
| Table 2 - Population census: Ethnic composition in % for 2002.....                                     | 14  |
| Table 3 – Attitudes towards migrations (1970/71) .....                                                 | 16  |
| Table 4 – Why is immigration good? (1970/71).....                                                      | 17  |
| Table 5 – Why is immigration bad? (1970/71) .....                                                      | 18  |
| Table 6 – Attitudes towards migrations from FYR (1972) .....                                           | 19  |
| Table 7 – Attitudes about employment of workers from FYR in Slovenia (1980/81).....                    | 20  |
| Table 8: How should workers from FYR in Slovenia act in the future (1983).....                         | 20  |
| Table 9: How should workers from FYR in Slovenia act in the future (1986).....                         | 21  |
| Table 10: How should workers from FYR in Slovenia act in the future (1988).....                        | 21  |
| Table 11 - Willingness to connect with members of other nationalities (in %, data for 1992/1993) ..... | 24  |
| Table 12 - Defining the attitudes of Slovenes towards immigrants (in %) (1994) .....                   | 24  |
| Table 13 - Results of the tested hypotheses .....                                                      | 182 |

## List of figures

|                                                                                                       |    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|----|
| Figure 1 - Immigrants in Slovenia by area of emigration within the Yugoslavia , in 1981. ....         | 10 |
| Figure 2 - Immigrants in Slovenia by area of emigration within the FYR, in 1991. ....                 | 12 |
| Figure 3 - Who threatens Slovenian security? .....                                                    | 22 |
| Figure 4 - How are the relations between members of different nationalities living in Slovenia? ..... | 23 |
| Figure 5 - What groups of people do you not want as neighbors? .....                                  | 25 |

## 1. Foreword

*Give me peace with these lies of yours,  
I'm fed up with these lies of yours.  
Don't tell me everything's fine,  
As long as her old man drives me away from home  
Because I'm not like him!  
I don't know, who does he think he is?  
I really don't know, who does he think he is?  
I know you'd rather stay home  
Than come with me.  
You will never know what life is like!  
And so what if I am not like him,  
The pigs are also on the other side of the river,  
So what if I am not Slovene?  
I don't know, who does he think he is?  
I really don't know, who does he think he is?  
So I said to myself:  
Vahid Vahid, where are you going?  
Vahid Vahid, you know you can't go there!  
Vahid Vahid, just go home.  
Just go home, forget her address!  
(Kuzle, Vahid Vahid<sup>2</sup>)*

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<sup>2</sup> Original in Slovenian. Translated by author.

Although an excerpt from a poem may ordinarily be extraneous to academic literature, the cited passage is vital to this doctoral dissertation, as it perfectly depicts the discourse of nationalism through the prism of discrimination and xenophobia in everyday life. The lyrics encapsulate precisely all the primary elements and dimensions of everyday nationalism and the Slovenian nationalist discourse itself: the territorial endangerment of Slovenes, the attitude towards others, as well as their feeling of superiority to other peoples of former Yugoslavia. While these lyrics in themselves do not have an excessively negative meaning, when combined with these attitudes, they take on a different connotation and become a signifier of mundane, banal nationalism – a nationalism that is so invisible that it is not actually perceived as nationalism. Involving borders and language, ranging from letters that are pronounced differently to last names ending in a different suffix, from coins and postcards to TV shows and graffiti, nationalism spreads invisibly in everyday life. Disguised in routine and everyday happenings, people accept this nationalism unconsciously. Unlike previous notions of nationalism, which firmly highlighted the role of ethnicity, this nationalism is different, perfidiously establishing itself in every pore of society, without society being aware that in fact, it plays a significant role in its spread.

Motivation to write a doctoral dissertation on this topic has existed for years. Nationalism as a direction has strongly characterized all the states of the former Yugoslavia. In some, it stood out through military power and the revived ideology of the “heavenly nation”, while in others it was carried out through the purification of language as the primary element of segregation. But in Slovenia, nationalism somehow perfidiously slipped through the loop, not causing violence and remaining relatively unnoticed. Some will agree that Slovenia has always been a democratic, pro-European country, so there has been no rise in nationalism. If we compare it with other FYR countries, this thesis is probably correct, but was everything that democratic?

*Where are you from? - They asked me during my studies in Slovenia.*

*Croatia. - I answered.*

*You know, my dad is from Serbia and my mother from Bosnia. You are one of us.*<sup>3</sup>

As a young girl, who came from Croatia – a country where, because of the war in the 1990s, there was and still is a big intolerance between Croats and some other ethnic groups – hearing

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<sup>3</sup> Author's memories of studying in Slovenia.

that in Slovenia we all form one particular group, was probably a cultural shock. In 2007, after finishing high school in Croatia, I enrolled at the University of Ljubljana. The motivation for this choice was to master a new foreign language, and to have a European university degree, because at that point Croatia was still not a member of European Union.

*You are not part of that group. Croatians are not perceived as čefurs. We say this more for Serbs and Bosnians living here. Especially if you are loud and aggressive, wear shiny clothes and tracksuits, and listen to that Serbian turbo-folk music. You Croatians are somewhere in the middle. You are not completely čefurs, but you are still not like us or Austrians. But you don't have to worry about it, because your last name doesn't end in -IČ. Just learn how to pronounce the letter "l" and you are safe.* - explained my Slovenian friends and colleagues from university later.

Even though it was meant light-heartedly, the question arose in my young head. How can people with different ethnic backgrounds, with different religions, and different native languages be treated as one group? How come something such as ethnicity or religion, which violently separates them in their homelands, makes them closer to each other in some other land? How come I had professors who allowed me to write exams in Croatian, because: “we were all a part of the same country and there is no need for me to struggle with Slovenian language”, while I also had professors who told me it is unnecessary to explain where I am from, because in Slovenia, the countries of Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia are the same. And why were my colleagues convinced they got lower grades because their last name ends in -IČ?

These were the personal reasons, which encouraged me to do research in everyday nationalism and identity policies in Slovenia. This section is freely written, to better present the motivation for this research. It is about the banality and everydayness of nationalism that imperceptibly extends through all spheres of social life. Without the use of violence, which is very typical of nationalism, this nationalism acts in everyday life through those Others. While most states defend their territory and nation from the intrusion of unwanted ethnic groups with weapons or wire fences, some states have done this in a more perfidious way. And this is where everyday nationalism as a direction comes to the fore.

Although much academic literature deals with nationalism in the territory of the states of the former Yugoslavia and thus Slovenia, none has so far dealt with this topic through the prism of everyday nationalism. Thus this dissertation offers insight into an entirely fresh approach to the observation of nationalism, which is also gaining importance in the academic literature. This is more than apparent from the growing number of researchers dealing with this approach (see Skey 2009, 2011; Hear and Antonsich, 2018; Knott, 2015; Bonikowski 2016; Edensor, 2002; and more). Many academic papers also deal with certain elements of everyday nationalism and how they are presented in certain countries, such as “Hot, banal and everyday nationalism - Bilingual road signs in Wales” (Jones and Merriman, 2009), “Greek dance and everyday nationalism in contemporary Greece” (Kalogeropoulou, 2013), “The ‘everyday’ of banal nationalism - ordinary people’s views on Italy and Italian” (Antonsich, 2015), and many more. However, research on former Yugoslav states using the everyday nationalism approach is lacking. Most papers study this area primarily through a top-down approach, i.e., primarily looking at the role of the state and its institutions in creating nationalism, neglecting the role of citizens and how nationalism is represented in everyday life.

For this reason, the study of Slovenia and the Slovenian national identity through the prism of everyday nationalism offers something new and opens space for further research using this approach – not only in Slovenia, but also in neighboring countries.

Slovenia, as the most developed and thus the richest country in the former federation, has been an immigration country for decades for many people from less developed parts of former Yugoslavia. The largest immigration flows occurred especially during the 1960s and 1970s when many members of different nations of former Yugoslavia came to Slovenia in search of a better life. Immigrants mostly settled in the capital of Ljubljana and in smaller towns such as Velenje and Jesenice, where there were mines or large iron factories. Although the nature of their migrations was primarily economic and should have been short-lived, because of the better living standard and developed economy of Slovenia, many migrants stayed. In addition, the war in former Yugoslavia, and especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also led to large-scale immigration, which changed the demographic picture of Slovenia. Currently, citizens from former Yugoslavia form the numerically largest ethnic groups in Slovenia, but based on the criteria of autochthony, they cannot obtain the status of national minorities.

## 2. Introduction

In my doctoral dissertation, I will explore the connection between the concept of everyday nationalism and the identity policies of ethnically different groups of people living in Slovenia<sup>4</sup>, namely the ethnic Slovenes, and members of the second generation of migrants from former Yugoslav countries. Through the five dimensions of everyday nationalism (see Skey 2011), I will try to explore how much territory, myths, and symbols, as well as culture, language, and political institutions, play a role in creating a national identity. Also, through the self / other dimension, the dissertation will check whether, in a discursive form, the stereotyping of members of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia has influenced the identities of persons belonging to the second generation of migrants. Unlike their parents, who came to Slovenia on purpose, their descendants were born here, attended school in the Slovenian language, and were culturally integrated into the Slovenian environment. Precisely for this reason, I am interested in the self-identification process of members of the second generation of migrants and how much the Slovenian nationalist discourse influenced their self-perception.

The dissertation starts with the initial hypothesis that in order to move away from the connotation and discourse of the backwardness of Yugoslavia and the Balkans, post-1991 Slovene politics (through political and media discourse) had to present Slovenes as a people of Central Europe. State politics did that strictly through highlighting the insurmountable difference between Slovenia and other nations of the former Yugoslavia.

The key research question is the following: to what extent do territory, culture, myths, and national symbols play a role in creating national identity and in the consequent discrimination against other ethnic groups living in the same area?

With a theoretical analysis of the dimensions of everyday nationalism, I will additionally try to give answers to the following sub-questions:

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<sup>4</sup> Because nations of the former Yugoslavia are, despite different ethnic backgrounds and nationalities, perceived as one group in Slovenia, the research will also use this perception in theoretical and empirical part.

- 1) To what extent did state institutions and politics itself influence the creation of the Slovenian national discourse after 1991 and consequently the perception of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia living in Slovenia?
- 2) What are the main anchors on which the national discourse is based?
- 3) To what extent did national symbols and mythology influence the notion of Slovene national identity among Slovenes themselves, as well as members of the second generation of immigrants?
- 4) How important are culture, national history, and territory in creating the Slovenian national discourse?

In the empirical part of the dissertation, I will look for answers to the following questions:

- 5) How did the political and media discourse affect the personal identities of Slovenes versus the personal identities of members of the second generation of immigrants from the FYR?
- 6) What are the self-perceptions of members of the second generation of immigrants?
- 7) Is there general discrimination in Slovenian society towards these people and have they ever felt discriminated against because of their ethnic background?
- 8) How is discrimination perceived in everyday life, and what are the fundamental elements for discrimination?
- 9) How important are national symbols and myths in creating national identity?
- 10) How do informants perceive Slovene culture with respect to other cultures?

In order to get answers to the above questions more easily and clearly, besides the original hypothesis, I set additional hypotheses which are closely connected with five dimensions of everyday nationalism, namely:

**H1:** To move away from the connotation and discourse of backwardness of Yugoslavia and the Balkans, post-1991 Slovene politics had to present Slovenes as a people of Central Europe.

**H2:** Slovene national identity is primarily defined through ethnicity and territory.

**H3:** Slovene myths and symbols are important in the self-identification of the respondents from the group of ethnic Slovenes, but not important to the group of second generation of migrants from FYR.

**H4:** The state and state institutions are the prime culprits for the Erasure.

**H5.1.:** Slovenia is seen as belonging to (Central) European culture, due to similar traditions and customs.

**H5.2.:** Music is the primary element of self-identification of the respondents.

**H6:** Members of the second generation of immigrants from the FYR are discriminated against because of their ethnicity.

**H7:** Identification with the Slovene (cultural) space is much stronger in the group of ethnic Slovenes, but in the group of second generation of nations from FYR.

The hypotheses listed above are closely connected with the theory of everyday nationalism, which highlights the role of myths, symbols, territory, state and elements such as culture and music, as will be shown in the theoretical part.

By carrying out semi-structured interviews with both groups of respondents, I have sought to capture a picture of the general climate in Slovenia towards immigrants from the FYR, and the processes of integration and assimilation of members of the second generation of migrants in Slovenia.

Using following research questions and hypothesis, the main goal of the research is to explore the perceptions of perceived differences between and different treatment of Slovians and Non-Slovenes, as well as to explore the perceived differentiation between the two groups and their perception of each other.

The doctoral dissertation is divided into two parts: one theoretical, and one empirical. The theoretical part comprises five main content streams. The first chapter serves as an introduction, while the second one contains a concise overview of Slovene history from 1945 until 1991. In this chapter, the migration flows to Slovenia and the reasons for it will be explained, as well as the public opinion towards migrants who came to Slovenia. This reveals the position of Slovenes regarding migrants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia in the past, and how much it has influenced today's attitudes on the matter.

In the subsequent chapter, the dissertation explains the theory of nationalism, constructivism, and the creation of national identity. In later subchapters, dissertation describes banal and everyday nationalism as directions through which the issues will be studied. This clarifies what everyday nationalism is, how it originated, its principal representatives, and why I used this approach for my research. Furthermore, five main dimensions of everyday nationalism, which are applied to the Slovenian situation, will be presented and explained.

The next subchapter refers to the political dimension of everyday nationalism, where the role of the state and political institutions in creating Slovenian national identity, in particular through the media and various laws and acts passed by the state apparatus, will be explained. Through the systems of education, language, culture, territoriality, and finance, the state may legitimate national discourse, and the nation therefore becomes a political society with firmly held views and dominant narratives ingrained in national institutions (Bonikowski 2016).

In later chapters, this dimension will be viewed through the prism of political myths and national minorities in Slovenia, as well as with the Erasure that happened in Slovenia in 1992. In addition, regarding the examples of minorities and the Erased people, the research probes the dichotomization of "us" and "them", considering the construction of national identity. Based on these examples, an evaluation of the role that the state played not only in creating national identity but also in the potential segregation of certain ethnic groups is carried out.

The next subchapter (5.2.2) examines the cultural dimension of Slovenian nationalism and its application in everyday life. To begin, the primary theories of cultural nationalism will be explained, while in chapter 8, it will be studied how these theories work on the example of

Slovenian culture. Chapter 9 looks into the relationship between “European” and “Balkan”<sup>5</sup> culture in the case of Slovenia. I will try to determine and explain the discourses of European and Balkan culture and how they are applied in the everyday life of Slovenes. It is in this example that I will research the interconnection between cultural and political dimensions of everyday nationalism in Slovenia and the meaning of central European identity for Slovenes. The research will be interested in the extent to which and in what ways post-1991 Slovene politics accepted independence and revived its Central European identity, and how this reflected on the notion of the Balkans in Slovene society. For this dissertation, the cultural dimension is important because, according to Južnič (1993, 21), „the Slovenian national identity has survived for through its culture, and not through political, economical or military power”. This ties back into chapter 4, with the distinction between ethnic and civic citizenship questioned as a “Western” or “Eastern” idea, as each of the two “constructs a different relationship between state and nation” (Hansen 1996, 475).

The tenth chapter takes up the elements presented in the subchapter 5.2.3., studying the Self and Other dimension of everyday nationalism, respectively, the critical role that people, and the different traits and values they are seen to embody, have in realizing and concretizing the image of a nation in a world of nations (Wodak 2006, 105). The relationship of the majority, dominant group with respect to minority groups and how the discourse of domination is presented in everyday life will be examined, with emphasis on the study of “Internal positive and Internal negative Others” (Petersoo, 2007). Having elucidated these mechanisms, the construction of the Other on the example of Non-Slovenes (immigrants from the former Yugoslav states) living in Slovenia will be described. This primary framework shapes the study of the construction of the other through the prism of language, media, and subcultures throughout the text. The focus remains on the primary elements of the construction of the Other through the last names, pronunciations of certain words, types of music, and other elements of everyday nationalism.

The subchapter 5.2.4. connects the two dimensions of everyday nationalism: the spatial and temporal dimensions. These dimensions are important because the relationship between space

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<sup>5</sup> These words are in quotation marks, because there is no single definition of European or Balkan culture. Instead, both are falling into the category of stereotypes.

and national identity can produce “complex geography that is constituted by borders, symbolic areas and sites, constellations, pathways, dwelling places, and everyday fixtures” Edensor (2002, 637). In additional chapters, the emphasis will be on the role of territories, borders, and symbols in the creation and understanding of national identity. Since the Slovenian national identity relies primarily on its history and culture, I will focus on the role of Slovenian national heroes, poets, and historical myths as symbols of Slovenian nationality. Also, because the territory is described as the fundamental element on which the state is formed, the focus will be on the role of the small Slovenian territorial area, as well as the Triglav mountain as the primary geographical symbol for the creation of national identity. The next subchapter will dive into Slovenian history and will try to explain the reasons and motives that led to Slovenian independence.

In the empirical part of the dissertation, starting from chapter 13, I will use a combination of methods. I opted for semi-structured interviews because they seek to understand complex patterns of society members (Fontana and Frey, 2000). These methods and the choice of participants are harmonized with the concept of everyday nationalism. By dividing participants into two groups, namely the group of ethnic Slovenes and the group of descendants of migrants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia, I will see the differentiation, i.e. in what way and through which elements each group understands the Slovenian national identity, eliciting answers to the questions of potential discrimination and self-perception of members of the second generation in Slovenia. The aim is to try to find out how important elements of the Slovenian national discourse are for those who have been living in Slovenia for years and have Slovenian citizenship. The research will be interested in how they interpret nationality and belonging to certain cultures, and whether they consider politics and state institutions as primary artifacts in creating a general national consciousness. Through the theory discussed in the previous chapters, I will take the research as a starting point and then illuminate it with the help of critical discourse analysis.

Unlike other schools of nationalism, which primarily focus on the study of nationality through the prism of ethnicity, theory and top-down approach, i.e., the role of the state and its institutions in creating and spreading nationalism, everyday nationalism offers a more modern and comprehensive approach to studying nationalism. Since it studies both the top-down and bottom-

up approaches, it does not neglect the role of the masses or ordinary people, who are themselves unconscious creators of nationalism on a daily basis.

In order to get to the core of the very notion of national identification and the notion of everyday nationalism in Slovenia, I deliberately opted for semi-structured interviews with a smaller number of people. Since national identification and self-perception are very complex, by doing interviews with 16 people, I got the opportunity to dive deeper into this topic, asking respondents additional follow-up questions and giving them enough time to express and clarify their views. Also, following the literature on everyday nationalism (see Skey 2011, Antonsich, 2015, and more), most studies and tests were carried out with a smaller sample of people and thus supporting this approach. As Skey (2011, 117) explains, “everyday nationalism must be studied ‘more systematically’, and more directly, ‘to better understand why nationhood matters.’”

### **3. Historical Background**

#### **3.1. Slovenia in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia**

Unlike the first Yugoslavia, in which Slovenia did not play an overly important political role, the changes after the Second World War, i.e. in 1945, greatly improved its political status, first and foremost, as well as its economic position. Although Slovenia has always been the most developed part of the former state, the economic situation in Slovenia after the Second World War quickly improved, and it can be said that Slovenia was up to several times more developed than other parts of Yugoslavia. However, since the Yugoslav politics and economy were based on socialism and the principle of self-government and the ideology of brotherhood and unity of all peoples of the former federation, Slovenia found itself in a very unenviable position, where, as the most developed country, it had to give much of its income to less developed parts of the federation. Likewise, it was precisely this development that led to the great internal migrations that took place in the 1950s.

As in almost every other country, the migration flows in the Yugoslav area are almost inseparable from its history. Over time, these migrations have changed the ethnic composition of the population in Yugoslavia (R. Petrović 1987, 9). As the basic type of migration in Yugoslavia (until 1991), the economic factors of migration are most easily seen indirectly, most often by comparing the economic development of the territory of emigration and the territory of immigration, with a known direction from a less developed environment to a more developed one. Another important factor is urbanization, i.e. relocation from rural to urban settlements, where, besides economic, there are other factors of social and psychological nature at play (ibid, 15). It is also important to consider that the population of Yugoslavia was very heterogeneous in its ethnic composition and Yugoslavia did not have an officially defined state language and state nationality. Yugoslavia was inhabited by Yugoslav peoples: Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, Muslims, Slovenes and Serbs. It contained a range of ethnic groups: Albanians, Hungarians, Italians, Bulgarians, Ruthenians and Slovaks, as well as members of certain ethnic groups, Vlachs and Roma, and members of some other European groups. The significant number of residents who chose to be Yugoslavs must not be ignored (R. Petrović 1987, 29).


While the initial migrations of the Yugoslav population to Slovenia were very modest, in the 1950s there was an increase in the amount of immigration, primarily as a result of the Second World War. Following the census in 1953, Slovenia had the largest share of the foreign immigrant population: 2.6% of the total population. Furthermore, there was a very strong population exchange between Slovenia and Croatia, such that Slovenia became a more important immigration target for Croats, while other peoples of the former Yugoslavia only later settled in the area. For example, compared to Bosnia and Herzegovina, the share of immigrants from Croatia (63.5%) was as much as six times higher than the share of immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina (Josipovič 2006, 232-233).

In the following two decades, namely in the 1960s and 1970s, there was an increase in the number of migrants from other parts of Yugoslavia, mostly because of work or education. First, among the temporary residents for the purpose of seasonal or regular work, most of the inhabitants were from other republics of the former Yugoslavia; for various reasons they could not or did not want to register as permanent residents of Slovenia, or they simply did not identify as such. Second among the temporary presences can be traced to schooling, with mostly secondary school students and university students studying in Slovenia. It is important to highlight that in this period, Slovenia experienced a significant emigration of educated individuals. Over the period 1961-1970, Slovenia lost over 40,000 inhabitants through departure, while at least part of the emigration was compensated by the immigration of a Non-Slovenian population from other republics. According to the census data, over a ten-year period, the population increased by a flow of 43,000 individuals from other republics of the former Yugoslavia, and 4,000 from other parts of the world immigrating to Slovenia. Almost half of the immigrants were from other Yugoslav countries (Dolenec quoted in Komac 2007, 77-78). However, immigration to Slovenia experienced its greatest boom in 1974, primarily because of the closure of the foreign labor markets into which the Yugoslav peoples had traditionally migrated. This was not surprising; keeping in mind that Slovenia was economically the most developed part of Yugoslavia with good opportunities for employment, this brought about immigration from less developed parts of Yugoslavia. The target points were primarily industrial areas and cities with developed production centers. However, because of the poorly regulated migration policy, not only did it strongly influence migration flows, which also had an effect on the ethnic composition of Slovenia, but it also led to large regional differences in development

(Borak 2002, 119-121). According to the census from 1981, the total number of immigrants in Slovenia was 143,082 or 7.56% of the total population. The largest, one-third, came from Slovenes born abroad or in other republics, followed by Croats (a quarter), and then Serbs and Muslims. Only 1% was composed of Montenegrins, Macedonians, Hungarians, and Albanians (Josipovič 2006, 241-242).

Mass immigration in the 1970s was a phenomenon that the Slovenian environment encountered for the first time in history. Immigrants were foreigners to this environment, often a stranger in the national body. This may be best characterized by the statement of the famous Slovenian poet Ivan Cankar when trying to explain Yugoslavism, saying: “We are brothers by blood, at least cousins by language, and we are much more foreign to each other than our Gorenjska farmer is to a Tyrolean, or a Gorizia winemaker to a Friulian, according to the culture that is the result of centuries of distinct upbringing<sup>6</sup>” (Komac 2007, 49).

Figure 1 - Immigrants in Slovenia by area of emigration within the Yugoslavia , in 1981.



Source: 1981 census, SURS<sup>7</sup>

After the quite peaceful migration flows in the 1980s, mostly because of the constant employment growth and low unemployment rates in Slovenia, from 1988 the situation drastically

<sup>6</sup> Translation by author.

<sup>7</sup> In Josipovič, D. (2006) The effects of immigration in Slovenia after the Second World War, p. 243.

changed. With the big political changes and the collapse of the single Yugoslav market, as well as with the strong ethnic homogenization of the population in individual republics, the rise of nationalisms of all kinds and the first inter-ethnic clashes (Kosovo), the whole Yugoslav picture together with migration flows gained a different meaning and sense. At the end of the 1980s, various laws were passed that enabled entrepreneurship and the possibility to dismiss workers due to bankruptcy or as a technological surplus. During this time, many immigrants from the former Yugoslavia emigrated from Slovenia, as recorded by official data on evictions in the then still single state (Dolenc quoted in Komac 2007, 85). For this period there is a highly notable phenomenon of emigration of economic migrants from the countries of the former Yugoslavia to Slovenia and the return of Slovenes from these countries to Slovenia (Dolenc, 2003).

The 1991 census was the last Yugoslav census; the republics carried them out independently and also published the results separately. Compared to the 1981 census, the total number of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia (153,586) increased by 41,674 over ten years, which means about 4,200 immigrants per year. The relations between immigrants in terms of ethnicity remained roughly the same as in 1981. The shares of the three largest ethnic groups (Croats, Slovenes, and Serbs) decreased slightly, while the share of Muslims and Albanians increased. Compared to the 1981 census, the 1991 census shows changes in the structure of immigrants in relation to the original republic of the FYR. Croatia was pushed out of the first place by Bosnia and Herzegovina, while both shares are very similar (close to two-fifths), so that migrations from these two republics represent almost 80% of all migrations to Slovenia by 1991. The share of immigrants from Croatia, Serbia and Vojvodina decreased, doubled from Kosovo and Metohia, and the share of immigrants from Macedonia increased slightly, while the share of immigrants from Montenegro remained stable (Josipovič 2006, 247-248).


According to Dolenc (2003), this period was characterized by the following migration flows:

1. immigrants from less developed areas (Kosovo and Macedonia)
2. refugees from war-torn areas on the territory of the former Yugoslavia (mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina)
3. Undocumented economic migrants from Turkey, the Middle East and Asia

4. The Albanians of Kosovo and Macedonia dominated the flow from the territory of the former Yugoslavia when attempting to enter Western European countries via Slovenia.

Especially refugees and forced immigrants were the ones who drastically changed the demographic picture of Slovenia in this period. Because of the war struggles in their homeland, already in 1991, approximately 30,000 Croats fled to Slovenia (later most of them returned to Croatia); with the war spreading to Bosnia and Herzegovina, many Bosniaks followed the Croatian example (Vrečer, 2007).

Figure 2 - Immigrants in Slovenia by area of emigration within the FYR, in 1991.



Source: 1991 census, SURS<sup>8</sup>

The 2002 census marked a turning point in the history of Slovenia's censuses for several reasons:

- it was the first independent census after the independence of Slovenia, with a one-year delay;
- a new definition of population was used, which made comparisons retrospectively difficult (the statuses of the permanent and present population and the population with or without Slovenian citizenship changed);

<sup>8</sup> In Josipovič, D. (2006) *The effects of immigration in Slovenia after the Second World War*, p. 248.

- the regime of displaying and collecting census data had changed;
- immigration was shown only at the state level, which made it impossible to make a more detailed comparison for the area of the former FRY;
- because of the sensitivity of data on ethnicity, religion and language, direct monitoring of changes in the ethnic structure of immigrants according to the emigration area was prevented (Josipovič 2006, 248-249)

An increased share of Bosniaks is noticeable (compared to the 1991 data, they represent a two-thirds increase). The share of Albanians also increased (by half), and as well as immigrant Slovenes. The share of Croats decreased by more than a third, the share of Serbs by about a fifth and the share of Montenegrins by as much as half. The largest absolute decline is represented by Croats, and the largest number of immigrants is Slovenes, followed by Croats, Bosniaks, and Serbs. These four groups represent over three quarters of the 151,432 immigrants to Slovenia from the countries of the former Yugoslavia (ibid, 249-250).

Josipovič contends that it is clear from the census that Slovenia had a more or less stable ethnic composition since 1981 and that later changes were because of different ethnic definitions of the population. Although the number of migrations has continued to increase in recent decades, this does not particularly affect the ethnic structure. It is an intertwining of several processes: immigration, more or less covert assimilation, a crisis of ethnic identification and non-determination in the 2002 census, and also in stereotypical performances in the Slovenian public (ibid, 251).

Table 1 - Nationalities in Slovenia

| Nationality - in percentage |         |       |         |       |         |       |         |       |         |       |
|-----------------------------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|---------|-------|
| Year                        | 1953    |       | 1961    |       | 1971    |       | 1981    |       | 1991    |       |
| Slovene                     | 1415448 | 96.52 | 1552248 | 95.65 | 1624029 | 94.03 | 1712445 | 90.52 | 1727018 | 87.84 |
| Croatian                    | 17978   | 1.23  | 31429   | 1.97  | 42657   | 2.47  | 55625   | 2.94  | 54212   | 2.76  |
| Bosnian/Muslim              | 1617    | 0.11  | 465     | 0.03  | 3231    | 0.19  | 13425   | 0.71  | 26842   | 1.36  |
| Serbian                     | 11225   | 0.77  | 13609   | 0.86  | 20521   | 1.19  | 42182   | 2.23  | 47911   | 2.44  |
| Macedonian                  | 640     | 0.04  | 1009    | 0.06  | 1613    | 0.09  | 13425   | 0.71  | 26842   | 1.36  |
| Albanian                    | 169     | 0.01  | 282     | 0.02  | 128     | 0.07  | 1935    | 0.1   | 3629    | 0.18  |
| Montenegrin                 | 1356    | 0.09  | 1384    | 0.09  | 1978    | 0.11  | 3217    | 0.17  | 4396    | 0.22  |
| Total                       |         | 2.24  |         | 3.03  |         | 3.92  |         | 6.86  |         | 8.32  |

Source: Kobolt, 2002

Table 2 - Population census: Ethnic composition in % for 2002

| Ethnicity | Slovenes | Croats | Serbs | Bosna and Herzegovina |      | Monte negrins | Macedonia ns | Albanians | Hungarians | Italians | Roma |
|-----------|----------|--------|-------|-----------------------|------|---------------|--------------|-----------|------------|----------|------|
| %         | 83.06    | 1.81   | 1.98  | Bosniaks              | 1.10 | 0.14          | 0.20         | 0.31      | 0.32       | 0.11     | 0.17 |
|           |          |        |       | Muslims               | 0.53 |               |              |           |            |          |      |
|           |          |        |       | Bosnians              | 0.41 |               |              |           |            |          |      |

Source: Josipovič, 2007

As Bučar Ručman (2014) explains, migrations bring a certain dose of dynamics to the current proportions of ethnic identities. The space in which an established identity already exists is suddenly entered by individuals who are often not allowed by members of the majority to be included in the so-called “we” group or who openly attribute to them the affiliation of other less valuable collective identities. It is this Otherness that can later lead to xenophobia, discrimination and perceived inferiority of certain ethnic groups. The next subchapter will show us the public opinion held by of the majority population, i.e. Slovenes, with regards to immigration processes and migrants themselves.

### 3.2. Attitudes of the Slovenian population towards immigration processes

Somehow it is a normal occurrence that there are always those who are dearer to us, compared to those we do not like so much. The same can apply to the level of the state and its inhabitants. It could be said that in every country there are ethnic groups and migrants who are preferred by the domestic group and those who are not; those migrants who are desirable and those who are not as much. Somehow, it is a common opinion that migrants from economically more developed countries will always be better accepted in the country of immigration than those who come from less developed areas. In the example of Slovenia, according to the results of the research (Zavratnik et al., 2008), it turns out that in Slovenia the general opinion is that those migrants who are considered part of the highly skilled labor force, i.e. who can contribute to greater economic development and competitiveness of Slovenia in foreign markets, are the desirable ones. It is also noteworthy that Slovenian public opinion is mainly negative towards refugees, asylum seekers, and migrants from former Yugoslavia (Zavratnik, 2011). Let us briefly see what Slovenian public opinion was like about these migrants in the past. In the analysis, I will primarily use the results of Slovenian public opinion and similar analyzes conducted in past decades, referring to the book *Immigrants: Studies on immigration and integration into Slovenian society* (Komac 2007b). These analyses, and the results obtained will help further discussion, because they provide insight into the general Slovenian public opinion about immigrants from other republics of former Yugoslavia before independence. With these interpretations, I can compare the results and answers given in the empirical part of the dissertation.

As Komac (2007b, 47) explains, members of other nations were treated as newcomers who should adapt to life in Slovenia as soon as possible, learn Slovene, and use it in public. Different performance and behavior in public were seen as “Southern” macho performance, perhaps even as provocation. In a certain period, there was an opinion that immigrants endangered the Slovenian nation. The results of empirical research conducted in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s demonstrate the negative attitude of Slovenes towards the immigration of workers from other republics. As Komac further shows (ibid), in the survey of Slovenian public opinion conducted

in 1970/71, i.e. before the start of the great immigration wave, Slovenes were asked whether immigration from other republics to Slovenia was good, and the following answers were obtained. The original question was: “In recent years, more and more people from other republics work in Slovenia. Do you think this is mostly good or bad?”

Table 3 – Attitudes towards migrations (1970/71)

|                             | Number | %    | %    |
|-----------------------------|--------|------|------|
| <b>Mostly good</b>          | 600    | 28.6 | 28.7 |
| <b>Depends on situation</b> | 411    | 19.6 | 19.7 |
| <b>Mostly bad</b>           | 892    | 42   | 42.7 |
| <b>Unknown</b>              | 188    | 9    | 9    |
| <b>Total</b>                | 2.091  | 99.6 | 100  |
| <b>Without answer</b>       | 9      | 0.4  |      |
| <b>Total</b>                | 2.100  | 100  |      |

Source: (Omerzu quoted in Komac 2007b, 47) 9

Only a third of respondents thought that immigration is mainly good from an economic point of view because these migrants did jobs that Slovenes did not want to do, while the rest of the respondents stated that migrants take jobs away from Slovenes, that they are lazy, and that Slovenes always have problems with them. The next question asked why respondents thought immigration is good.

<sup>9</sup> Novodobne narodnostne skupnosti. Pregled vprašanj, ki so bila postavljena v raziskavi SJM v letih 1970–1998. (Modern ethnic communities. An overview of the questions raised in the SJM survey in 1970–1998.) Editor: M. Omerzu, Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov. Ljubljana: FDV(2001, 1)

Table 4 – Why is immigration good? (1970/71)

|                                                             | Number | %    | %    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------|--------|------|------|
| There is a shortage of unskilled workers                    | 260    | 12.4 | 47.4 |
| They do everything                                          | 92     | 4.4  | 16.8 |
| It is good for our development                              | 21     | 1.0  | 3.8  |
| They learn from us                                          | 38     | 1.8  | 6.9  |
| They do not have work at home                               | 30     | 1.4  | 5.5  |
| Better here than abroad                                     | 7      | 0.3  | 1.3  |
| Nations are getting closer                                  | 40     | 1.9  | 7.3  |
| We must not be reserved                                     | 8      | 0.4  | 1.5  |
| Other                                                       | 52     | 2.5  | 9.5  |
| Total                                                       | 548    | 26.1 | 100  |
| No answer                                                   | 52     | 2.5  |      |
| In Table 1 he replied it was bad                            | 892    | 42.5 |      |
| In Table 1 he answered it depends; I don't know, no answer. | 608    | 28.9 |      |
| Total                                                       | 1,552  | 73.9 |      |
| Total                                                       | 2,100  | 100  |      |

Source: (ibid, 48)

Likewise, the following question sought reasons Slovenes think immigration was bad for their country.

Table 5 – Why is immigration bad? (1970/71)

|                                                                | Number | %    | %    |
|----------------------------------------------------------------|--------|------|------|
| There are enough Slovenes                                      | 418    | 19.9 | 48.7 |
| It's at our expense                                            | 191    | 9.1  | 22.3 |
| They are not skilled                                           | 23     | 1.1  | 2.7  |
| They do not like to work and are lazy                          | 49     | 2.3  | 5.7  |
| There are annoyances with them                                 | 57     | 2.7  | 6.6  |
| Bad for Slovenes                                               | 61     | 2.9  | 7.1  |
| They have work at home                                         | 34     | 1.6  | 4.0  |
| It is difficult for them to live here                          | 6      | 0.3  | 0.7  |
| Each republic should employ its own workers                    | 19     | 0.9  | 2.2  |
| Total                                                          | 858    | 40.9 | 100  |
| Does not want to say why                                       | 34     | 1.6  |      |
| In Table 1 he replied it was good                              | 600    | 28.6 |      |
| In Table 1 he answered with as ever?; I don't know, no answer. | 608    | 28,9 |      |
| Total                                                          | 1,242  | 59.1 |      |
| Total                                                          | 2,100  | 100  |      |

Source: (ibid, 48)

The results show that, besides jobs, some elements of national identity are also endangered - primarily the Slovene language. Still, Komac stresses that the threat to language depends on the consistency of its use in private and public life, and also in communication with immigrant populations. “If members of the majority nation have adapted themselves to the language of the incoming population, this cannot be blamed on immigrant communities. However, the newcomers learned the language of the environment only slowly, many with a great deal of repulsion, which the Slovenes especially resented” (Komac 2007b, 50).

Table 6 – Attitudes towards migrations from FYR (1972)

|                                                                                                                                          |   | <b>1–severely<br/>threatens</b> | <b>2 –<br/>threatens</b> | <b>3 –<br/>does not know,<br/>undecided</b> | <b>4 –<br/>does not<br/>threaten</b> | <b>5 –<br/>does not<br/>threaten at<br/>all</b> | <b>Middle<br/>value</b> |
|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---------------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|
| <b>Slovenians always<br/>talk to members of<br/>other Yugoslav<br/>nations in their<br/>language.</b>                                    | N | 517                             | 830                      | 187                                         | 444                                  | 55                                              | 2.36                    |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 25.4                            | 40.8                     | 92                                          | 21.8                                 | 2.7                                             |                         |
| <b>Slovenians do too<br/>little to make<br/>Slovenian<br/>books translated<br/>into the languages<br/>of other Yugoslav<br/>nations.</b> | N | 222                             | 689                      | 587                                         | 457                                  | 78                                              | 2.74                    |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 10.9                            | 33.9                     | 28.9                                        | 22                                   | 3.8                                             |                         |
| <b>Slovenes in federal<br/>bodies (Assembly)<br/>do not use Slovene.</b>                                                                 | N | 482                             | 821                      | 319                                         | 373                                  | 38                                              | 2.34                    |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 23.7                            | 40.4                     | 15.7                                        | 18.3                                 | 1.9                                             |                         |
| <b>Slovenes learn other<br/>Yugoslav languages<br/>but<br/>others do not learn<br/>Slovene.</b>                                          | N | 555                             | 889                      | 218                                         | 330                                  | 41                                              | 2.22                    |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 27.3                            | 43.7                     | 10.7                                        | 16.2                                 | 2.0                                             |                         |
| <b>Only Serbo-Croatian<br/>is used in the<br/>Yugoslav People's<br/>Army</b>                                                             | N | 380                             | 73                       | 309                                         | 53                                   | 74                                              | 2.6                     |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 18.7                            | 36.2                     | 15.2                                        | 26.3                                 | 3.6                                             |                         |
| <b>Workers from other<br/>republics and<br/>regions in Slovenia<br/>do not learn<br/>Slovenian.</b>                                      | N | 562                             | 909                      | 244                                         | 288                                  | 30                                              | 2.17                    |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 27.6                            | 44.7                     | 12.0                                        | 14.2                                 | 1.5                                             |                         |
| <b>Slovenians do not<br/>care enough about<br/>their language,<br/>we use foreign and<br/>distorted terms.</b>                           | N | 806                             | 931                      | 167                                         | 112                                  | 17                                              | 1.82                    |
|                                                                                                                                          | % | 39.6                            | 45.8                     | 8.2                                         | 5.5                                  | 0.8                                             |                         |

Source: (ibid, 49)

In the early 1980s, a severe economic crisis knocked on Yugoslavia's door. The problem of difficult employment was also reflected in the attitudes of respondents towards immigration and immigrants in Slovenia (ibid, 50). The question respondents were asked was: "Should employment be provided in Slovenia in the future for the workers from other republics or not?"

Table 7 – Attitudes about employment of workers from FYR in Slovenia (1980/81)

|                                        | Number | %    |
|----------------------------------------|--------|------|
| No                                     | 99     | 48.6 |
| Yes                                    | 592    | 28.9 |
| Do not know, undecided, without answer | 462    | 22.5 |
| Total                                  | 2,049  | 100  |

Source: (ibid, 51)

Respondants were also asked how workers from other republics and provinces that have been in Slovenia for a long time, should act in the future.<sup>10</sup>

Table 8: How should workers from FYR in Slovenia act in the future (1983)

|                                                                         | Number | %    |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------|------|
| Let them learn the Slovene language and habits                          | 177    | 8.6  |
| Let them keep their language and habits and live for themselves         | 37     | 1.8  |
| Let them maintain their language and habits while adapting              | 1467   | 71.0 |
| Let them work here only for a short time, and then let them return home | 20     | 9.9  |
| Other                                                                   | 15     | 0.7  |
| Do not know, undecided, do not care                                     | 166    | 8.0  |
| Total                                                                   | 2,067  | 100  |

Source: (ibid, 52)

A similar question was asked three years later, in 1986, and then again in 1988, asking respondents to explain how workers from other republics who have been living for a long time in Slovenia should behave.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>10</sup> Slovenian public opinion, 1983

<sup>11</sup> Slovenian public opinion, 1986

Table 9: How should workers from FYR in Slovenia act in the future (1986)

|                                                                  | Number       | %          |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------|------------|
| Let them learn the Slovene language and habits                   | 157          | 7.7        |
| Let them keep their language and habits and live for themselves  | 56           | 2.7        |
| After the period of stay in Slovenia, they should return home    | 80           | 3.9        |
| They should learn the Slovenian language and adapt to each other | 1,288        | 63.1       |
| They need to be able to go to school in their own language       | 288          | 14.1       |
| Do not know, undecided                                           | 173          | 8.5        |
| <b>Total</b>                                                     | <b>2,042</b> | <b>100</b> |

Source: (ibid, 52)

Table 10: How should workers from FYR in Slovenia act in the future (1988)

|                                                                      | Number     | %          |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------|------------|------------|
| Let them abandon their culture and language and accept Slovene       | 174        | 8.4        |
| Let them preserve their culture and language and live for themselves | 41         | 2.0        |
| After the period of stay in Slovenia, they should return home        | 174        | 8.4        |
| They should learn the Slovenian language and adapt to each other     | 126        | 61         |
| They must be able to attend school in their own language             | 27         | 13.3       |
| Do not know, undecided                                               | 146        | 7.0        |
| <b>Total</b>                                                         | <b>207</b> | <b>100</b> |

Source: (ibid, 53)

It is more than clear from all the research in the 1980s that the answers of the respondents are negative towards immigrants from other countries of Yugoslavia. This perception is in line with the vision of ownership of the Slovene state described in the introductory pages of this text: Slovenia is a state of the Slovene nation (“ethnic” Slovenes) and two traditional minorities, Italian and Hungarian, to which an appropriate set of “compensatory” rights is given. Other “Non-Slovenes” should adapt to life in the Slovene environment, learn the Slovene language, and use it in everyday life in public (Komac 2007b, 52).


Also interesting is a survey from 1990, in which respondents were asked which rights the constitution should recognize for indigenous national minorities in Slovenia, and which for ethnic groups who immigrated to Slovenia (Croats, Serbs, Albanians, Muslims...). From the obtained results, the Slovenian environment strictly distinguishes between the set of “special”

rights that members of individual minority categories are supposed to enjoy, while the set of special minority rights for members of “classical” minorities does not seem questionable, they are highly selective in “granting” rights to immigrant communities. They reject anything that goes beyond the realm of the private and creation within their own ethnic group (ibid, 53-54).

Toš (1999) concludes that “there is an increasingly pronounced distinction between the different, the other and the foreign. This takes on a negative connotation in the expression of national intolerance, in the denial of equal human rights in the environment and in individual cases even in aggressive nationalism” (Toš 1999, 59).

Likewise, following the results from Slovene public opinion from 1992, when asked who threatened Slovenian security the most, most of the respondents felt that immigrants from the FYR were the biggest threat, and among nationalities, Croats took the first place.


Figure 3 - Who threatens Slovenian security?



Source: Toš, 1999 quoted in Kobolt 2002, 30-31

In the same years, respondents were also asked how they would describe the relations between members of different nations living in Slovenia. Most of the respondents felt relations were neither good nor bad (47%), while 26% of them agreed that relations were good. Only 2% thought that the relations were really bad, while 13% of the respondents felt that relations between different nations living in Slovenia were bad.

Figure 4 - How are the relations between members of different nationalities living in Slovenia?



Source: Toš, 1999 quoted in Kobolt 2002, 30-31

When asked about their willingness to connect with members of other nationalities, even though in the survey above they were represented as the biggest threat, most of the Slovenes would still rather have Croatians for work colleagues or friends, than for example Serbs or Muslims.

Table 11 - Willingness to connect with members of other nationalities (in %, data for 1992/1993)

| Nationality | Marriage | Friendship | Neighborhood / good working relations | As little as possible / avoidance |
|-------------|----------|------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| Croatian    | 4.7      | 21.8       | 32.0/18.5                             | 19.9/ 15.0                        |
| Serbian     | 2.7      | 13.1       | 18.4/18.5                             | 19.9/ 15.0                        |
| Muslim      | 3.1      | 14.9       | 21.0/22.5                             | 16.0/ 7.8                         |

Source: Toš 1999, 202

In defining the attitudes of Slovenes towards immigrants in the period from 1991 to 1994, in 1991 most of the respondents had neutral attitudes towards the migrants (45%), while the negative attitudes towards them were 29.7%. Already in the next year, there was a decline in neutral and positive attitudes, while the percentage of negative attitudes increased to 42.5%. In the next two years, the increase in negative attitudes towards the migrants was even higher.


Table 12 - Defining the attitudes of Slovenes towards immigrants (in %) (1994)

| Year | Negative | Positive | Neutral |
|------|----------|----------|---------|
| 1991 | 29.7     | 22.5     | 45.6    |
| 1992 | 42.5     | 14.2     | 43.2    |
| 1993 | 43.4     | 13.2     | 33.4    |
| 1994 | 52.8     | 9.4      | 37.8    |

Source: Mlinar 1994, 817

When asked what groups of people Slovenes did not want for their neighbors, the attitudes were quite different. While most of the respondents (23%) did not want drug addicts to be their neighbors, 20% of them did not want to live next to Roma, while 19% did not want to have people from former Yugoslavia in their neighborhood. Some respondents did not want to see Muslims as their neighbors (17%), and 21% did not want to live next to people with HIV.

Figure 5 - What groups of people do you not want as neighbors?



Source: Toš 1999, 272<sup>12</sup>

Kobolt (2002, 33), who compared the above results with other countries, concludes that the results show the (in)tolerance of Slovenes and a high index of ethnocentrism and xenophobia compared to other countries. She points out that it is a matter of discrimination against Others<sup>13</sup> (according to gender, race, language, statehood, etc.) and discrimination against Otherness (way of life, religious beliefs, sexual orientation, etc).

If we look at recent Slovenian history, it turns out that public opinion has changed little. As part of the research "Migration, integration and multiculturalism - contextualizations of contemporary migration through public opinion" (Zavratnik et al., 2008), on a representative sample of 838 respondents, it is concluded that integrating migrants into the labor market elicits at least partial discomfort and a sense of threat, and that, given the geographical location of migrants, respondents wish to restrict migration. Only immigration from the old EU Member States should be maintained at the same level. While on the one hand they believe that the immigration of Slovenes from abroad, as well as ethnically and culturally equal should be encouraged, they

<sup>12</sup> Data for 1992.

<sup>13</sup> In Slovene: „drugi“ and „drugačni“

believe that the immigration policy for asylum seekers or migrants from third countries should be stricter and more restrictive. However, it is interesting that the respondents supported the claim that Slovenia should strive for an open, tolerant and multicultural society and that migrants contribute to the co-creation of a multicultural environment.

## 4. What is nationalism?

As an introduction to the theory of everyday nationalism, this chapter will briefly explain the origin of nationalism and characterize it. It is believed that the starting point of the emergence and development of nationalism was the French Revolution of 1789, with the idea that legitimizes the will of the nation as a form of government. Already in the next century, nationalism gained in importance and spread to other parts of Europe and later the world. It is important to emphasize that the ideas and movements that took place in parallel with the breakthrough of nationalism were fundamentally different from the original ideas of the French and American<sup>14</sup> revolutions (Gellner 1998, 8). Nationalism can be described as a penetrating ideology that captures large numbers of people and determines their political behavior. It can be seen as a kind of “loyalty” that includes the individual in the community, as a political resource for the use of mobilizing individuals and pursuing common interests, or as an ideological myth, aimed at indecisive individuals seeking simple solutions to more complex situations (Brown 2000, 1-2). Furthermore, Brown concludes that the only authentic nationalism or the right one, is ethnic nationalism, because ethnic groups represent a commune composed of common ancestors connected by the same origin: language, religion, appearance or the same origin of residence (ibid, 6). It is a community or a nation, which is recognized based on certain collective characteristics. Still, it is important to emphasize that nationalism cannot exist without the nation. Smith concludes that “nationalism is an ideology that puts the nation at the center of its interest and seeks to contribute to the nation’s well-being” (Smith 2005, 19). The goals in the name of which nationalism seeks to contribute to national prosperity are national autonomy, national identity, and national unity (ibid).

The concept of “nation” has undergone many changes in its history. The original approaches described a nation based on a natural community made up of individuals who feel attached and belonging to that community (Brown 2000, 6). When it comes to the study of nationalism, however, it is important to highlight the difference between ethnic group and nation, because ethnic group does not have political labels and does not include public culture and its own territory. A nation, in contrast, must inhabit its own homeland, develop a public culture and have,

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<sup>14</sup> When it comes to nationalism, the American Revolution is actually considered a precursor to the French Revolution.

or desire, a certain degree of self-determination (Smith, 2005). For a particular ethnic group to be considered a nation, it must also be politically aware and culturally grounded. For this reason it can be concluded that nationalism is at the same time both a cultural and political term, as well as a social movement (In der Maur 1991, 11; Wehler 2005, 53). To put it succinctly, nationalism is “an ideological movement to achieve and maintain the independence, unity and identity of the population, which some of its members consider being a potential or actual nation” (Smith 2005, 19).

Relying on the works of Miroslav Hroch, Wehler concludes that there are three typical stages in the development of nationalism and nation-building. The first phase is characterized as a historical, literary and artistic expression of intellectuals, who emphasize the importance of language, art and culture with the highlight on the subject “national.” In the second phase the original intellectuals or elites develop nationalism ensured by sympathizers of civic descent; while in the third phase the notions of nationalism grow gradually and continuously, thus finally mobilizing mass movements (Wehler, 2005). Among Slovenian scholars, both Mandelc (2011, 76) and Korošec (1999, 24-25) agree that roughly all authors could be divided into those who understand nationalism as: - progressive - positive social phenomenon; as well as regressive - a negative social phenomenon, and with this division they can create some kind of “dichotomy”. For nations that have lived or are still living under the colonial yoke or in a state of national oppression at all, nationalism can be a progressive social phenomenon, which is hardly to be separated from the useful national interest, after having set itself to aim for political, and in many senses also social liberation. Of course, even in such societies, the content of nationalism changes, so that at a certain stage of its development it can turn into a regressive social phenomenon, which is essentially a special form of manipulating nationality. Here, it is a so-called negative nationalism, by which the term denotes collective longing and aggression, excessive intolerance of the interests of one nation (usually one’s own) over the interests of another nation. In the literature and political practice, the negative notion of nationalism refers to any overemphasized exposure to the rights and values of one’s own nation, at the expense of the rights and even the existences of other nations or peoples. Repressive nationalism is alien to the idea that equality and freedom of nations can be one of the important conditions for the unhindered creation of one’s own nation (Korošec 1999, 24-25).

In short, nationalism can be reduced to two primary phenomena: the emergence of nations and nation-states, and to the ideological apparatus that supports these phenomena and thus makes them existing. It is based on elements such as culture, language, ethnography and various customs, as well as on symbolism and national myths. Nationalism functions as an ideology by which we can experience ourselves as part of a particular group or nation and thus feel a sense of belonging. By recognizing certain similarities, or differences with someone, the process of identification occurs. Belonging to a certain community will further confirm and construct this process, but, it is important to emphasize that this process is never final. Giddens (1991, 365) concludes that concepts such as people, nation, and nationalism are too equated, and that defining them is therefore very problematic and even contradictory. For this reason, he stresses that a nation must be defined as a state with a single administrative authority over its sovereignty, while nationalism is a psychological phenomenon, such as belonging to a set of symbols and beliefs with pronounced community ties between members of the political order. From all this it can be concluded that nationalism is a discursive force that is primarily based on peoples and through it is identified and established, and that it is closely linked to political actors and elites, who use it in forming and maintaining a certain community of people. Nationalism is an ideological movement that was formed in the past, is maintained in the present, and there is a great assumption that it will exist in the future as well.

There are many types of nationalism, which are dealt with by different authors, but without delving too far into this issue, the focus will be on newer theories of nationalism, i.e. the theory of banal and everyday nationalism and their connection with the constructivist approach to the study of nationalism.

## 5. Constructivism, nationalism and national identity

After a brief description of nations and nationalism itself, for the purposes of this research, a constructivist approach to understanding nationalism will be adopted. The constructivist approach to the study of nations emerges in response to the primordial, which was, until the 19th century, the dominant approach in researching nationalism. While primordialists primarily advocate the concept of nation through the prism of ethnicity and belonging to a particular geographical area, where there is a certain historically connected community of people who speak the same language, constructivists consider nations and nationalism to be the product of the modern state, secularism, capitalism, bureaucracy, and political elites.

So, where does the national identity fit in here? According to Smith (2005), national identity is the constant reproduction of certain myths, symbols and traditions associated with the heritage of a particular people, and the individual's identification with them. Edvard Shills (1957), for example, felt that kinship is the foundation of nationhood, emphasizing the role of so-called *Gemeinschaft* (community), which emphasizes the role of the family. The core of national and ethnic identity, according to Van Den Berghe's social biological perspective, is ethnicity, which is completely biologically conditioned and arises from the genetic propensity to kinship selection. Other ethnic group features are of secondary importance. (Bandov 2009, 30)

On the other hand, constructivists consider national identity to be a modern and artificial phenomenon, while neglecting the role of ethnicity, common ancestors or language. They believe that nations and nationalism are a construct of modernity and emerged as such in the second half of the nineteenth century, as a result of social construction produced by political elites. It is crucial to note that there have been nationalist theorist in the past, such as Hegel and Rousseau, who saw national states as a political rather than a cultural structure. (H. Birch 1989) For example, „Hegel viewed Napoleonic Empire to be only one more step in human growth, to be followed by another, presumably more advanced stage“ (H. Birch 1989, 21-22). Rousseau also proposed that political societies should have their own institutions of administration, and that the creation of an ideal political society should be based on some shared links of origin, interest, or convention, rather than natural growth or spontaneous combination. (ibid, 14-15)

The literature on national identity distinguishes between a political and a cultural conceptualization of the nation, or between a “Western” and “Eastern” idea, and each of them constructs a different relationship between state and nation (Hansen 1996, 475).

The German historian and nationalism specialist, Peter Alter, divides them into the “cultural nation” (*Kulturnation*) and “political nation” (*Staatsnation*), whereby the political nation clings to the idea of collective and individual self-determination and proceeds from the free will of the individual and his personal belonging to the nation, while cultural nationalism is based on the ethno-cultural principle, which emphasizes the importance of the language and traditions of one’s own culture. It highlights the “spirit of community contained in the cultural nation which is based on a seemingly objective criterion of common heritage and language, a territory in which it resides, religion, customs and history” (Alter quoted in Rizman 1991, 230).

A similar division can be seen in Hans Kohn’s (1944) idea of ethnic and civic citizenship, wherein civic citizenship represents a rational and liberal way of thinking based on respect of human rights and personal freedoms, while ethnic citizenship represents ethnocentric, religious and mystical mindset based on common language, tradition, and kinship connection. (Tamir 2019)

Civic citizenship/political nation is characteristic of liberal Western states, while ethnic citizenship/cultural nation is characteristic of Eastern states focused on language, culture and ethnicity, and thus primitive, motivated by blood, territory, emotions and belonging (Tamir 2019). Bieber (2015, 877) concludes that in most of Central and Eastern Europe one can observe centripetal identity dynamics, which he describes as identity packages, where language and/or religion are closely linked to a particular nation, often used as proxies for national identity.

Hrotch (1996) calls this the “new nationalism” that characterized the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1980s and 1990s, and described the collective mentality, which, similar to traditional national movements, prioritized the interests and ideals of one’s own nation over all other. Civic nationalism, on the other hand, is defined as a manifestation of more sophisticated political and moral growth (Kohn 1944 in Tamir 2019).

Nielsen (1996, 47) explains that the civic nationalism is in particular not only political but also a cultural nationalism, as well as an ethnic one is, because national identity is defined also through a cultural component.

Ethnic nationalism, as all nationalisms, is cultural, but not all cultural nationalism are ethnic. Cultural nationalism defines the nation in terms of a common encompassing culture. But the culture can be, and typically is in the West, a liberal democratic culture. The aim of the nationalist movement is to protect, and to ensure the flourishing of the culture of the nation that nationalist movement represents. Where the nation has a state, that state will in certain respects privilege that culture, though, if it is a liberal democracy, it will only do so in ways that protect the rights of its minorities and indeed protect rights across the board. (Nielsen 1996, 48)

If we go back to the theories of primordialism and constructivism, it should be taken into account that constructivists look primarily at the role of the state in nation-building, that is, the role of the political elites and political institutions in construction nations and national identities (Vucetic & Hopf, 2019) but on the other hand, they neglect the influence of the masses in creating national identities. For, as much as constructivism emphasizes the social construction of reality and thus the nation, it primarily emphasizes the role of the state and state institutions, neglecting the role of the people, the so-called bottom-up approach. National identity cannot be created only by political institutions, as it largely depends on those „Others“, who exist precisely to emphasize differences and establish ‘our’ national identity. Only in this way can one see himself as a part of a national group. As Goode (2020) stresses, constructivist approach can only partially explain the success or failure of state-led nationalisms as forms of legitimation, as it needs to understand not only the institutional approach but also citizens’ informal, everyday practices.

Although everyday nationalism is a relatively new approach to the study of nationalism, so there is not too much literature available, some scholars (Goode & Stroup 2015, Vucetic & Hopf 2020, Goode 2020) argue that in the comparative study of nationalism, national identities, and ethnic politics, the ‘everyday nationalism’ as an approach is both valuable and required for refining existing constructivist approaches. „Everyday nationalism promises to address the gap between constructivist theory and the methodological individualism of existing studies. This approach proceeds from ethnographic observation and utilizes reliant methods on observing societal interaction or relational meaning making for verification”(Goode & Stroup 2015, 1). As they further explain, „while the constructivist turn produced useful insights about the nature of

ethnicity, it remains vulnerable to blind spots and shortcomings often associated with the study of nationalism and ethnic politics” (ibid, 3). “Precisely the growing literature on 'everyday nationalism' promises to add value to the social constructivist study of nationalism and ethno-nationalism by foregrounding practices and interpretivist methodologies” (Vucetic and Hopf 2020, 1). Goode and Stroup argue that, in order to put the masses back into the picture, constructivist approaches would benefit from further development of the ‘everyday nationalism’ approach. (Goode & Stroup 2015, 2)

Vucetic and Hopf (2020, 2), following Goode's and Stroup's (2015) research on everyday nationalism, conclude that this approach is important because:

- 1) „it allows constructivist to steer clear of the twin pitfalls of essentialism and reification and stay true to their intersubjective ontology;
- 2) it enables new accounts of 'how the vast majority of people conceive of, and interact with, ethnic or national identities';
- 3) it links the above to 'large-scale social and political processes, such as the sources of authoritarian legitimacy or the ethnicization of economic development';
- 4) it provides new insight into 'the repertoires available to elites' and also 'why citizens respond to certain varieties of ethnic cues rather than others (religious, educational);
- 5) it provides new insight into 'the repertoires available to elites' and also 'why citizens respond to certain varieties of ethnic cues rather than others (religious, educational);
- 6) it facilitates novel cross-case comparisons since it helps us observe gaps and overlaps in ethnic vs nonethnic, market vs nonmarket or domestic vs transnational practices (to use but three binaries circulating in the literature on nationhood and ethnicity); and
- 7) it enables new accounts of how identities change“.

For this reason it can be concluded that everyday nationalism is an excellent upgrade to constructivism because „it explores not only how the masses respond to elite manipulation and cues, but also how the masses elaborate, (re)produce, or challenge national identity categories“ (ibid). As they further state, following Brubaker and Billig, everyday nationalism focuses on

„routine, taken-for-granted habits and symbols of social life that lie beyond the authority, attention, or culture of politicians, government mandarins, and other establishment figures“ (ibid). Also, scholars dealing with the theory of everyday nationalism (see Skey 2009; 2011, Antonsich 2015) believe that everyday nationalism developed in response to an earlier modernist approach to the study of nationalism, that is, banal nationalism. Let us see in the following subchapter what banal nationalism is, how it developed and what its primary characteristics are.

## 5.1. Banal nationalism

Amongst the more prominent theories of nationalism is Michael Billig's definition of banal nationalism, which presumes that nationalism cannot be regarded as something that comes and goes but explains that the nation is preached daily in the lives of its adherents (1995, 8). According to Özkirimli, "Billig's influential *Banal nationalism* can be considered as the first study that provides a systematic analysis of the reproduction of nationalism." (Özkirimli 2000, 199) In his work, Billig shows that in every country there is continual "flagging", or reminding of nationhood, meaning that the established nations can only be those states that have confidence in their own continuity. Hence, he states that it is precisely the nationhood which is the provider of "a continual background for political discourses, for cultural products, and even for the structuring of newspapers" (Billig 1995, 8), further clarifying different ways in which the citizenry is daily reminded where their place is in a world full of different nations (ibid). However, this reminding is so familiar and so continual, that it is not consciously to be seen or registered as reminding or, as he further explains it: "The metonymic image of banal nationalism is not a flag which is being consciously waved with fervent passion; it is the flag hanging unnoticed on the public building" (Billig 1995, 8). As Özkirimli interprets it, the symbols of nationhood, such as coins, banknotes, and stamps become a part of our daily lives, turning the background space into a national space (Özkirimli 2000, 200). Billig points out that nationalism does not disappear when the nation gains a political roof: instead, it becomes absorbed into the environment of the established homeland (Billig 1995, 41).

This viewpoint holds that nationalism is the property of "others," namely the peripheral states that have yet to complete their nation-building processes, rather than "ours," the Western nation-

states. (ibid) If we personify this thesis on the territory of the former Yugoslavia, it is more than evident that nationalism is becoming a primary feature of those “Eastern” neighbors, who can in no way match “us Westerners”. The very notion of the hypothetical West as a circle of civilization to which all countries aspire, can in fact be characterized with banality, because every country, including those “established Western” ones, have their own state nationalism. But what is important to emphasize is that in our eyes, the nationalism of our state and people becomes personified with patriotism or love for one’s homeland and thus positive, while nationalism is always understood in a negative context.

In his work on banal nationalism, Billig follows Ernest Gellner, one of the representatives of the constructivist school, who defines nationalism as “the political principle according to which political and national units must be matched” (Gellner 1998, 20). According to Gellner, nationalism seems to come to light only in a social environment, where the existence of the state has already been emphatically accepted as something self-evident. Even though, with nationalism, their opinions slightly differ, following Billig’s explanation that only the developing nations need nationalism, while Gellner argues that nationalism only exist in the environment, where the nation’s existence was already accepted, Gellner still explains that the existence of politically centralized units and the moral and political climate in which such centralized units are held to be self-explanatory and considered norms is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for nationalism (Gellner 1998, 24-25). As he further highlights, there are two criteria for becoming a part of a nation:

- a) Only if two people share the same culture, which is defined as a system of ideas, signs, relationship, and ways of behaving and communicating, they belong to the same nation.
- b) Two people belong to the same nation only if they recognize each other as a member of the same nation. Man creates nations, while nations are the artifacts of human beliefs, loyalty, and solidarity. (Gellner 1998, 24-25)

A mere group of people (residents of a particular territory or a member of a particular speaking area) becomes a nation if and only if members of a group firmly recognize one another’s common rights and duties based on their shared affiliation. They are transformed into a nation by

their mutual recognition for the like-minded people who share similar characteristic and views, and not by the other commonalities that separate this category from non-members, whatever their characteristics are (Gellner 1998, 27). A similar explanation is given by Michael Hetcher, describing nationalism as a “collective action designed to render the boundaries of the nation, a territorially concentrated and culturally distinctive solidary group, congruent with those of its governance unit, the agency responsible for providing the bulk of public goods within the nation’s territory” (Hetcher 2000, 7). According to Eric Hobsbawm, nationalism or a national question “is a social phenomenon that anchored in the collective consciousness at a time of transformation and modernization of political structures in nineteenth-century Europe. At its origin, it is so closely linked to the social phenomena of modernization that it is most marked by the industrialization of labor.” (Hobsbawm 2000, 15) Hobsbawm notes that nationalism emerged during a period of rapid change in social relations when old traditions fail to respond to new challenges. Nationalism manages to offer its replacement. As he further explains, “new traditions emerged simply because the old ones could not be adapted” (Hobsbawm 1989, 5). For this reason, he introduces the concept of invented traditions, pointing out that, with the emergence of the national state, one needed to invent not only national symbols as flags, anthems, and emblems but also to invent a historical continuity (Hobsbawm, 1989). Resulting from this, invented traditions are “a process of formalization and ritualization characterized by reference to the past, though only through the imposition of repetition” (ibid, 4). They can be formulated “as answers to some new situation, that takes the form of referring to old situations or introducing their own past through quasi-obligatory repetition” (ibid, 2). In this sense, invented traditions originate from a sense of identification with the community and/or institutions that represent, express, or symbolize it as a nation, and in most situations where people are aware of their citizenship as such remain and are associated with symbols and semi-ritual and ritualized practices (such as elections), most of which are historically new and invented like flags, images, ceremonies, and music (Hobsbawm and Ranger 2003, 11-12). Similarly, Benedict Anderson describes nations as “imagined political communities, conceived of as inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1990, 17). It was conceived because even the smallest nation’s citizens will never meet or hear about the majority of their country’s citizens, but the image of their community lives on in each individual’s imagination (ibid).

According to this view, nationalism can be understood if we associate it, “not with conscious political ideologies, but with the great cultural systems that preceded it, from which it originated, and against which it originated” (Anderson 1990, 20). If nationalism is characterized as an imagined political community in which are members, although they do not know each other, connected by certain cultural particles and symbols needed to form a nation, the question remains what their role is. Are they just passive consumers of nationalism imposed on them by the state and the state apparatus tacitly offered by banal symbols such as hanging flags on the facades of buildings, postcards with pictures of national beauties, or coins with engraved characters of national heroes? Do people as a nation actually have any role in creating nationalism and consequently national identity? And that is where banal nationalism as a direction fails. Many theorists of everyday nationalism approach agree that Billig’s nationalism is focused primarily on the influence of the state, i.e. on the top-down approach, while ignoring the influence of bottom-up approval, i.e. the influence of people (see Skey 2009, Antonsich 2015, and more). For this reason, the focus of this doctoral dissertation is on the everyday nationalism concept, because through it, one can gain an insight into both the top-down and bottom-up approach, that is, to see how both states and people create nationhood on a daily basis.

## **5.2. Everyday Nationalism**

It was from Billig’s theory of banal nationalism that a new direction developed, called everyday nationalism. Everyday nationalism, as a derivate of banal nationalism, day by day gains in importance. In the last twenty years, there are more and more authors using this concept in their research (see Skey 2011, Edensor 2002, Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, Knott 2015, and more) focusing especially on the term “everyday” and its interconnection with nationalism. In these studies, everyday is described as “a place, not spatially or temporally circumscribed, but imperfectly delineated by the individuals who people it” (Fox & Jones 2013, 396).

Most people have daily experiences and routines that are so similar that they actually become common. From Billig’s reading of a nation’s newspaper in a common language, which results in an imaginary sense of community, to everyday mundane praxis from displaying national

symbols such as coats of arms in school buildings, flags on building facades, to chanting, national territory, and national beauties in popular culture. And it is here that the very core and difference of everyday nationalism versus the banal is seen. In everyday nationalism, people themselves play a major role, creating and transmitting the discourse of nationality from generation to generation in everyday life. But just living that day-to-day life, we do not realize how much the banality of everyday life can actually play a significant role in creating a national identity.

Unlike banal nationalism, which has a tendency to overlook a lot of other components of nationalism, and “tends to treat people as being passively and unconsciously exposed to banal national ‘flagging’ orchestrated from above, often failing to discuss how individuals daily, actively, and often deliberately ‘make’ nationhood” (Rossetto quoted in Antonisch 2015, 2), everyday nationalism mostly focuses on the “agency of ordinary people, as opposed to elites, as the co-constituents, participants, and consumers of national symbols, rituals, and identities” (Knott 2015a, 1). Most scholars agree that the problem of banal nationalism is that the focus is primarily on the top-down approach, i.e. the role of the state, while neglecting the influence of people and individuals on the spread of nationalism in everyday life (Miller-Idriss & Rothenberg, 2012; Bonikowski, 2016). Still, there is no doubt that in every form of nationalism, including everyday nationalism, the state has a substantial role to play.

As Fox and Miller-Idriss explain, to make a nation, the people first need to become national. One can achieve that “through the promotion of standardized languages, national (and nationalist) educational curricula, military conscription and taxation—and the more nefarious methods of war, forced assimilation, expulsion, and extermination—the nation, or people, are made one with their state” (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008, 536-537). Precisely for this reason when researching the concept of everyday nationalism, it is still essential to mention the role that the state has in creating and spreading nationalism. Here we do not mean only the institutional laws and acts that the state uses in making people national, but also other factors, which are part of everyday life. For example, radio stations or television programs must have a certain percentage of shows dedicated to national topics. The bottom-up approach revolves around ordinary people and the everyday situations they encounter. This approach recognizes people as important because, “as a ‘neglected political arena’, our understanding is based on un-tested assumptions of

actors' preferences and identities constructed from above" (Kostovicova et al. quoted in Knott 2015b, 3). Through this approach, one can investigate the processes from using a bottom-up approach through the views of ordinary people (Rose 2009). Research employing the everyday nationalism concept is important because the simultaneous combination of a top-down and bottom-up approach reveals both formal nationalism, which is connected with nation-state, and informal nationalism, which is mostly associated with civil society, different collective events, and ritual celebrations, allowing these to be observed (Eriksen 1993a).

As Malešević (2013) shows, the top-down and bottom-up approaches are mutually constitutive or, as he further explains it, "mundane, everyday nationalism could not exist without the elaborate institutions and organizations of 'official' nationalism" (Malešević 2013, 131). Skey also discusses this, stating:

Institutions continue to have a key role to play in underpinning and disseminating forms of the knowledge that largely (re) create the idea/l of the nation as a bounded, coherent and knowable entity. Even in an era of increasing global flows, the state remains paramount in regulating and managing many aspects of everyday life, often justifying policies and actions in terms of national priorities and sensibilities. (Skey 2011, 19)

Still, according to some studies on the "everyday nationalism" approach, citizens should have an active role in the construction of a nation, if not otherwise, then through the lens of their self-identification, or through the way they perceive others and the world around them (Duchnese 2018; Brubaker 2002). It is this self-identification and differentiation from others that one can find primarily through cultural diversity that is produced precisely through myths, symbols, celebrations, languages, and various rituals.

Bonikowski explains that the key thesis of banal nationalism is that the cultural and institutional dominance of the nation is reproduced through the same cognitive and symbolic processes regardless of national context. Research on everyday nationalism accepts that claim, but further suggests that these universal processes result in heterogeneous cognitive representations of the nation across (and possibly within) countries (Bonikowski 2007, 148-149).

A similar view is shared by Jones and Merriman, stressing that "the terms 'everyday' and 'banal' are not synonymous, because everyday life is both a place of banal and mundane processes but

may also incorporate a variety of hotter differences and conflicts that affect people's lives habitually" (Jones & Merriman 2009, 166). Antonsich offers a fresh look at this topic, pointing out that by adding the term "everyday" to banal nationalism, it is possible to overcome this problematic distinction between banal and hot nationalism, "and it can also better serve the purpose of exploring how the nationhood can be activated from below" (Antonsich 2015, 2).

Michael Skey highlights that "by exploring the everyday (re) production of national identity through banal signifiers, our attention is focused on the fact that it is the daily forms of life, lived in and understood in relation to a world of nations, that underpins the more visible (and sometimes virulent) aspects of nationalism" (Skey 2009, 334). Everyday nationalism, according to Fox and Ginderachter, is an approach that allows us to see how ethnicity and nationhood are manipulated as social practice categories and reproduced "by ordinary people doing ordinary things" (Fox and Ginderachter 2018, 547). As Bonikowski stresses,

the goal is to investigate the range of meanings with which people imbue the nation, examine the relationship between national and other forms of identification, uncover the mechanisms that reproduce the unquestioned cultural and political dominance of the nation-state and observe the manner in which the nation is evoked. The central unit of analysis in this tradition is not ideologies but collective narratives, political claims, symbolic representations, and cultural schemas. (Bonikowski 2016, 431)

It is precisely through the study of everyday behaviors – ranging from ways of speaking, to clothing choices, to certain customs and rituals – that one can see the real core of the "everyday nationalism" principle, and thus, "to understand how and why identities are lived and made meaningful" (Skey 2009, 334).

While national identity is explained as a "form of life which is daily lived in a world of nation-states" (Billig 1995, 68), it is also made up of two parts: (1) self-categorization as a member of the country and affiliation with it; and (2) identification with a "imagined community", which includes feelings of belonging, togetherness, loyalty, and solidarity. (Bar-Tal 2002). The concept of national identity is defined by these shared goals, concepts, narratives, collective memories, societal beliefs, holidays, commemorations, rituals, and myths. (ibid). Nationalism, specifically everyday nationalism, is particularly fascinating and is most prominent during periods of

national and political transition or protracted public conflicts, when stronger national self-awareness emerges. (Bonikowski 2016)

Fox and Miller-Idriss in their paper “Everyday nationhood” (2008) divide the everyday nationalism approach into four parts, where the focus is on the individuals in societies: (1) talking about/with the nation, both to see what people say about it, but also when and in what contexts; (2) choosing the nation and understanding the circumstances in which a preference for a nation is enacted, or not; (3) performing the nation (in the sense of spectacle, staging), all the instances in which people are led to take on national symbols themselves; and (4) consuming the nation, which reflects the expression of taste.

For the present research, Skey’s (2011, 11–12) five-dimensional analysis of national discourse (spatial, temporal, cultural, political, and self/other) will be applied. Connecting spatial and temporal dimensions, he shows that both routine and events as ongoing activities are situated in particular places, where spatial figures and places form “a solid visible and ongoing presence and help individuals orientate themselves in relation to other people and the moral orders that define what is seen to be appropriate at a given place and time” (Skey 2011, 16). Combining and reproducing deixes (see Billig 1995) “here” and “now” through daily social practices, individuals can mutually recognize each other as a part of a community living on the same territory in a particular time period (ibid). For this reason, they can consequently also identify themselves as a group by distancing themselves from the so-called Others. Similarly, through a political dimension of everyday nationalism and the role that the state has in creating it, one can understand the importance of different political organizations and state institutions in creating and defining the nations, which is mostly represented through the cultural dimension of everyday nationalism. Precisely this interconnection of all of the above dimensions makes nationalism work on the everyday level. In the subsequent chapters I will dive deeper into each of these dimensions and personify it in the example of Slovenia.

### 5.2.1. The Political Dimension and the Role of the State

The political dimension emphasizes the importance of political organizations in mobilizing and then sustaining national movements. That everyday nationhood is closely connected with the political dimension of everyday nationalism can be seen from the later examples. For the nation to be understood as more than just an ethnic group, it should have an aspiration to be or to become a political community, in the sense that it should be institutionally complete, to have its own self-government, as well as a territory, language, and culture which can be controlled (Kymlicka 1995, 11).

From this it becomes clear that “the nation is not a static cultural object with a single shared meaning but a site of active political contestation between cultural communities with strikingly different belief systems” (Bonikowski 2016, 428). In this sense, “the nation is not just a political entity but also a cognitive frame through which people apprehend social reality and construct routinized strategies of action, and research on nationalism must incorporate insights from cultural sociology and social psychology about how meanings structured by institutions shape social interaction and group relations ”(ibid, 429). Billig (1995, 63) argues, that through systems of finance, law, education, and territorial control, the state has become the major institutional machinery for legitimizing national discourse. However, as he further shows, there is rarely, if ever, a simple fit between nation and state. For this reason, various political authors and organizations appear on the national scene, struggling to provide their own definition of what national is and should be in the cultural, historical, and physical sense (Billig, 1995, 63).

Therefore, the first thing one should question here is the relationship between the nation and the state, which is crucial. The state is neither the only nor primary factor in creating the nation, but it can be an utterly important component in terms of so- called nation- building. Bonikowski argues that the relevance and political implications of nationhood are dependent not only on the situational environment and sociopolitical conditions, but also on the interaction between firmly held beliefs and hegemonic narratives ingrained in national institutions. (Bonikowski 2016, 433). According to Walzer, states are the political expression of a common life and (most often) of a national family (Walzer quoted in Tamir 2019, 421). “The emergence of democratic states therefore depends on the ability of individuals to get together to join a community, and then on

processes that turn the community into a political entity that wishes to govern and express itself in the public sphere” (ibid, 428). For instance, with invented traditions, such as national holidays, and representative emblems of the country, states seek to both evoke a national identity and secure the loyalty of the newly-minted citizens. Meanwhile, supporting institutions museums, exhibitions, pageants, statuary reinforce the supposed natural congruence of its cultural and political borders (Hobsbawm & Ranger, 2003). As Foster (1991, 239) further explains, “nationalist elites, intellectuals and politicians deploy rites and symbols as solutions to perceived problem of integration, of instilling a heterogeneous population with a sense of shared national identity” (ibid). Democratic states must actively encourage the construction of a unifying consciousness based on a historical narrative, a common language, norms, culture, and symbols, especially during the formative years. (Tamir 2019, 428). Exactly in this early stage, homogenization of the public sphere comes to the core through an attempt to form a shared identity that will provide individuals with “the personal and social tools necessary for becoming active social, economic, and political agents” (ibid).

These tools, or as he calls them, “the habits of the heart” belong to the people and not the ruler. For this reason, he concludes that the birth of the modern democratic state and that of the nation are therefore inherently interrelated; one cannot do without the other (ibid, 428).

The vitality of nationalism is founded on the creation of an ideal institutional setting based on long-term organization and ideological development, which allows for the proliferation of a prosaic and mundane sense of loyalty to a country. (Malešević 2013, 140). “Expressions of nationalism at the everyday level are, therefore, expressions of attachment to a specific social organization, such as the nation-state” (Malešević 2013). As Bajt points out, “state laws on immigration, naturalization, minorities, and integration, as well as the very functioning of national institutions and policies reveal a complex interdependence between the dominant nation and various dis-privileged minorities, which are marginalized and excluded through the nationalist (and racist) logic of non-belonging” (Bajt 2016, 52). Edensor stresses that “through its laws, broadcasting policies, policies and economic management, the state provides a regulatory apparatus that informs many standard actions and ostensibly champions good habits” (Edensor 2002, 530).

As Bonikowski explains that the

nation's symbolic boundaries and rightful role in the world are sites for active contestation in the public sphere. For these reason, for some scholars, they represent a stable repertoire of competing narratives, which fluctuate in relative dominance and leave lasting imprints on policy and public consciousness, while for others, their shared understandings are actively reshaped by social movements and radical political actors, who take advantage of public insecurities and protracted racial, ethnic, and religious animosities to mobilize support for their political projects. (Bonikowski 2016, 436)

Precisely through the territorialization of the nation (census and citizenship law), the production of national history through school textbooks and media, the promotion of national culture, “the state continually reasserts the primacy of the national community in its citizen's thinking and behavior. Plus, ‘formal’ exclusion of those judged not to hold appropriate traits or credentials for national membership” (ibid, 432-433).

As in every other former Yugoslav country, in the late 1980s and especially after the break-up of Yugoslavia, there was a need in Slovenia to strengthen the national consciousness and ideology of citizens by political and national institutions. Precisely in the formative years of the newly-established and territorially small state, which throughout its history was subordinated to politically and militarily stronger forces, Slovenian politics had to find a way to fight for its independence through the strengthening of the national consciousness. In the following chapters, I will examine whether Slovenian national policy followed the above theories of emphasizing national affiliation through cultural elements such as national mythology, language and territory, and the exclusion of others in favor of creating a common Slovenian identity.

### 5.2.2. The Cultural Dimension

Culture, as one of the primary dimensions of everyday nationalism, is of great importance. The cultural dimension refers to the symbolic systems that are used to “define and justify certain social values and norms, as well as to create so-called maps for social actors” (Özkirimli 2005, 188). Beside this explanation, it is necessary to draw a careful distinction between the idea/l of a national culture that is viewed (and valued) as largely self-evident by particular groups, and the ongoing struggles to produce and define that culture (Skey 2011, 26). This means that those who have grown up in a different cultural context and narrative can react differently to some situations than people who have lived in another cultural environment. The way one perceives or practices a culture can vary, especially in growing up in a particular culture and accepting certain norms of behavior as normal and correct in relation to other cultures. It is from this that the wrong narration of one’s own culture as correct and superior to other cultures very often develops.

For Geertz (1973, 89), culture is a system of shared values, beliefs and knowledge that forms the basis for political, social, economic and religious institution, and is historically transmitted form of meaning embedded in symbols, respectively, “a system of inherited concepts expressed in symbolic forms through which people communicate, renew and develop their knowledge of life and attitudes towards it” (ibid). As Jurše (1993, 56) highlights, culture must be learned, and be passed from generation to generation. Besides, culture should be interwoven, meaning that parts of the culture need to be strongly connected, while culture also needs to be shared between the members of the group.

For this research, it is important to emphasize that the cultural dimension is intertwined with other dimensions of everyday nationalism, and especially with the political dimension, due to the complex position of the state towards pre-existing cultures, for

certain cultures may be eradicated (especially with ethnic and religious particularity) or they may be adopted and adapted by the cultural establishment. Hence, questions about who is left out of the national culture, how are ethnicity, religion, language, and region accommodated by the state and who is marginalized or rejected as unsuitably national, can also be raised (Edensor 2002, 3-4).

The borders of the nation-state, where cultural identities overlapped, have replaced absolute borders, the notion of citizenship has emerged, and they are often based on an individual's ethnicity. In this sense, the nation begins to be understood as a territorially-limited political community protected by a centralized state apparatus (Canafe 1996, 91-98). This indicates that borders have an important role in determining culture and, as a result, identity. When it comes to cultural boundaries, it is one's culture that opposes or confronts another, with boundary crossing expressing itself as a positive human experience.

As Leersen (2006) notes, nationalism studies have not yet taken a clear approach in addressing the cultural dimension of nationalism. „All parties tend to locate culture outside the nationalist ideology, explaining it as a general external ambiance, which was invoked or influenced, rather than analyzing cultural rhetoric as an intrinsic part of, and commitment within, the nationalist agenda“ (Leersen 2006, 560-561).

On the other hand, Hutchinson (1999) emphasizes that cultural nationalism gains in importance as a movement that is distinct from that of political nationalism, which is mostly concerned with the identity and regeneration of the national community (ibid, 392). Velikonja makes a similar division, stating that there is a difference between political and cultural nationalism, which, however, are both geared towards the same goal, the nation-state with political nationalism is based on the “territorial principle and striving for the establishment of autonomous state institutions” (Velikonja 2002c, 285). But neither for political nor cultural nationalism does the size or number of members of a particular group really matter, as long as that group possesses individuals bounded by territorial boundaries, and connected by a sense of imaginary community. It is important that this group of people share and understand some certain meanings to which they can respond properly in their daily lives.

As Maiz explains, cultures are

dynamic processes of re-creation and re-interpretation of their own characteristics, a continual ‘making and re-making’ that involves a multiplicity of dialogues among ill-defined subcultures, factions, and groups of insiders and outsiders. This fluidity and pluralism, which is displayed to a greater or lesser extent by all cultures, implies that cultures should be regarded as essentially indeterminate and contingent, as being always in a state of reconstruction and hence always the arena of debate among conflicting conceptions. (2004, 70)

Tamir posits the celebration of a nation’s uniqueness as one of nationalism’s most common characteristics, showing that “by fleshing out the importance of their particular narrative, nationalists contribute their fair share to the detheorization of nationalism” (Tamir 2019, 422). As he further states,

This preference for case-specific justifications and the endorsement of a particularistic approach to politics and morality affirms the nationalist claim that values and standards are intrinsic to one’s history and tradition. Nations and their cultures, values, and habits are therefore presented not only as unique but also as incommensurable, an approach that reinforces the claim that each nation must live according to its own norms, fostering its own customs and experiences. If members of a nation deserve rights or benefits, it is not because they are similar to but rather because they are different from members of other nations. (ibid, 422)

He concludes that “even the most liberal forms of nationalism rely on a collective identity that cherishes some cultural, linguistic, and symbolic features that mark the border between insiders and outsiders, ‘us’ and ‘them’” (ibid, 431). In other words, in order to accept a certain culture as our own, we must segregate it from other cultures. In this way, our culture becomes different, special and ultimately independent, consequently creating our sense of self. If there are other cultures to which we can compare our own, our culture becomes valid. In this sense, to have a sense of self, one should find a group that differs from the dominant group.

The very notion of a nation with a fixed, 'given' cultural identity is a sign of the success of a whole array of practices in naturalizing that identity. It is also the sign of the success of a particular construction or version of national culture. In other words, making national cultures implies something other than the transmission of a 'national character', the stereotypic reproduction of enduring personality traits through child-socialization practices. Yet making national cultures always the creation of the 'national citizen', a particular kind of subject with a definite sort of historical consciousness, view of authority, and sense of self. (Foster 1991, 238)

Furthermore, because identity-related messages emanate from the Other, identities within a group must share a high degree of similarity, with language serving as a common denominator. Only in this sense can a group or collective identity be discussed. People must interact in a larger environment and over a longer length of time in order to shape their identities. (Verhaeghe 2016, 39).

If we look at the role of language, returning to Billig's example of daily newspapers, we realize that language certainly becomes the primary link and indicator of national identity and thus of distinction from others. For example, a Slovene from the north of the country, who speaks German because of his proximity to Austria, and his compatriot from the south of the country, who speaks Slovene and Italian, will both, when they pick up a national newspaper written in standard Slovene language, unconsciously accept an imaginary sense of community. Because, even though they live in different parts of the country and speak different dialects, their standard native language is something that connects them. As Bonikowski stresses, ideologies of national belonging are not only common sense and belief systems that reproduce the unquestioned cultural and the political dominance of the nation. They can also help to solidify the dominant position of certain groups within it (Bonikowski 2016).

As Skey points out, "in the struggles to define the terms of national belonging, some are 'more equal' than others, because they possess greater levels of national cultural capital" (2011, 67). It follows that national culture results from combining:

- 1) pre-modern cultural heritage, which includes folk, aristocratic, and religious culture, which has not been changed for the needs of nation and state formation;
- 2) early bourgeois culture, which already shows modernist elements; and

3) highlighting differences to other cultures. What is ultimately included in the culture's concept of a nation results from an arbitrary process, where the balance of power on the political stage is expressed (Velikonja 2002c, 288).

Culture, consciously or unconsciously, always adapts to dominant groups. It is always the ruling classes that determine how a culture will be used for a particular goal. These are also always so-called higher goals, which aim to preserve national unity from a potential aggressor who will either destroy the national culture or change it in their favor.

As Južnič (1993) shows, the connection between Slovenian national identity and culture is obvious, while it is also worth noting that Slovene national identity has lasted for over a thousand years only due to its culture, rather than political, military, or economic dominance. As he further states, "culture has actually become a pillar around which political, economic, and similar programmes have been created" (Južnič 1993, 21). But again, to define our cultural identity, we need to define the Other.

For this reason, borders play a primary role in demarcating our national culture with other, neighboring cultures, creating the so-called Other, and thus our sense of collective identity through national symbols imposed by the political apparatus. In a further discussion and in the empirical part, this thesis will try to detect whether theories of culture coincide with the attitudes of the respondents. The discussion of these results will try to explain and define the development of Slovenian culture through other dimensions of everyday nationalism. Following the above theories, in the interviews, the focus will be on gaining insight into how much the language, common history, and rituals have in defining an informant's cultural identity.

### 5.2.3. The Dimension of “Self and Other”

The Self/Other dimension points to the critical role that people, and the different traits and values they are seen to embody, have in realizing and concretizing the image of a nation in a world of nations (Wodak 2006, 105). Dominant groups (the majority) are required to justify their own dominant status and the benefits that flow from it. The secret of the success of nationalism lies in its simplicity, and because it is not intellectually demanding and is essentially emotional, it can be easily propagated (Debeljak 2004). By defining “us” as a particular group to which we belong, it is easy to make a relationship with those who do not belong, and thus strengthen our collective identity. But, in order to gain a certain image of oneself, its history, culture and identity, as exceptional and unique, those Others must be found. (Luketić 2013, 227). Identity, both personal and social, is a

context-dependent category that is always linked to the creation of difference – an image of the Other is needed to create and manifest one’s own identity. [...] Othering highlights and reinforces similarities among a national collective’s members by emphasizing the Other’s distinctiveness. A nation, a community, or a group sharing certain values, is defined through an ‘us versus them’, or ‘inside versus outside’ dichotomy. Besides a given group’s inward-looking self-consciousness, its differentiation from the out-group also plays an important role in their identity construction. (Vezovnik & Šarić 2015, 237)

As much as this work is primarily done through a political science prism, one must certainly touch on the theory of social identity in this chapter, which, while it is primarily used in social psychology, can also clarify self-identification processes through the lens of the everyday nationalism approach.

Tajfel and Turner (1986) created a theory of social identity, the foundation of which is the role of social categorization and social identity in different groups. Unlike personal identity, which is primarily based on certain personal values such as certain ideas or goals for oneself, social identity is based on the self-perception of each individual through the prism of group belonging, along with values and goals that apply to the whole group (Tajfel 1982, 255). If we ask someone to define him- or herself, there is a high probability that the individual will do so precisely through the prism of a certain national or (sub) cultural group. Although this dynamic is to be

further explored in psychology, which lies outside the remit of the present work, it is still possible to conclude that for many people, identity is determined by belonging to a particular group. It is for this reason that even today there are different groups, ranging from football fan groups, political parties, to all forms of different subcultures. It is important to emphasize that this affiliation must also be perceived in a positive context. In order to have a positive social identity, the group to which we belong must also be characterized as valuable and positive in relation to other groups with which one compares one's own group. The same theory can apply to a nation as a particular ethnic group: "If a nation is a category or discourse that constructs a certain community of people on the difference against other homogeneous wholes (nations) around it, it always means the exclusion of everything that does not belong to the concept" (Stanković 2010, 163).

Kralj (2008a, 121-122) further emphasizes that precisely by dividing into us and them, nationalist discourse is shaped, through which a sense of identity and belonging is formed. In terms of nationalism, this can also lead to a dualistic distinction, which manifests itself in glorifying one's own national movements, as a way of strengthening nationalist affiliation and patriotism, on the one hand, and in perceiving foreign nationalisms as aggressive and oppressive. Nationalist discourse "legitimizes these relations by the projection of historical and social differences into the sphere of imaginary nature" (Kralj 2008a, 121-122). All those who fall out of the nationalist interpretive framework of the 'us' category, who are therefore not connected by common blood into a homogeneous whole, are marginalized or excluded. Another feature of nationalist discourse is its self-naturalization, where national values are perceived as natural, self-evident, absolute, and hegemonic. The last characteristic is the functioning of nationalist discourse through institutions, where it is (re) produced daily through state institutions and everyday life (ibid, 122-124). From all of the above, it can be concluded that nationalism as a direction cannot survive without social categorization. In order for nationalism to function properly, a certain group must be formed, i.e. as Turner (1982) states, in the theory of social categorization, there is often a feeling of depersonalization or separation from oneself, which results in group cohesion, cooperation, group polarization and ethnocentrism. As a result, we might conclude that, since identities are formed by distinction, we can only comprehend identity formation through our relationship to the Other, to relation to what we are not and what others

lack. By rotating between capacity and distinctiveness, identities can serve as sites of identification. (Hall 2000, 18)

Bielefeld goes a step further, focusing on the prism of group identity through differentiation from strangers. He believes it is the foreigners who make us feel unity:

With their existence, foreigners point to the unrealizable desire for unity. We also develop our attitude towards those foreigners we only imagine, who are no more or who are not yet. The mixture of the real and the imaginary, fear and attraction, proves that the relationship between the foreign and one's own is not determined only by objective conditions, measurable numbers, visible places and different clothes, morals and customs. The excitement brought by foreigners also hides a significant individual and collective participation. National identification, on the other hand, changes the attitude towards foreigners into an experientially independent and, in principle, problematic attitude. (Bielefeld 1998, 148)

According to Billig (1995, 80), debates and controversies arise about how similar or how different various groups of foreigners are to "us". Hence, they are also very often associated with anti-immigrant attitudes (Bonikowski 2016, 430). As Nielsen (1996, 46) explains, immigrant groups are paradigmatically ethnic groups, which quite rarely have any aspirations to become a part of a political community, to seek self-governance or to constitute themselves into the state, but despite that, they are treated as the internal Other. In brief, there can be no "us" without "them" (Billig 1995, 78), where "them" in academic literature is most often described as Others.

Petersoo divides this category of Others into internal positive, and internal negative Others. According to this interpretation, internal positive Others are minority groups that are legitimate, live on the same political territory as a majority nation, and are not seen as a threat to the identity and integrity of the latter. (Petersoo 2007, 123)

In this sense, in Slovenian context, Italian and Hungarian minorities are perceived as these unthreatening Others, because they are legitimate, and are not scattered, but live in a precisely defined geographical area. Most often, immigrant groups are perceived as the internal negative others, which means that the groups that are perceived as the Others against whom the identity of the nation is constructed, usually live and work in a climate of discrimination, exclusion and racism (Smith quoted in Petersoo 2007, 123) Petersoo argues that there is always enough room for multiple Others, because national identity is not a "strictly 'monogamous' affair between one nation and one significant Other, but as a complex interplay between the nation and various

Others” (Petersoo 2007, 121). She explains it with the thesis that “the identity of a nation may be defined and constructed around a cluster of several key variables, such as language, religion, culture and history, each of which may require a different Other” (ibid). In this way, foreigners become a threat to the nation. Still, there is always a possibility of turning a traditionally negative Other into positive one (ibid, 125). As Bielefield explains (1998, 131), not all Others automatically become “strangers”. In certain circumstances, they can even become friends. If they live long enough together with the host nation, and are not perceived as a threat to a nation’s everyday habits and culture, these groups can be perceived as a friendly group. Similarly, if these people are a part of a nation, which in the eyes of the host nation is perceived as positive or even culturally superior, there will be no need to see them as a threat. As much as this identification is primarily related to the bottom-up approach or the role of ordinary people and masses in creating internal positive and internal negative Others, the role of the state must not be neglected.

The nation-state and its institutions carry out the process of active support of national culture, through subsidies, systematic preservation, and defense against undesirable cultural elements (Velikonja 2002c, 287). The cultural Other is in Europe’s present and past, the fundamental means of legitimizing European identity, which has indeed always been articulated in relation to and in opposition to the Other (R. Petrović 2009, 20).

As Luketić states:

We need to identify those “Others” in order to make it easier and gain a specific vision of ourselves, our identity, our past, and our culture as something distinct and unique. This concept is most exemplified in the processes of post-Yugoslav countries, which regard adjacent cultures and nations as less valuable, inferior, powerless, and hostile to “us,” by creating their own narrative about themselves and declaring them to be different. The neighbors had devolved into complete barbarians. (2013, 227)<sup>15</sup>

The labeling of an individual or a group as Other takes place in parallel with stereotyping, that is, with the value form of naming or labeling an individual, a group in a reductionist way and with a strategy of symbolic exclusion. Both processes aim primarily at controlling contradictions and creating boundaries between the legitimate and the illegitimate. From this point of view, creating the Other can be defined as distancing the peripheral, marginal, and secondary to existing cultural norms, denying history or re-historization as a necessary means of revealing the

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<sup>15</sup> Translation by author.

emergence and preservation of stereotypical notions. With this repression of the historical and the political, we are approaching the workings of myths and the tendency to perpetuate social exclusions and economic disparities (Šabec 2007, 108). The imagined national community must always be reaffirmed, because only in this way does the fictitious “us” turn into something tangible, natural, and existing.

Brought to a basic level, the fact is that different people have different everyday experiences. They have different jobs, different interests, different routines, different incomes, and sometimes also different ethnic backgrounds. So, to understand how nationalism works on a daily basis, we need to examine the role that the society at large, together with state institutions, has in creating a common national identity. It is impossible to understand a society globally, if we are not versed in the relationships to and among particular groups in that society.

As already mentioned, while Hungarian and Italian minorities are perceived as the internal positive Others because they have legitimate minority status and there are no feuds between these groups and ethnic Slovenes, we must ask which the groups are treated as internal negative Others. The question that arises is: Are all immigrant groups in Slovenia shown in a negative light, or does this only apply to certain ethnic groups living in Slovenia? Are, for example, Austrians or French living here treated like Serbs or Bosnians? Also, if we start from the presumptions that, in order to define ourselves as a nation, we must find those Others, to whom negative characteristics are most often attributed, do all neighboring nations automatically become less valuable and barbaric? Can negative internal Others really turn into so-called friends? And if so, which are the ways and processes that need to be made in order to achieve that?

#### 5.2.4. Spatial and Temporal Dimensions

Space and time are often seen as elemental and essential dimensions of one's life, but on the other hand, these determinants can be quite crucial in defining human existence in some area and consequently, their national identity. As Edensor explains,

The relationship between space and national identity is variegated and multi-scaled, producing complex geography that is constituted by borders, symbolic areas and sites, constellations, pathways, dwelling places, and everyday fixtures. And the national is evident not only in widely recognized grand landscapes and famous sites but also in the mundane spaces of everyday life. The nation continues to be the pre-eminent spatial construct in a world in which space is divided up into national portions. The nation is spatially distinguished as a bounded entity, possessing borders which mark it as separate from other nations. (Edensor 2002, 37)

In this sense, the territory becomes the fundamental element on which the state is formed, where the link between the territory and the state are the people who need to adapt to the land (Bras 2003). Boštjan Šaver further adds that national unity in this respect is a manifestation of the completion of the state on its territory, through which the nation is realized (Šaver 2005, 47). Likewise, the territory is also important in defining national identity because with the nation-state, foreigners or minorities become a permanent and strong social category, while the national-state-oriented nationalist myth defines groups of Others as unnatural, directed against its artificially natural unity (Bielefield 1998, 62). Skey stresses the significance of national territory – that is, in the boundary between those who do and do not belong. Even though these boundaries are socially constructed, they are still very real in their positive and negative consequences for different people. Focusing on established and democratic nation-states, he concludes that those recognized as belonging within national boundaries are generally offered access to a range of socio-economic benefits (healthcare, housing, pensions, legal frameworks, etc.) and citizenship rights (Skey 2011, 24).

Strictly speaking, “for a national space to keep its power, it must be domesticated, replicated in local context, and be understood as part of everyday life” (Edensor 2002, 65). According to De Fina, one should understand spatialization as an “indexical process through which individuals, groups, and institutions invest material space coordinates with social meanings” (De Fina 2009, 111). Therefore, “the national landscape ideologies are imagined as enduring spaces, which are

forged over millennia through the sacrifice of blood and toil” (Edensor 2002, 66) Assuredly, it is about the kinship or the kin connection, respectively, about the connection from “blood, language, and custom” (Geertz 1993). Or, as Šaver illustrates it: “The imperialist Germanic concept of *Blut und Boden* is still relevant because preserving and affirming the fundamental identity traits of the national is still extremely important today in the time of common political imaginaries such as modern Europe” (Šaver 2005, 179).

The community attaches certain meanings to the space in which it lives. Semantically enriched, however, such a space can be the bearer of both personal and group identity. The community will identify its national affiliation with those symbols that will be understandable within a particular group and will be recognized by its members as such. Therefore, symbols, the recognizable geographical characteristics of a certain country are mostly highlighted, which can then become the object of national worship and gain the inspiration of the sacred. The chanting of national self-confidence today often refers to the chanting of the beauties of the landscape.<sup>16</sup> (Kučan 1998, 43)

In defining landscapes and national myths, the influence of symbolism itself on the creation of national identity in a certain area also plays a major role. According to Zdislaw Mach (1993, 106), in changed contexts certain old symbols can be imbued with a completely new meaning.

The mythology of society is depicted in the corresponding symbology, which Velikonja divides into expansive and inclusive symbols. The expansive symbols are about “spreading outwards”, while the inclusive ones are the inverse – they unite, connect, and they are about the so-called centripetal symbols which are directed towards the center and which unite a certain fragmented being into a coherent whole (Velikonja 2003, 34-38).

Edensor writes about the ideological power of landscapes, mostly focusing on the rhetoric of rural, as the supreme marker of most European nations’ national identity. Writing about (rural) England, Edensor highlights that “the effect of this ideological perpetration is to produce so-called ‘purified space’, where anything ‘out of place’, stands out as un-English” (Edensor 2002, 43). In this context, similar rural marker can be seen in Slovenian national mythology (especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s), when Slovenes, fighting for independence, needed to rediscover their national identity. As Cirila Toplak points out,

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<sup>16</sup> Translation by author.

the political discourse in Slovenia is still returning to the historical polarization to the conservative and liberal current, to the ‘cultural struggle’ started by the Roman Catholic Church in the second half of the 19th century to maintain its political dominance in the Slovene-speaking (and traditionally peasant) and conservative space, with both pro secular free-thinking members of the bourgeoisie and more left-leaning thinkers and activists considered foreign and thus hostile. (Toplak 2014, 92)

In order for space to become an element of identification, we must attach some significance to it. It is important to emphasize that the social perception of space is not fixed, but changes depending on the needs of the nation itself or the state apparatus. For example, in Slovenia, the narrative of South Slavism and unification with “South Slavic brothers” was nurtured for decades. Because of oppression during the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a strong idea of Pan-Slavism was present in Slovenia, that is, the existence of Slovenia through the community of South Slavic nations that are much more similar to them than the Austrians or Hungarians. After 1991 and Slovene independence, a strong national narrative appeared in the Slovene collective consciousness through the prism of the revival of Slovene history, which was reproduced precisely through territory. Slovenia was again referred to as an Alpine and Central European country, suddenly asserting many more similarities with the neighboring Austrians than with their “South Slavic brothers”.

## **6. The Empirical Case Study**

### **6.1. Purpose, goals and methods**

In the empirical part of the dissertation, based on the theories from the previous part, I have examined the opinions of the participants. The respondents were divided into two groups: the first group included ethnic Slovenes, and the second group included members of the second generation of migrants from the former Yugoslavia. In this way, I could gain better insight into everyday nationalism in Slovenia.

The research was interested in how much the attitudes and opinions of one group differ or coincide with the opinions and attitudes of another group. Using the theory of social identity (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), through empirical research, I wanted to find out whether there is a so-called “in group” and “out group” in Slovenia and by what elements they are marked. The questionnaire consisted of five sets of questions, which directly relate to the five dimensions of everyday nationalism, i.e., political, social, temporal, spatial, and the dimension of Self / Other.

In the research, I used semi-structured interviews, because in social sciences interviews have a lot of advantages, among which are immediacy, joint questioning of the topic, research of causality, personal contact, and speed (Gorman and Clayton 125-126), as well as examining the feelings and attitudes of the respondents (Gray, 2009). Moreover, semi structured interviews have the benefit of being more flexible than structured interviews, because they do not use strictly formulated questions, rather they give room for additional sub-questions during the conversation. According to Fontana and Frey (2000, 653), a structured interview tends to capture accurate data that can be easily coded to explain respondents' behavior toward pre-established categories, while a semi-structured interview attempts to understand complex patterns of society members' behavior without imposing any preconceived categorization that could limit the research field. In the research I have also used the snowball sampling method, which is often used in social sciences qualitative research.

## 6.2. Population and sample

The research includes 16 informants, among whom 8 are ethnic Slovenes, and 8 are the descendents of migrants from former Yugoslav countries. The following criteria were used for the group of ethnical Slovenes:

- a) parents and grandparents are from Slovenia
- b) place of birth
- c) spent most of their lives in Slovenia
- d) went to school in Slovenia

For the second group, the criteria were as follows:

- a) at least one parent is from Slovenia
- b) place of birth
- c) spent most of their lives in Slovenia
- d) are members of the second generation of migrants
- e) went to school in Slovenia

The languages used in interviews were Slovenian, Croatian, and Serbian (all translations are by the author). Among the 16 informants, 15 were born in Slovenia, while one was born in Sarajevo, (Bosnia and Herzegovina), but came to Slovenia in early childhood. The educational structure of the informants was similar: 13 of them had obtained a university education, one has a Ph.D., and two have completed high school, and are currently studying at university.<sup>17</sup> For the purposes of the research, the age structure of the informants is similar, so that everyone interviewed is between 27 and 41 years old. While the primary intention was to make these interviews live, in order to be able to monitor nonverbal communication as well, because of the COVID-19 pandemic, all the interviews were conducted in March and April 2021 through Zoom meetings. To maintain anonymity, the identity of participants was concealed, and they were named with the abbreviation *inf* and a serial number according to the order of the interview.

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<sup>17</sup> Although I initially planned for respondents to take people of different levels of education, given the snowball method I used, most of the respondents are in circles of people who have a similar level of education. Also, a relatively homogeneous group of people from the aspect of education, can give a much clearer picture and vision of this topic.

As mentioned in the summary, I deliberately opted for a smaller sample of respondents, respectively, 16 of them, 11 females, and 5 males. Although my initial desire was to have an equal number of respondents from both genders, using the snowball method, my acquaintances were much simpler in proposing and finding women as respondents. It should also be noted that several potential interviewees refused to take part in the interview, considering the topic of research irrelevant for their lives, or saying that too much space is given to these (annoying) groups of people already.<sup>18</sup>

Mostly using my interview guide, I still gave the respondents enough space not only to answer the questions asked from the questionnaire, but to have enough space for personal reflections, attitudes towards some topic, or some intimate memories. Using semi-structured interviews along with a smaller number of respondents, it allowed me to have the interviews last long enough for the respondents to relax and open up enough to tell everything they considered important. In this way, I was able to get very relevant and complex answers from the respondents. Still, it needs to be taken into account that this is not a representative study. This study only provides an indication on attitudes of a certain group of people in a certain context on the issue of Slovenian everyday nationalism. Nevertheless, this research serves as a potentially useful introduction to later deeper and more extensive analyzes of Slovene identity through the prism of everyday nationalism.

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<sup>18</sup> Ethnic Slovene referring to the group of second generation of migrants from FYR.

### 6.3. Data processing methodology

The theoretical starting points of everyday nationalism elaborated above allow us to check the views of the respondents on everyday nationhood and their personal identification processes. To check and clarify the answers from the conducted interviews, I will use critical discourse analysis (CDA). It is considered to be an established school within linguistics, and it includes several different approaches, critically defining analyzed texts (Vezovnik 2008, 84).

Following Fairclough (1989), to act “critically” means to uncover links that may be hidden from people; e.g., the links between language, power, and ideology. Critical discourse analysis attempts to explain the relationship between language use, communication and discourse, which are micro-levels of social order, and macro-level of the same order, such as power, inequality and dominance between social groups.

A critical analysis of discourse seeks to explain the link between language use, discourse, and communication, which are micro-levels of the social order, and macro-levels of the same order, such as power, dominance, and inequality among social groups. This “bridge” between the two levels is social cognition, everything that people need to know or believe in order to function as competent members of a group or culture. Social cognition is the “missing link” in the chain between the individual and society, between individual opinions and the behavior of social groups, and thus between discourse and the results of its reproduction (van Dijk 1993). Thus, the term discourse implies different social processes of organization of meaning, which connect action and communication between social actors. Discourses are also sets of statements that shape a particular subject, but also forms of culturally and historically determined social practices through which people create and reproduce common systems of meaning. Any signifier and anything that has meaning can be part of the discourse. This means that discourses are not just chains of sentences, but that they form a series of statements that have meaning, power, and impact in a social context (Mills, 1997). All approaches to critical discourse analysis deal with “power, domination, hegemony, inequality, and the discursive processes of their proclamation, concealment, legitimization, and reproduction” (Vezovnik 2008, 84). The aim of critical discourse analysis is to expose social inequality and discrimination (re) constructed, expressed and legitimized through language and in language; that it is not apolitical, but has primary

mission to be on the side of the discriminated and weaker, and to make it clear injustice and abuse of power that is repeatedly (re) constructed and legitimized through language (van Dijk, 2001; Fairclough 2005, Wodak 2001).

Fairclough (2005, 21-22) provides three basic steps in text analysis. The first step refers to the description of the text, its properties, and elements. Some scholars think that discourse should not be considered an exclusively linguistic phenomena, but also be seen in other symbolic forms, such as images or a combination of words and images, such as cultural artifacts, photographs, artistic production, music, or architectural creation (Fairclough 1995, 4). The second step is interpretation, which he calls the process of interaction with the text and the state of analysis. This step refers to seeing the text as a process of production and as a source in the process of interpretation. The last step is an explanation – the connection between interaction and social context, i.e. social determination of the production process, interpretation and their social effects, and consequences (Fairclough 2005, 21-22). Although all three dimensions of CDA will be used in the empirical part, the primary emphasis will be on the latter because “the non-transparency of social relations between discourse and society is a factor in ensuring power and hegemony” (Fairclough 1995, 132).

In the first part of the analysis the focus will be on the declarations of the interviewees and linguistic elements, while the second part of the analysis will focus on the statements of the interviewees based on five main factors, which are closely connected with the five dimensions of everyday nationalism, and which most strongly influence their responses.

Even though I am aware that CDA has “the flaw of dealing with discourse, intertextuality, due to which this research largely depends on the subjective decision of the researcher and on the formulation of the question she or he composes” (Wodak 1997, 6), CDA openly acknowledges its sociopolitical position, unlike other scientific disciplines that deny it (van Dijk, 2001). And precisely because of its multidimensionality, however subjective it may seem, CDA can critically best interpret and analyze interviews. The advantage of CDA over other approaches to text analysis is that it addresses not only what is present in the language but also what is absent (Fairclough, 1995) and thus always observes the social, historical, or political context within which there some text is found.

## 7. Myths and symbols in Slovenian narrative

One of the main mythical geographical areas of Slovenia and the formation of the Slovenian national identity is Mount Triglav, which already during Communism and the belonging to Yugoslavia, was established as the state symbol and a site of secularized pilgrimage at the center of Slovenia (Šaver 2005, 49). Although all South Slavic nations formed a federation in which the emphasis was on brotherhood and unity, in order to minimize the potential influence of nationalism, the national identity of each nation continued to manifest primarily through the glorification of certain parts of states as national symbols. While in neighboring Croatia the national narrative manifested itself through the Adriatic Sea, in Serbia the territory of Kosovo, characterized as the “heart of Serbia”, was one of the most important symbols of national identification. The same narrative can be carried over to the Slovenian example, where, geographically, Mount Triglav became the primary element and symbol of national identification.

Šaver emphasizes that the example of Slovenian mountains can be read as a pictorial example of a sign that reconstructs the structures and practices of national struggle and national ideology, while also revealing structures, practices, goals, values, and social functions within the national field as subordinate classes, classes, and groups (2005, 50). According to this view, mountain Triglav actually has a great mythological power, representing a marker or a point on the map, which is the strongest and the primary marker, as it distinguishes many forms of social phenomena, patterns, relationships, ideologies, etc. of the alpine culture of Slovenia (ibid, 73). Nowadays the political and social dimensions of everyday Slovene life are intertwined with the symbol of Triglav and the Slovene mountains – from postcards, films, to current state symbols (ibid, 260). Besides these dimensions, Šaver highlights the religious and historical dimension that Mount Triglav has for Slovenes (the pilgrimage to Triglav), illustrating how “a seemingly insignificant sign becomes a crossroads of national and cultural struggle, as well as an object of ideological and political interests” (ibid, 262), and exactly with these takes on the role of a national myth. Similarly, in the Slovenian national narrative as a long-term constant, the smallness of the Slovenian geographical territory appears. In history, its small geographical territory has emerged as an important part of the construction of Slovene national identity. From

this problem of smallness, which has long been part of the Slovene imagination, a consensus emerges that it is precisely the small territory which causes the various kinds of domination that foreign nations have had over Slovenia (Vezovnik 2007, 471). Through these notions of smallness and the associated threat to the Slovene nation, the paranoid impression that “Slovene identity is endangered and that Slovenia as a nation will become extinct is still being reproduced (and sentimentalistically and sensationally marketed), especially with the help of the media, thereby perpetuating general xenophobia and self-evident racism” (Šumi 2004, 21). This reaffirms the influence of the state on the creation of national identity and the intertwining of all dimensions of everyday nationalism. It is the state that creates and revives myths, constructing them depending on the situation and, through various laws, acts, and national media, transmits them to the people, who then unconsciously accept them.

The importance of the national myth lies in the fact that it is inseparable and closely connected with both temporal and spatial dimensions, because, when defining a nation and national identity, one is always referring to some past time and geographic area on which the national heroes fought “bloody battles” for independence, struggling against oppression, and formed their own special national language, poetry, culture – or, as Matić explains, “we find man’s attempt to illuminate the world around him and his place in it” (1984, 11). In this way, national symbols and myths can simultaneously become a means of identification with a particular space and people, as well as a means of manipulation, most often produced by political elites in favor of the identification of peoples. Symbols and myths, disguised in national culture, become something real and tangible, that truly exist and that make “us” and separates us from Others.

It is national heritage itself which is closely connected with the development of national consciousness and the nation state, since, through various cultural and folklore societies, museums and other educational institutions; it has a formative role in the process of “national awakening” and thus heritage means politicization of culture and mobilization of cultural forms for ideological goals (Peckham quoted in Jezernik 2010, 19).

A similar pattern can also be seen with the state symbols. Following Billig’s explanation of banal nationalism through “unwaved flags”, regarding the example of the Slovenian flag post-independence, Bajt argues that “the emblem has a shape of a shield, in the middle of which is a representation of Mount Triglav, three golden stars of Celje, and two undulating blue lines

symbolizing the Adriatic Sea and Slovenia's rivers. The golden stars of Celje<sup>19</sup> are drawn from the allegedly Slovenian medieval Counts of Celje" (Bajt 2017, 27).

She further clarifies that "these counts are not only disputable on the grounds of their supposed 'Slovenian ethnicity' but they also do not represent a wider all-embracing Slovenian identification because of their localized resonance" (Bajt 2017, 27). Moreover, she argues, "the three stars were obviously selected because the new state felt the need to anchor its identity in a way that enables a relation to an allegedly Slovenian medieval nobility. When compared to the communist republic emblem the continuation of the symbolic value of Triglav, the Adriatic, and rivers, however, points to the durability of the Slovenian ethno-scape" (Bajt 2017, 27)

A similar explanation can be seen from the example of the Slovenian national anthem, where the former Yugoslav hymn dedicated to all Southern Slavs, "was replaced by a nineteenth-century poem written by the Slovenian national poet France Prešern. Prešern's *Zdravljica* (A Toast) as a symbol of Slovenian national identity replaced the old state hymn *Hej Slovani* (Hey Slavs), which praised the Slavic spirit of brotherhood and unity" (ibid). The importance of this song lies primarily in its author, for Prešern was portrayed as the father of the nation. When Slovenia was part of the Austrian Empire, he preferred to write in Slovene rather than in German. By placing the Slovene language and culture before German, his literary work became an important part of Slovenian national identity. (Hansen 1996, 477)



Picture 1. Title: Slovenian flag. FOTW- Flags of the World, accessed 24 May 2021, <https://www.fotw.info/flags/si.html>

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<sup>19</sup>Town in Slovenia

## 7.1. National and Public Holidays

The same narrative can be seen in celebrations of national and public holidays precisely because:

the attention that the community pays to the collective and expresses with rituals and symbols, strengthens the group identity of individual members of the community. The holidays help them form a sense of coexistence and history and mobilize them to work for the common good. Historical figures and events change into the image of a nation and thus become an object of admiration, pride, a role model for the masses, become symbols for the preservation of which members of a particular nation go to fight and, if necessary, to death. (Jezernik 2013, 9)

As he further points out, these holidays point to the political dimension of the calendar, because through the proclamation of public holidays, the authorities in society thus appropriate the past and canonize the knowledge and significance of individual historical figures and events, as well as their interests. Through the design of the holiday, the administration establishes a tool of collective remembrance, which shapes the performances of imagined communities and mobilizes its members to achieve goals in the future (ibid, 11). In this sense, national holidays play an important role in shaping group memories of the past, as they are the sign that marks historical events and personalities that all citizens must know, thus creating a space of symbolic unity for all members of the nation (Jezernik 2013, 19). “The past is thus constructed, reconstructed, and constantly reinterpreted in the light of current events and visions of the future” (ibid, 12).”By circumscribing the use of specific costumes, imposing a rigid order of events, including pseudo-antique carriages and artefacts to form pageantry that is saturated with the gravitas commonly accorded to ancient rituals, such events perform timelessness, grounding nation in history, symbolizing community and legitimizing authority” (Edensor 2002, 73)

For example, in the transition from a member of the FYR to an independent state, Slovenia both changed and gained a completely new set of public holidays. As Simonič (2013, 93) highlights, the turning points that occur between historical periods, including the transition of ethnic and national groups from one political form to another (independence), are in fact only in the spectacle’s service of the same centralized and class society: where everything changes, nothing actually changes.

As Simonič further emphasizes, mythology was very important in establishing current policies because in collective memory both the right and left political poles that emerged after independence, were strongly based on attitudes towards history, such as attitudes to the factors driving World War II, attitudes towards independence, attitudes to the Roman Catholic Church, up to and including the future relations with the European Union and NATO (ibid, 95-96). Simonič gives the following example of state celebrations after the independence of the state, which always had its protocol part with anthem, greeting of the flag, review of the honorary company, and the presidential speech, as well as a more spectacular part, in the service of emphasizing national affiliation and bringing political points. That Slovenia really exaggerated in celebration of national holidays in the beginning is shown because it had the largest number of national celebrations in the whole of Europe. It is also interesting that most of the celebrations were held on Congress Square (*Kongresni trg*) in Ljubljana, which is smaller than Ljubljana's Republic Square (*Trg republike*), but is commemoratively associated with many major political rallies from the past. Also, the Slovenian "political spring" began in that square in 1989 with the publication of the May Declaration. Furthermore, every year, a few days before the major celebration, a Mass for the Homeland was held in the Ljubljana Cathedral (ibid, 97-102). This is the perfect example of the connection of national symbols, myths, values, national culture, and political interests.

## **7.2. Political Myths**

If myths are understood to be guides for the awakening of national spirit or to strengthen national identity, it is easy to conclude that every country or nation will try to construct or evoke their own national myths. These are mostly myths about common language, shared culture and history, national heroes and shared national space or, as studies have identified different typologies of the myth, ranging from natural, social and anthropological myths, to theogonic, cosmogonic, and eschatological myths (Milošević and Stojadinović 2012, 77), as discussed in the previous chapter. Still, according to Velikonja, "the broadest forms of post-socialist mythologies of transition are political mythologies. They are the story of an interested group,

which usually emphasizes the political changes that are supposed to take place after the fall of the old regime” (2003, 79).

Political myths are considered to represent an ideological explanation of the political phenomena that constitute a source of belief for a specific social group (Milošević & Stojadinović 2012, 78), which then shapes itself into the political community (Bottici 2007). Naturally, “myth becomes understandable when it is placed in a concrete discourse. The latter is the instance that reminds, gives meaning, and selects the elements from the robbery of historical memory” (Velikonja 2003, 57). For a political myth, in order to be successful, a certain ruling community needs to be formed, i.e. an elite that creates a certain program and promises a better life, prosperity, democracy, or what the majority of the population strives for. But the problem is that it leads to the cessation of social cohesion.

The birth of a political myth comes when social trauma – crisis and scarcity – is transformed into a psychological and personal one. The fate of a society, nation, or state becomes the subjective fate of the individual. The mechanism of replacing the general with the personal appears. In the mythical discourse, it becomes the only valid, permitted personal identification. The boundary between private and the public is blurred, while the individual becomes external (Velikonja 1996, 22). It is the mythical past that is the guiding thread of a nation during the transition; more precisely, in the Slovenian example, during the exit from the Communist regime of Yugoslavia, and the transition to an independent democratic state.

Velikonja further points out that in the phase of an awakening of national identity, the phase of transition, enemies are often sought and created, because, with myths about enemies and conspiracies, the ruling structure seeks to unite the community against those outside (Velikonja 2003, 11). With conspiracy myths, the ruling elite try to justify and explain all the events in society and the current situation: external and internal enemies are to blame for the unpleasant situation in the country. There are groups that try to prevent or even to destroy the home society from successfully transitioning to a new state. “The ideal enemy or conspirator is, therefore, the absolute difference of the idealized member of the parent group: he has no culture, history, religion, morals, he is contagious, stupid, evil and inhuman” (Velikonja 2003, 11).

As mentioned already above, there is a rediscovery of old dormant heroes of national mythology and re-identification with the geographical and cultural space of a particular state. Here the ruling group reawakens, creates, and merges culture and politics, in order to create a homogeneous group and to create their national identity. The choice of these myths is always dictated by the interest of the ruling structure, which relies on the existing traditional myths of most members of a particular group. In this sense, old heroes can sometimes be forgotten, and new heroes can be found regardless of which stage in history. There is a revival of various national myths, such as the Slovene literary hero Martin Krpan, who often becomes the primary subject of conflict between the Slovene left and right (Baskar 2015, 85), a link with the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, although once extremely hated as the oppressor, with a new mythological narrative becomes everything that Slovenia is, has always been, and strives to become culturally and historically. Political myths, as an intrinsic aspect of political discourse, serve as an important tool for ideologically legitimizing political processes and setting the groundwork for a variety of acts (Stoica 2014, 22)

The basic or constitutive myths of modern political mythologies are also the foundation of Slovene political mythology (Velikonja 2003, 10). Following Girardet's classification of myths, Velikonja (1996) divides Slovenian mythology in four phases: the golden age of the community, defeat by stronger neighbors, the Yugoslav stage, and the final liberation.

The first phase refers to the so-called "golden age of community", which begins with the settlement of the Balkan space represented as a geographical determinant of the spatial dimension and the first Slovene independent state called Carantania<sup>20</sup> in the temporal dimension. "It is also linked to the process of Christianization, which eventually gained mythical proportions" (Velikonja 1996, 23), and later becomes one of the key factors of the Slovenian national identity, especially by dissolution from Yugoslavia.

Precisely Carantania was an important element of construction of Slovene nationhood, because it was three times the size of present-day Slovenia, and it stretched into what is now Austria and Hungary and centered on what is today the Austrian province of Carinthia. Carantania also existed as an independent political entity from the sixth until the middle of the eighth century, when it became a part of the Frankish Empire. In the late 1980s this Slovene "homeland" became central in calls for an independent Slovenia, and in the

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<sup>20</sup> In the seventh century, in the present area of Slovenia, the first independent state, the Principality of Carantania, was formed.

early 1990s it has played an important role in the explanations of why Slovenian independence was natural and necessary. By linking the independent Slovenia with the imaginary of Carantania, an unbroken chain of “being Slovenian” through the ages is established. In this way, Carantania becomes an important political category (Hansen 1996, 474-475)

When it comes to religion, it is important to mention for the further research that the role of religion among Slovenes has never reached such great mythical proportions as among some other nations. Slovenian mythical choice is called culture; in contrast to other South Slavic nations, where the role of military and political history was emphasized (Velikonja 1996, 172–173).<sup>21</sup>

The second phase is mostly based on political and military defeat against a stronger neighbor, as well as on the Protestant Reformation, and the fight against Turkey (Velikonja 1996). Already from the latter sentence, the differences between the Slovenes and other South Slavic nations are visible, having in mind that none of the other nations have experienced the Protestant Reformation. Velikonja (1996) emphasizes that the Protestant Reformation was the event that linguistically unified and culturally enthroned the Slovenian nation. During the Reformation period, focus was on the relationship between individual and God that led to the view that religious texts should be accessible in vernacular languages, which meant that Slovene became a written language and this creation was seen as an establishment of Slovenians as a part of European culture. With their culture in their native language, Slovenes are supposed to prove their national identity and the legitimacy of existence within a multinational state (Hansen 1996, 476; Velikonja 1996, 179). For this reason, the Slovenian language is still nowadays one of the most important markers of Slovene national identity.

The third phase, called the “Yugoslavian phase”, seemed the best option for moving away from the repressive Austro-Hungarian apparatus and for association with the “South Slavic brothers”. It is precisely through the myth of common ancestors, a similar history, and languages that these South Slavic peoples united in one federation. Within the framework of a strong multinational Yugoslavia, which connected related nations, the Slovenian nation could live a safe and free life. The necessity of uniting small and powerless nations into one common state was one of the most important unifying mechanisms in the country (Velikonja 1996, 182). Fear of the spread of

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<sup>21</sup> Despite that, the Slovene national narrative, in order to emphasize its European affiliation, often celebrates Slovenia as “the pre-wall of Christianity.” (Bartulović, 2010)

Austria to the territory of Serbia, resulted in the unification of all South Slavic peoples and became a “counterweight to Germanization” (Hansen 1996, 477-478). The First Yugoslavia<sup>22</sup> brought Slovenes a better position than ever before, especially in the development of Slovene science and culture. This had a significant impact on the strength of Slovene national identity, which is why Slovenes finally established a political nation – a nation with its own state-political concept (Nečak 1997, 22). Despite this, the imperialist forces so dismembered them that more than a quarter of the ethnic territory and people were cut off from the majority and that strongly influenced the Slovenian political development and mentality. “They dreamed of establishing a united Slovenia” (Prunk 2012, 21).

The last “holy drama” in Slovene mythology took place at the time of Slovenia’s independence with the ten-day war for Slovenia. “The Balkan barbarism and savage passion that simmers beneath the surface is supposed to leave and enter civilized and tame Europe” (Velikonja 1996, 183). Independence seemed to be one likely option for leaving the Balkan chaos and the party that was to blame for all the troubles in the federation (ibid). It was the Slovene government and the Slovene political elite that were to make the state independent, which would finally fulfill the long-standing wish of the Slovene people for their own nation gathered on the same territory, and after that, they could follow their European dream.

With the proclamation of the independent and sovereign Republic of Slovenia, we took a historic step and finally broke free from international anonymity, proved our political maturity, and, as a full-fledged subject, became one of the nations of the world. In this way, we realized our centuries-old dreams, because all our centuries-old desires were consciously or unconsciously directed to this glorious moment when we took our destiny into our own hands and created our own country. (Rode 1992, 7)

In this way, the Slovenes could justify their departure from Yugoslavia and the ten-day war of liberation, and in order to achieve that, victims had to be found. As in a lot of other countries, the process of victimization occurred. As mentioned above, a myth is being born about enemies and hostile groups and the various conspiracies created by these groups. Although victimhood “makes a claim for a non-political space”, and thus present itself as neutral, it actually clears the

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<sup>22</sup> Officially, Kingdom of Yugoslavia, that existed 1918 until 1941. From 1918 to 1929, the official name of the state was „Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes“.

ground by creating “a space for a specific kind of politics” (Jeffery & Candea 2006, 289). Kohl and Schroven argue that “such politicized victimization discourses are the ways in which victims are made in the context of national projects” (Kohl & Schroven 2014,7), and that some of these discourses can be “fabricated, historicised, and divulged by elites, hence in a ‘top-down’ fashion to spread nationalist ideas” (ibid). Still, they stress that the results of such projects mostly depend on “their persuasive power and resilience amongst the general population” (ibid), in the context that “nationalist victimhood narratives had to be popularized among decisive parts of the population to achieve popular support for the respective nation-building claims and processes” (ibid).

As Velikonja explains, with the help of these myths about conspiracies or their undoubted existence, states or institutions try to explain and justify the situation and events in society. Political mistakes and various crises are presented in such myths as the consequences of the activities of various conspiratorial groups, thus the ruling elite avoids inconveniences and retains its legitimacy. Likewise, conspiracy myths are a very convenient means of various purges and reckonings with adversaries who are supposed to be enemies of the nation or suspicious persons (Velikonja 2003, 75-76).

That the territory is important to every state or, according to Anderson, an imaginary community, can be seen from the statement of Nina Kozinc, who explains that the geographical area of Slovenia in the FYR was perceived as nationally monolithic – as it is still perceived in political debates and activities, although in history its territory has always been multinational: on the outskirts, it was inhabited by Italians and Hungarians, Germans and Roma, and after the Second World War the population immigrated from other Yugoslav republics (Kozinc 2005, 98). As Edensor stresses, the nation is always the one which remains “the paramount space within which identity is located. At cognitive, affective, and habitual levels, the national space provides a common-sense context for situating identity” (Edensor 2002, 64).

“To engage with the deep ways in which the nation is embedded in notions of space, it is vital to conceive of space as multifaceted: as evidence of (political, capital) power, as symbolically and semiotically loaded, as esthetically interpreted and fashioned, as sensually apprehended and part of embodied identity, and as a setting for reflexive and unreflexive practices” (Edensor 2002, 65). For all of the above reasons, we can conclude that spatial and temporal dimensions are

always closely connected with politics. In order to confirm its independency, Slovene politics needed to reinvent and to revoke old national heroes, symbols, and mythology. Furthermore, presenting the nation and its territory as victims of larger and militarily stronger nations is an approach which is used in almost all territorially smaller and economically weaker states, and the same pattern can also be seen in all former Yugoslav states. In Slovenian case, the threat that was once Europe, and in particular the Austro-Hungarian Empire, in this new context becomes something desirable and natural, while Yugoslavia, which was once perceived as the best solution for preserving Slovene nation and identity, with the change of political situation, becomes undesirable and distant. For this reason, we conclude that national myths and symbols have a major role in spreading the political aspirations of the ruling party in Slovenia. For example, at the time of independence, Slovene national politics evoked the mid-19th century, and the program of the United Slovenia. "They envisioned a community that would unite Slovene-speaking people in one political entity, who at that time lived in various administrative units and political regimes. Following the example of the then-primordially conceptualized notions of the national community in Europe, the Slovene population was conceived as a community distinguished by a common origin, language, culture and territory and continuous continuities of these attributes throughout history" (Knežević-Hočevar 2003, 353). The co-creators of the state-building discourse thus restored the pre-existing image of the Slovene nation in the period of Slovenia's "independence" and equated it with the national population. In their efforts to establish a new Slovenian statehood, they reactivated the anachronistic formula according to which the national population is equal to the nation state or, by definition, includes in its membership those people who live in a common territory and also have a common linguistic, cultural, and historical experience (Kreager 1997, 155).

## 8. Yugoslavism and Slovene National Identity

Yugoslavia was a federation with the diverse mixture of ethnicities, cultures, languages, and religions. Composed of six republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia) and two autonomous provinces (Vojvodina and Kosovo), housed five nations (Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians) and had at least three official languages (Slovenian, Serbian-Croatian and Macedonian) The religious population was divided into three different denominations – Roman Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Muslim. (Tomić 2017, 271) Each of these entities had its own individual religious, historical, and/or linguistic traditions. These traditions also incorporated earlier conflicts with other parts of socialist Yugoslavia. (Godina 1998, 410-411)

From the above, it is already more than evident how complex Yugoslavia as a state was in terms of (self) identification. History has shown that the project of Yugoslavia, conceived as a solid community of different nations united by South Slavic origins, was not feasible. As Godina (1998, 410) stresses, the outbreak of radical nationalism among the nations once merged into the Yugoslav state was the result of a „reorganisation within an identification matrix“. (ibid) She also claims that the biggest problem which later led to outburst of nationalism in former Yugoslav states was precisely in Yugoslav supranational identification (ibid).

With the historical conflicts even before the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the constant competition for domination between Serbs and Croats in which, as she further states, Serbs imposed themselves, the animosity among these three nations was more than visible, which later led to the collapse of the first Yugoslavia (ibid). Godina emphasizes that besides these guerrilla wars between the Ustasas and the Chetniks during WW II, “what is surprising is not the present outburst of nationalism but the lengthy non-nationalistic period in the past“ (ibid, 411).

Primarily due to Serbian domination over other peoples of the federation and the need of Bosnian Muslims to strengthen their ethnicity, a supranational identity was created, an artificial creation called ‘Yugoslavism’. The task of Yugoslavism was to appease more pronounced nationalist aspirations and tensions and to pursue a policy of „brotherhood and unity“.

„It marked and propagated two dimensions of national relations“ (Godina 1998, 413). “With 'brotherhood', it appealed to the common link between Yugoslav nations (emphasizing their common Slavic origin, while appealing to variants of the pan-Slavic idea). With 'unity', it presented unification as the realization of long-lasting historical desires and interests of the various Yugoslav nations“(ibid).

The term „Yugoslav“ was first used in the third post-war census in 1961. Officially, this category was reserved for the „nationally unaffiliated“ and was treated as an additional residual category for those who had no particular national identity (Petrović 1983 in Godina 1998, 14). In this way, the members of the people of Yugoslavia found themselves in an interesting position of the dual identification. On the one hand, they had their own national identities, which were closely linked to their religious and linguistic identity (Bieber 2015, 895), and on the other side, they had the opportunity to identify with the Yugoslav supranational identity.

Each individual was able to develop parallel identities: „a national one (which suited the membership of one's nation, and which correlated geographically with part of Yugoslav territory), and a 'Yugoslav' one (aligned with the state frame politically as well as geographically)“. (Godina 1998, 416) Still, she stresses that these two identities were generally never in conflict for the majority of the population. However, when there was a conflict between the two, it was automatically resolved by giving the priority to the „Yugoslav identity“ at the expense of the national identity. (ibid)

Yugoslavism, as a collective identity, served the purpose of the leading party (the League of Communists of Yugoslavia) because collective identities are relatively fluid discursive constructions and can be rewritten (Volčič 2007, 68). “Their political, cultural creation is an active, dialectical process that involves the evolving construction and reconstruction of a sense of self-identity. The construction of a collective identity also involves active strategies of inclusion and exclusion whereby the boundaries of a given collectivity are controlled”(ibid). “The historical importance of creating an imagined community within the former socialist Yugoslavia was an attempt to unify all differences around the multilayered model of national rights, which included a peculiar mixture of suppression and compromise” (Volčič 2007, 68).

Sekulic, Hodson and Massey (1994, 85-86) identify four sets of factors encouraging increased self-identification as a Yugoslav:

1. Modernization – It was assumed that urbanization and increased education and literacy would diminish the importance of national identities as contact between groups increased, „as a shared national history developed, and as a prosperous national future would emerged“ (Deutsch 1969 in Sekulic, Hodson and Massey 1994, 85). With industrialization came geographic mobility and greater contact between nationalities in urban areas, and identification as Yugoslav became a means of facilitating social relations between people of different national backgrounds by minimizing cultural barriers and differences (ibid).
2. Political Participation – Stories of military sacrifice and victory, the identification of common enemies, and images of a common destiny were propagated to support the image of the unification of nations. Nationality as a dividing force was condemned by patriots who remembered the partition of Yugoslavia during the World War II and the internal war was instigated by foreign countries that cost hundreds of thousands of lives. „Thus, to identify as a Yugoslav was to condemn the forces that betrayed the memory of the war and to identify with the efforts of the Partisans to create a progressive, socialist society“ (ibid, 85).
3. Demographic Factors – This was especially important for the children of nationally mixed marriages, where each parent could expect their child to recognize their own national identity. By identifying as Yugoslav, one could resist other's claims to one's identity and thus avoid potential conflict. Yugoslav identification also offered a way to break with an increasingly discredited past, especially among younger people. It was a protest against traditional nationalist politics, which seemed to be the heart of the region's problems (after Banac 1984). „Furthermore, the recognition that much of Yugoslavia was less prosperous than the rest of Europe – an observation often reflected in Yugoslav popular culture encouraged a Yugoslav identity as a reflection of hopes for greater integration into the European community. An important step in this direction was the abandonment of particularistic, traditional notions and movement toward a vague notion

of 'Europeanism.' Yugoslav identification seemed closer to this ideal than more narrow ethnic or national identifications“ (ibid, 86).

4. Majority/Minority Status – Those who identified themselves as a Yugoslavs thus avoided either conforming to the majority or calling themselves a minority (ibid).

As they further point out (ibid, 88), increased urbanization, less rural isolation, higher levels of education, an open opportunity structure, worker-owned businesses, and living in a single state for nearly two generations should weaken the political force of nationalism and replace it with cultural traditions and ethnic pride common to all South Slavic peoples.

Observing Yugoslavism as a cultural phenomenon is also interesting from the aspect of everyday nationalism. In order to maintain Yugoslavism as a supranational identification concept, a top-down approach alone was not enough, i.e. the imposition of this identification mark by the state apparatus, through, for example, censuses offering the category „Yugoslavs“ or Tito's motivational speeches.<sup>23</sup> It was necessary to instill this concept in the consciousness of the masses, using a bottom-up approach. Yugoslavism was supposed to enter the consciousness of all the peoples of the former federation in a perfidious, somewhat banal way, as something clear, mundane and completely normal. For this reason, it could be concluded that Yugoslavism was not only an identification mark, but also a brand that manifested itself primarily through music.<sup>24</sup> For example, Croatian singer Doris Dragović sang the song „Hey Yugoslavs! (Hej Jugoslaveni!)“, where the verses *Hey, Yugoslavs, let the voice be heard! We are like a rock, because brotherhood unites us* promoted just the above mentioned brotherhood and unity. Also, the singer Lepa Brena, at that time considered among the population as one of the symbols of connecting all the peoples of the former federation, had many songs that served to promote Yugoslavism, which is evident from verses such as: *The land of peace, the land of Tito, the land brave and proud. The world knows about you. We love you, our mother. We won't give you to*

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<sup>23</sup> Volčič highlights that „through a combination of suppression, compromise and charismatic personality, Tito managed to control nationalisms during his reign“(2007, 76).

<sup>24</sup> Discussion about the connection between the music and everyday nationalism explained in subchapter 10.2.

*anyone. Long live Yugoslavia! or My eyes are the Adriatic Sea. My hair is Pannonian. My sister is the Slavic soul. I am Yugoslav!*<sup>25</sup>

It is evident that all these songs had the task of promoting the Yugoslav identity in a very subtle and people-friendly way. While, for example, the singing of national patriotic songs that were considered nationalist in Yugoslav discourse was punishable, the promotion of Yugoslavism through music was more than desirable.

Still, After Tito's death, Yugoslavia fell into a multidimensional internal crisis manifested by a sharp decline in economic standards, external debt and hyperinflation, increased ethnic and political tensions in Kosovo, with nationalist aspirations by Serbia and a desire for independence by Croatia and Slovenia. It is quite clear that Yugoslavism as a concept and identification mark could not calm the growing tensions between nations.

Just as in most countries of former Yugoslavia, the idea of independence of Slovenia existed for years before it happened. According to Bučar (2003), in the late 1980s, Yugoslavia existed mainly only in the structure of state coercion, and, as a natural social system, it was largely a fiction. As he further stresses, Yugoslavia as a single state or even as a federal state, never had the conditions for existence, and, therefore, “suppressed the existence of all as a form of forced integration” (Bučar 2003, 178). In his words, a state is a formation based on perfectly defined uniform criteria, and Yugoslavia was not like that, because its construction was shared. It was an assembly of countries, nations, and languages, which did not reflect the integrity of a sovereign state (ibid). At the time of the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the independence of Slovenia, the nationalization of Slovene politics and society was extremely strong. As the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia states, Slovenia became independent on the basis of “the fundamental and permanent right of the Slovene nation to self-determination and the historical fact that Slovenes in the millennial struggle for national liberation formed their national identity and established their statehood” (Kozinc 2005, 105-106).

It was precisely because of Belgrade’s increasing influence and disobedience to advanced ideas that a spontaneous reaction developed in Slovenia, directed against the authorities at the time.

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<sup>25</sup> All translations made by author.

Yugoslavia found itself in inter-ethnic conflicts that led to the May Declaration,<sup>26</sup> authored by the Slovenian Writers' Association, the Slovenian Democratic Union, the Slovenian Peasant Federation, the Slovenian Christian Social Movement, and the Social Democratic Union of Slovenia. In the introduction, it was estimated that Slovenes in Yugoslavia were experiencing misunderstandings and also hostilities, and that hard times would fall upon Yugoslavia (Rupel 1992, 27). The signatories stated they wanted to live in the sovereign state of the Slovenian nation so that they would independently decide on connections with the South Slavs and other nations within the framework of a renewed Europe. They emphasized that the Slovenian state would be based on respect for human rights and freedoms, on a democracy that includes political pluralism, and on a social regime that would ensure spiritual and material prosperity under natural resources (ibid, 27). Bučar further highlights that the main problem of Yugoslavia was the different development of its parts, in the context where Slovenia was already "mature" enough to accept democracy and freedom, while its core, however, still clung to communism and unitarism (2003, 178).

In this sense, to support Yugoslavia, from the Slovenian point of view meant subordination to one-party centralism and communism, rejection of one's own language or adopting a "common" Serbo-Croatian language and supporting the underdeveloped parts of Yugoslavia (ibid, 179). Furthermore, the process of Slovenia's independence was not only opposed by powerful factors in the disintegrating Yugoslavia, but also was not supported on the international scene. Klinar (1992, 86) stresses that the opposition to independence led to aggression against Slovenia by the Yugoslav People's Army, followed by economic measures meted out by the federal and Serbian authorities, which hit Slovenia hard. As the most developed and richest part of the former state, Slovenia also had the greatest aspirations to become independent. Klinar emphasizes that this "difficult path to independence, and especially aggression against Slovenia, clearly strengthened the Slovenian national consciousness, where Slovenian public opinion expressed a markedly overwhelmingly positive attitude towards Slovenia, its people, and its independence, where patriotism is, though to a lesser extent than these above, received a positive rating" (ibid, 87). Indeed, it was already clear from the Slovenian public opinion of November and December 1991 that 76% of the population would vote for an independent Slovenia, although at the plebiscite

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<sup>26</sup> Created on the 8th of May, 1989.

they would know that the decision on independence would be linked to the military conflict and the economic crisis (ibid). Likewise, the reasons for an independent Slovenia were primarily economic and only to a lesser extent political and cultural, but, following the aggression against Slovenia, political reasons seemed to prevail. Slovene nationalism merged the following elements: national consciousness with ethnic identity, internal cohesiveness, and political movement through mobilization for the realization of a sovereign nation-state related to the growth of national consciousness (Alter quoted in Klinar 1992, 86). As Klinar adds, this nationalism, which is primarily aimed at the nation-state, thus affected those Yugoslav peoples who choose to preserve Yugoslavia. However, it does not find aggressive or threatening tendencies towards other Yugoslav nations. Encouraged by a re-awakened national charge, Slovenia has rediscovered its “European” identity and aspiration to “rejoin” Europe. As Mastnak (1998) explains, despite all political divisions, fundamental political continuity and orientation towards Europe were recorded in Slovenia. Entry into “Europe”, with broad support, had become a strategic goal for Slovenia.

Europe is also synonymous with prosperity, democracy, freedom, solidarity – all values which Slovenia has admired and wanted over time. Slovenia regarded itself as democratically firm and as a protector of all those human rights that were violated in the Balkans in the 1990s. Post-independence Slovenia relied primarily on the idea of democracy, respect for human rights and freedoms, which moved it away from the Balkans and brought it closer to Europe (Vezovnk, 2009). As Klinar stresses, Slovenia’s self-esteem “gradually matured and demanded cultural, educational, economic autonomy – until the demand for its own national state” (Klinar 1992, 86).

This statement can further be validated with the 1995's publication called „*New nationalism in the East and West, Slovenia and Austria*“, where the nationalisms and public opinions of the inhabitants of the two neighboring countries were being observed. One of the reasons for this observation is the fact that both countries share a common history (Austrian-Hungarian Empire) and similar culture, despite the fact that Austria was for decades developing in the capitalist spirit, while Slovenia has been a socialist state. From this survey, it is evident, that Slovenians are most proud of their success in sports and their independence, as well as their culture. (Ogris et al. 1995, 23) It is interesting that, while defining their own identity and the similarities with other

nations, the Austrian self-understanding reflected mostly in similarities with Germans and the Swiss, while every second Slovene saw the biggest closeness exactly with Austrians. Every third could find similarities with Germans and the Swiss, while only every seventh compared himself with neighboring Croats. Likewise, the distance to Serbs and people from Bosnia and Herzegovina was the same both in Austria and in Slovenia (ibid, 24), what is quite alluring, having in mind that Slovenes have lived for decades in the same country with this nations. The authors themselves emphasize that the Slovenian population is thus significantly more oriented towards the economically stronger neighbor in the north than to the nations that are related to it by language, but also to the former fraternal nations in the former Yugoslav federation. The Slovenian population, therefore, has a pure "Western" self-understanding, which is very similar to that of the Austrian population, and feels even more related to the Americans than the Austrian population. (ibid) Slovenian national identity, according to Hafner-Fink (1997, 265), is founded on ethno-cultural features such as supposed ancestry and a common language. Being a true Slovene, according to nationalists, entails not only speaking Slovene and residing in Slovenia, but also being a native Slovene.

Bajt (2017, 19) continues by stating that Slovenian national identity is inextricably linked to the landscape. Political issues are only brought to the fore later, and they supplant the demands of one's own country. Slovene nationalism is easily treated as an example of cultural nationalism, because of the "exposed and compensatory role of language and culture / literature" and "for the sake of its bearers, who were initially exclusively culturalists and intellectuals" (Velikonja 2002c, 292).

There are various factors in the development of Slovene national culture, including: external political pressures (Germanization and Italianization), changes in the strategic orientations of Slovene society, feelings of cultural inferiority in relation to more developed Western European countries, and cultural superiority in relation to the Balkans, cultural struggles between the left and the right, and internal ecclesiastical and political pressures (ibid). Taking 1991 as the starting point for the development of Slovene nationalism, one can speak of a certain post-Socialist phenomenon that has affected many former Socialist states. It was the fall of Communism that was the wind in the sails of nationalism and xenophobia in the former Socialist countries. According to Kuzmanić (1994, 165-166), post-Socialisms are a collective name for

related Central and Eastern European post-revolutionary regimes, which could not change without greater or lesser discrimination, without the spread of nationalism, xenophobia, machismo, chauvinism, racism and all the accompanying social and cultural phenomena of European civilization.

As Toplak, following Verdery's survey of the entire Eastern European region in the mid-1990s, stresses, one of the first visible consequences of democratization was the revival of "ethno-national" identities, based on which both citizenship and constitutionally-guaranteed fundamental rights in the newly established states, especially those that emerged from Communist federations, were redefined and redistributed (Toplak 1998, 294). Constitutionally-legitimized nationalism (and not democracy) was the ideology that replaced Communism in these societies, and nationalism did not represent an alternative to Communism, but rather its continuity in terms of more conservative collectivism (Verdery quoted in Toplak 1998, 294). Bajt points out that even entrenched democracies routine nationalism through involvement in political structures (2015, 154). The preservation of the "national substance" became an increasingly central political theme (Mencin Čeplak 2005, 112).

Kozinc explains that an important strategic element of the constitution of the new state was also nationalism, which is not recognized by Slovene historiography (2005, 100).

Slovene historiography has written national history, it has created the myth of collective action, which more or less understandably does not include the secular and tolerant political tradition of new social movements. [...] Slovene historiography has written a homogenizing recent national history, which more or less implicitly refers to general unity, the power of the political class, and its authority. (ibid, 101)

## 9. European versus Balkan Culture

In this thesis, the “Balkans” is not understood as a purely geographical concept, but as a cultural entity defined by the region’s shared imperial heritage and its specific peripheral position in relation to Western Europe. Geographically and culturally, the Balkans include Bulgaria, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Croatia, Kosovo, Slovenia, Albania, Greece, Romania and Turkey. These countries share and intertwined socio-cultural heritage and modern trends with some common (cultural) emotional structures. (Volčić 2013, 334)

The Balkans has always been a debatable area, because there are several definitions regarding its geographical area. While one definition clarifies that the Balkan states are all the states of the former Yugoslavia together with Albania, and without Slovenia, the second definition puts Greece in the Balkans, while the third considers Romania and Bulgaria as the Balkans, but excludes the northern part of Slovenia and Croatia. To complicate this, the very notion of the Balkans is always full of negative connotations, so Todorova argues that the Balkans are a part of Europe, albeit one playing a provincial or peripheral part for the last several centuries. The Balkans, in contrast to hypothetical West, is considered as a structural variant of Said’s Orientalism<sup>27</sup> (Todorova 2015, 27-28). However, unlike Orientalism, which Todorova considers a discourse on imposed opposition, Balkanism is a discourse on imposed ambiguity, because they are indeterminate, persons or phenomena in transition; just like those who are the marginalized, they are dangerous –both to themselves to others (ibid, 37).

The Balkans, if we can understand it as a relatively fixed term, is a place of very different intersections of ‘European’ and ‘Oriental’ culture, so understanding the ‘Balkans’ as a purely quasi-Oriental exoticism fundamentally overlooks an extremely important part of the historical formation of the Balkans as such – that is, its European history (Stanković 2002, 234).

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<sup>27</sup> According to his interpretation, Orientalism is a European invention that, on the basis of the “we” and “they” divisions, European culture could be justified as dominant, that is, “the Western way of dominating the Orient, restructuring it and having power over it” (Said 1999, 9). In this way the Orient becomes mystified and exotic, and at the same time backward and backward towards European culture, but equally produced by the culture of the West that produced it in such a way that it “corresponded more to the culture that created it than to its supposed object.” (Said 1999, 32).

According to Milica Bakić-Hayden, Balkanism developed its rhetorical paradigm independently of Orientalism, given its own specific geopolitical, religious, and cultural location. In this sense, the discourse of Balkanism is treated as a variation of Orientalism, which means that different forms – Balkanism and Orientalism – become related (Bakić-Hayden 1995, 919). Unlike Orientalism, Balkanism as an academic discourse does not rely on earlier academic traditions, for it emerged during the disintegration of Yugoslavia, when the Balkans became an important topic in academic literature. (Vezovnik & Šarić 2015, 238).

Velikonja explains the Balkans is “not just one, a land of bloodthirsty warriors out there somewhere, but a complex scene, an environment in which differences between cultures, countries, nations, mentalities, religions, etc. complement the similarities between them. In the Balkans, it is as justified to look for what is common as to emphasize all that is different” (Velikonja 2002b, 143). To someone who does not live within the imaginary boundaries of the geographical area of the Balkans, it is difficult to explain the above differences and similarities. While ethnic, religious, and linguistic components are the primary artifacts of differentiation in all spheres of life, from the political to the everyday, the Balkans still boasts the members’ similarities through certain cultural components, primarily through elements of popular culture. The Balkans is actually an imaginary place full of tensions through differentiation from those Others, which disappear when members of the so-called Balkan nations find themselves in an area outside the Balkans. Exactly what causes the most tensions in the imaginary Balkans, such as linguistic issues, disappears in some foreign areas, because, characterized as Others in the eyes of the native population, the similarity of languages is what unites them. If we touch briefly on the cultural components in the search for the similarities of the Balkan nations, we can conclude that popular culture, expressed precisely through the linguistic prism and similarities of languages, is what connects these people. Danesi understands culture to be a “system that includes beliefs, rituals, art forms and performances, lifestyles, language, symbols, as well as music, dance, and any form of human expressive, intellectual, and communicative behavior associated with a community over a period of time”(Danesi 2008, 2).

But apart from this, there is the negative connotation that Balkan carries, mostly connected with and known for its aggression, primitivism, backwardness, and nationalisms among nations (see Todorova 2015, Luketić 2013, Vezovnik 2007). As Zupančič explains, the poorest countries in

Europe are in this area, as well as a visible lag behind other European countries in social and technological terms (Zupančič, 2015).

The Balkans is something beyond the horizon, something unseen, incomprehensible, unclear, meaningless, not the same, non-European... Since the introduction of the Balkans as a geographical and geographical-cultural concept, it is the lexeme “Balkan” derived in the manner of negation. It represents the other and opposite poles in opposition to European progress. The Balkans deny Europe at its core, the Balkans deny European values, deny themselves and resist. (Džigal 2002, 72)

Todorova emphasizes that the notion of the Balkans, from literary works to the everyday speech of the people who live in those areas, actually borders on banality (2015, 35). Džigal (2002, 73) even says that the Balkans as a geographical-cultural entity does not exist. The Balkans is a space inhabited by imaginary content, a space to which some simple rhetoric is projected, limited by a selective view of reality.

In the Slovene national narrative, there is a dichotomy between Europe and the Balkans – that is, the creation of a Slovene identity through the prism that, to put it simply, “everything that is European is good and desirable”, while everything that is “Balkan” is foreign and undesirable. On the other hand, there is a great historical and cultural attachment to Europe. As Vezovnik emphasizes, “Europe has become the alpha and omega, the measure of everything, the supreme good, the sum of all values, in short, the imaginary” (Vezovnik 2009, 150). Stankovič highlights that, at the time of independence, Slovene nationalism was articulated almost diametrically opposite to what was understood as the Balkans. This newer articulation of Slovene nationalism operated in the manner of introducing the basic binary opposition of Europe to the Balkans and had two peculiarities. First, a multitude of derived markers (diligence, precision, rationality, honesty with “Europe”, and laziness, emotionality, dishonesty, dirt on the “Balkans”) were attached to these two poles and misunderstood the relationship between Europe and the Balkans on the relationship between solely good and bad. Second, in political, cultural and media discourses, Slovene national identity is (was) entirely placed in the field of the “European”, and all nations south of the southern Slovene border in the field of the “Balkans”. In short, the concept of the Balkans, in which more or less all traditional European prejudices and negative stereotypes are inscribed, was a symbolic focus through which Slovene nationalism was established in the 1980s and legitimized in the minds of most members of Slovene nation (Stankovič 2002, 230).

Bechev stresses that Central Europe and its regional institutions was a magnet for more developed Balkan countries, such as Croatia, Romania, and especially Slovenia, which, “following the brief war in 1991, staged the quickest escape from the Balkans fuelled by economic prosperity and rapid rapprochement with the West ” (Bechev 2004, 12). As he further points out, joining arrangements like the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA) became a priority, because being a part of Central Europe was a springboard for joining Europe (ibid). It was precisely the Yugoslav history that hindered the Slovene identity, which was in fact European. For this reason, Slovenia must prove its true European affiliation, specifically through the fight against its “Balkan mother”. The negative connotations of the Balkans cause the fact that leaving the “Balkan” identity means entering the “civilized”, “diplomatic” nations of “Europe”. Slovenia must construct its new European identity by rejecting and abandoning all the characteristics of “Balkan-ness” (Vezovnik 2009). Lindstrom (2003, 316) found that Slovenes describe themselves as progressive, hard-working, tolerant, and democratic Europeans, who differ from primitive, intolerant, and backward “Balkans”. According to her, Slovenes want to portray Slovene national identity as completely different from the Yugoslav heritage and other Yugoslav nations, thus justifying their desire for independence as a necessary liberation from the Balkans and at the same time the right to join the European institutions (ibid., 317).<sup>28</sup>

As pointed out earlier, even though the identification with religion in Slovenia was not as strong as in other nations of the former Yugoslavia, there is still a strong national narrative in Slovenia as a country which is defender of “Christianity and Europe”. Bartulović emphasizes that “the quarrels within the European West in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries shifted the important burden of defense [against the Turks, the author’s remark] to the ‘Slovenian’ lands and Slovenian territory” (2010, 80). For example, as Gruden explains:

The Slovene and Croatian lands have been the defenders of Christian Europe all this time. While in the north and west the nations progressed unhindered in peace and prosperity, there was a fierce struggle for the survival of Christian culture in the south-eastern Alpine countries, in the Posavje and Podravje regions. A Slovene and a Croat stood guard over the most expensive shrines of European nations. (Gruden 1910, 321)

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<sup>28</sup> She found the same for Croats, and in her opinion, the Slovenes succeeded much better than the Croats, because at the time of her research, Slovenes were just before joining the EU and NATO, and in contrast to the Croats, few associated with the Balkans. (Lindstrom 2003, 316)

Since all countries in this area want to become part of the European Union as soon as possible and thus move away from the Balkans and accept European identity, it is widely believed that the Balkans lost their identity when it began to Europeanize. For this reason, nations living in this geographical-cultural zone have two options: “They either accept the stigma of being Balkan or project it onto their neighbours in order to assert their own ‘Europeanness’ ” (Bechev 2004, 10). In this discourse, the Balkans is another ‘cultural Other’, in contrast to which Europe can be presented as a cultural civilizational whole (R. Petrović 2009, 20). The Balkans is a kind of “inner Other”, a “half Other”; as “European Non-Europe”, which is in stark contrast to “European identity” (ibid). From this it can be concluded that in the Slovene narrative the Balkans fall into the category of so-called close Others (*bližnji drugi*).

Those foreigners are needed so that “we” as a nation can be able to characterize ourselves in a positive context, but according to geography, history, and even religion, they still do not fall into the category of the so-called absolute others. In the case of “absolute others”, the otherness is so visible and intense that we cannot share any common points with them. “Such an enemy are the Turks, who construct us as Europeans and also as Christians. Today they are increasingly replaced in this role by Muslims, who are the closest clearly identifiable foreigner after the fall of the Iron Curtain” (Čepič & Vogrinčič 2003, 332).

Velikonja further clarifies that the part of the Slovenian Eurocentric metadiscourse, is its connection to the dominant national discourses, and calls it “Euroslovenism”, explaining that the Euro-Slovenian discourse is divided into two mutually complementary discourses on the position of Slovenia in relation to Europe. The first distinguishes between Slovenia and Europe: Slovenia will become part of Europe. The second hinges on being a returnee: “we are returning to where we have always been” (Velikonja 2005, 16). “Return to Europe” was an important motto by which Slovenian leaders wanted to secure international recognition of the country, achieve the distinction between national and Yugoslav identities and legitimize accession to the EU and NATO (Lindstrom 2003, 313-14). In a nation with a young national tradition, as in the Slovene case, one can observe a mixture of using European identity for the reconstruction of national identity, based on various Slovene cultural features and common values within the European civilization sphere (cultural identity), and the desire for a new Slovene state to be established by joining the common European framework (political identity) (Plavšak 2001, 80). In the latter,

national identity is redefined only in the EU context and in relation to / in contrast to the existing European identity (ibid).

It is interesting that Europe, which in the former national narrative, was a threat that will destroy the small Slavic people and, accordingly, the reason for unification with the “South Slavic brothers”, later, through its democracy and promise of better economic status becomes the only solution to preserve national importance (Vezovnik 2007, 2009).

“One Slovenian cultural specificity is the coexistence and simultaneity of the senses of cultural inferiority towards those nations which seem to have developed a higher level of culture (West European, but predominantly towards Germans) and on the other side a sense of cultural superiority towards those on the lower cultural level (Balkan and Eastern European nations)” (Velikonja, 2000)

In this sense, after becoming a member of European Union, Slovenia compensated its national integrity with exclusivism and nationalism inwardly, to groups that deviate from the mythical image of national unanimity and thus of European justice. “It is more than obvious that the more the state opens outwardly, the more it closes inwardly; the more it enters a complex, interdependent and competitive external environment, the more it replaces it with internal exclusion” (Velikonja 2009, 86). For this reason, one can talk about eurocentrism, about one universal, and in this case, European culture, that has a dominant position in comparison with other cultures, and whose norms and values must be followed. As Lukšič-Hacin (1999, 73) stresses, eurocentrism is naturalized as a common sense that forms the glasses of perception of the world and is assumed that all the best is done by Europeans.

As previous chapters demonstrate, culture plays a significant role in Slovenian national identity, which could be one of the factors in social exclusion. Slovenia has always been eclipsed by larger and wealthier surrounding countries and empires throughout history. As a result, Slovenia was unable to differentiate itself through force or wealth, and instead relied on its culture and language to define its national identity. (Čopič & Tomc 2010, 42).

From the definitions above, it is obvious that in Slovenia one can find really strong attachment to the European discourse, meaning that Slovenes as a nation feel culturally inferior to other European nations, such as for example, neighboring Austrians, but they still feel more connected

to them than they do to any other South Slavic nation. Also, in order to define themselves nationally, Slovenes needed to rediscover their European identity, which later led to becoming a part of European Union, and respectively, to dissociate from negative connotations of Balkan discourse.

## 10. The Construction of the Other: Non-Slovenes

*You are a foreigner already because you have the wrong last name. If your grandparents come from the south, if you eat čevapčiči or lobster, if you listen to sevdalinke or Azra. Sometimes it is enough if your accent when pronouncing a Slovenian word is not right, if you dislike sauerkraut roast, if you have a slightly pointed nose, if you're too tall or if your eye, hair and skin color are a bit darker. (Kuzmanić 1999, 11)*

In Slovenia, migrations have changed and reshaped the cultural homogeneity of the nation. In addition to which, nationalism is undoubtedly one ideology that has marked the history of the last two centuries. It represented the idea of mobilizing the people around a fundamentally pure and in principle superior nation, which, by some definitions, leads to conflicts. Thus, in Slovenia, there were various phenomena of exclusion of those who in one way or another did not belong to the poetic story the nation told about itself (Stankovič 2002). As already mentioned in the previous chapter, “anti-Balkanism” in particular has become an essential starting point for Slovene nationalism, where it served as a point of negative identification (Velikonja 2011; Stankovič 2002, 233). It is precisely this personification of the Balkans with members of other nations of former Yugoslavia and the consequent stigmatization and discrimination that extends from political practices to popular culture and media, marked as “Balkanophobia”, has become part of the dominant discourses (Velikonja 2011). According to different public opinion polls conducted by the Slovenian state and scholars<sup>29</sup> dealing with the attitude of the majority population towards the immigration of foreigners to Slovenia, public opinion is mostly negative, and especially towards the people from former Yugoslav states.

As can be seen in the third chapter, the Slovenian public already had experience with stereotypes related to the Balkans during Yugoslav times. In the Slovenian national narrative, the Balkans are presented as barbaric and uncivilized, in opposition to the civilized and cultural area of Central Europe, to which Slovenia also belongs. A similar narrative could be seen in neighboring

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<sup>29</sup> see Kralj, A. (2011) Ekonomske migracije in delavci migranti v ogledalu javnega mnenja, ANNALES · Ser. hist. sociol. · 21 · 2011 · 2, pp. 285-296.

Komac, M., M. Medvešek (ed.) (2005). Percepcije slovenske integracijske politike. Ljubljana: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja

Croatia. According to multiple studies, the judgments of Slovenes and Croats towards Balkan terminology were especially strengthened after the independence of the states and their desire to join the EU (see Velikonja 2002a, Stankovič 2002, Bechev 2004, Vezovnik 2009, Zupančič 2015). Šarić (2009) has researched connotations of the term “Balkans” in post-Yugoslav media articles, and shows how much both Slovenia and Croatia have distanced themselves from this term. As she states, “in the eyes of the Croatian and Slovenian media, the Balkans are the opposite of the international environment” (Šarić 2009, 404).

Klinar stresses that even though Slovenian nationalism in the context of secession from Yugoslavia was understood as positive, at the same time the elements of negative nationalism can be seen. As he further specifies,

this phenomenon is spreading across Europe after the collapse of socialism, not only in the anomic and crisis situations of all post-socialist societies, which are plagued by the problems of widespread restructuring with high unemployment and poverty, but also in Western European societies living in fear of the actual and potential rush of refugees, asylum seekers, and economic immigrants from the East. Among Slovenian respondents, negative nationalism comes to the fore in attitudes towards immigrants from other Yugoslav republics. (Klinar 1992, 89)

Nowadays, following significant immigration from the Middle East, it is evident that Slovenian politics is also afraid of migrants and asylum seekers. But in the past, migrants from the former Yugoslavia were presented as a threat. A specific proper term for ex-Yugoslav nationals was established and popularized in Slovenia in the 1990s (Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Macedonians, Montenegrins, and Albanians). Non-Slovenes was their collective moniker (Neslovenci). (Velikonja 2000) While other ethnic groups living in Slovenia are normally called by the names of the nations to which they belong, the above ethnic groups, regardless of their ethnicity, different languages, and religions, belong to this particular group. It was this intolerance in the 1990s which led to marking people from former Yugoslav republics who lived in Slovenia with this term. “They were given names such as *Balkanci* (Balkanians), *Bosanderosi* (referring to Bosnians), *Čefurji* (čefurs), *Južnjaki* (referring to Southern ones), *Jugosi* (referring to people of former Yugoslavia), or *iči* (a reference to their last names)” (Patljak 2010, 31). According to Baltić (2002, 165), the problem with these terms is that they are used primarily to refer to the

working class and criminal gangs. These labels, therefore, do not function as ethnic labels, but rather ones that carry a social value (Gazdić quoted in Baltić 2002, 165).

In this sense, there is a relationship of power inscribed in ethnic discourse, where the self-presentation of Slovenes as non-čefurs<sup>30</sup> is not only a neutral dividing line that helps to understand who is Slovene and who is not, but also a point of reproduction of unambiguous social classification on ‘better’ and ‘worse’ (Stankovič 2010, 164). With the widespread use and establishment of the term “Non-Slovenes” as a catch-all for immigrants from all the republics of former Yugoslavia, a binary mythical logic was formed, according to which people are classified only as belonging to the groups “us” or “them”, and where “them” has a mainly negative connotation (Velikonja 2005, 5).

For example, there is a belief among Slovenes that people who immigrated to Slovenia from the former Yugoslav republics are less educated than Slovenes, or that they have no education at all. When we compare this with the statistical data, it is evident that this statement is completely unfounded. According to census data from 2002 to 2003,<sup>31</sup> there are no major deviations from between Slovenes or immigrants, with respect to the national average. Sometimes, even certain ethnic groups from FYR are more educated than the native ethnic group. However, it is necessary to consider the fact that these data apply only to the permanent population, but do not include seasonal workers who come to Slovenia in large numbers (Dekleva & Razpotnik 2002, 26). Among the members of the majority population (Slovenians), the predominant level of education is secondary school graduates (54.3%). The situation is similar among the Croats (50.8%), Montenegrins (52.6%), Macedonians (47.7%) and Serbs (51.5%) living in Slovenia<sup>32</sup> (Kralj 2008b, 238).

Still, such stigma makes it impossible for immigrants to contribute fully to the development of society with their knowledge and skills, and at the same time society cannot exploit the

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<sup>30</sup> In the general opinion, čefur is the most common name/denominator for people from FYR.

<sup>31</sup> See Toš, N. et al. 2002. „Slovensko javno mnenje (Slovenian public opinion)“. Sumarnik raziskav. Ljubljana: Univerza v Ljubljani, Fakulteta za družbene vede. Arhiv družboslovnih podatkov.

<sup>32</sup> These are the latest data found regarding this topic.

potential of the immigrant population. Hence, there are two processes that must take place, respectively: (1) immigrants must adapt to life in the host country, and (2) the majority in the nation must accept immigrants as equal members of society. And when neither the first nor the second process is sufficiently implemented, then the intolerance, ethnic distance, discrimination, and consequently the conditions for the formation of unequal opportunities for the immigrant population develop rapidly (Medvešek 2007, 189).

Although Slovenian laws and mechanisms for eliminating discrimination have as a priority the construction of models for the integration of immigrants and their descendants into Slovenian society and mechanisms for eliminating all forms of discrimination (ibid, 190) in practice this is unfortunately often not the case.

For example, Article 49 states that freedom of work is guaranteed to everyone under the same conditions, or as Article 63 states that it is unconstitutional to cause “any incitement to national, racial, religious or other inequality and incitement to national, racial, religious or other hatred and intolerance” (ibid). Nevertheless, there are many examples in everyday life that do not follow this. Likewise, in Article 14 of the Constitution it is written that everyone is guaranteed “the same human rights and fundamental freedoms, regardless of nationality, race, sex, language, religion, political or another opinion, financial status, birth, education, social status, or any other personal circumstance” (Medvešek 2007, 190).

As an example, in 2020 the first mosque was built in Ljubljana. It took a full 50 years for this project to materialize. The problem is that in the Slovene national narrative, Islam as a religion is still associated with the Others, in particular, the Turkish and Ottoman troops in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The construction of the mosque as a religious center of the Muslim inhabitants in the Slovenian national narrative was personified with the Turk, who constantly threatened Slovenian national culture, and whose role often included all Muslims living in Slovenia, from migrants to Slovenian citizens of the Islamic religion (Bartulović 2010, 89). She further emphasizes that the mere mention of the period of the Ottoman invasions has become a powerful argument for why the construction of a mosque or Islamic cultural center should not be allowed in Slovenia. Reading the comments on the forums, Bartulović concludes that there is a strong “us”/ “them” narrative in the Slovenian national space, because the comments are

primarily written in the first person plural, which implies a strong identification with Slovene national identity (ibid).

The understanding of Muslims is heavily burdened by the discourse of Otherness, so among the mosque's opponents, Islam has remained determined by a militant attitude that stems both from the memory of Ottoman invasions and from heavily distorted media and political interpretations of terrorism (Jezernik 2002 quoted in Bartulović 2010, 94). A passage cited from a forum illustrates this

We Slovenes are a small nation, a young country, with our cultural and historical identity, and we found it very difficult to preserve our identity, as we were oppressed for centuries by Turks, Germans, Nazism, fascism and all possible dominations that violently denationalized us and persecuted us humanly and politically. Such a small nation must show greater willingness and sensitivity to preserve the spiritual foundations of its existence. Our identity is a stronghold of truth, and our cultural tradition is the legitimate representative of European and humanistic omics. (Bartulović 2010, 95)

According to the latest census (2002), people who declare themselves as Muslims in Slovenia mostly come from former Yugoslavia, which in brings about twofold discrimination because not only are they treated as Others in the discourse of Balkanism, but they are also treated as others in the discourse of Orientalism, since the Islamic religion is associated precisely with the Orient and the image of the Turk. In this context, the Balkan Others, because of the similarity of religions (taking into account that all other peoples of FYR are predominantly members of Christian religions), become much closer to Slovenes than Muslims are to them.

Similar discrimination may be found in the establishment of the Šišenska<sup>33</sup> Civil Initiative in 2001, which aimed to evict foreigner from their local environment. The arguments were that the center for foreigner should not be located in an urban environemt bacuse foreigners' lifestyles were unpleasant and disturbing, and foreigners pose a threat to the local population's safety because they are prone to crime. (Kralj 2008a, 139). To this day, their webpage still exists, in which they give reasons supported by stories and anecdotes from everyday life, why migrants and asylum seekers should be removed from their part of the city.<sup>34</sup> The same things occured in educational institutions, where the descendants of immigrants often complained that they were

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<sup>33</sup> Šiška is one of the neighborhoods in Ljubljana.

<sup>34</sup> See: <https://wega3.tripod.com/docs/>

stigmatized or discriminated against based on their ethnicity, religion, or different surnames<sup>35</sup>. A similar thing is happening still nowadays with construction workers from the FYR who came to Slovenia in order to work.

Slovenia's accession to the EU and later to the Schengen area had a powerful impact on Slovenia's attractiveness for immigration. The latter were especially exploited by Slovenian employers, who, under the pressure of demands for labor market flexibility and the related abolition of labor protection, were looking for cheap labor (Leskošek 2016, 92). These foreign, temporary, and flexible workers were perfect alternative to otherwise protected domestic workers because they had extremely limited access to the system's social rights and benefits. This was especially true for temporary migrants, who could only enjoy their rights, for example, if they had a permanent residence and a residence permit, and who could not use their rights at all if they lost the latter (ibid).

At the end of 2008, foreigners accounted for 3.5 percent (70,723) of the total population of Slovenia, compared to, for example, 2.4 percent (48,968) in 2005. Among them, 74 percent were men, mostly coming for work. The vast majority of migrants were from non-EU countries, with slightly over 90 percent of all migrants came from the republics of the former Yugoslavia (Pajnik et al. 2010, 154).

Also, it should be emphasized that within the spectrum of different statuses characteristic of the classification policies of the European space, they in fact belonged to the status of desirable migrants, especially in specific economic sectors (Zavratnik 2011, 62). As there was a chronic shortage of workers in the construction sector in Slovenia, members of other FYR nations proved to be an ideal solution because, among other things, they were not only cheap labor for Slovenian employers but also a very convenient labor force, because of the proximity, and other important factors, such as political and historical ties, recent residence in a common country, and acquainted with Slovene culture and language (Frangež & Ručman 2017, 6).

Still, according to data from interviews with migrants, it is difficult to obtain a personal work permit in practice, and even in the case of receiving such a permit, it is difficult to talk about the

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<sup>35</sup> Author's memories during her studies in Slovenia

equality of migrants with domestic workers. In particular, interviews show frequent discrimination mainly on the basis of language and ethnicity, while the migrants with a personal work permit also have great difficulties in obtaining employment (Pajnik et al. 2010, 156-157). Furthermore, the article points out that recently an increase in so-called patriotic groups and associations that promote the national values of “Slovene-ness” and, contrary to the claimed tolerance, are actually exclusionary, even inciting against any Otherness (especially with regards to the Roma, the LGBT community, Muslims and members of former Yugoslavia). Nationalist discourse and racist prejudice are often present in political rhetoric as well. (ibid, 158)

### **10.1. Non-Slovenes in culture and media**

As Velikonja stresses, even in the Slovene mass media, stereotypes about “Non-Slovenes” are created and reproduced on a daily basis, which are supposed to pose a danger to Slovene-ness and its culture. “Southerners” are presented as the lower class or even as criminals (Velikonja 2002c, 292). It is especially damaging that names like the above-mentioned *Čefur*, *Jugović*, and *Južnjak* are also used in the Slovenian media (Kuzmanić 1999, 22).

“In television series, humorous shows and films, the stereotyped image of an uneducated, unorganized ‘non-Slovene’ who speaks poor Slovene is symptomatically linked to lower-value, low-paid work or criminal activities” (Velikonja 2002a, 81). On the example of the three most popular Slovenian entertainment series in independent Slovenia: *Teater paradižnik*, *TV Dober dan* and *Naša mala klinika*, Mlekuž states that southerners are shown as lower class in all three: as cleaners (Fata in *TV Dober dan*) and porters (Veso in *Teater paradižnik* and Veso Lola Ribar in *Naša mala klinika*). And their behavior, which can only be described as unusual, bizarre and exotic, makes them not only socially stigmatized by the work they do in such series, but it also represents them as culturally inferior. (Mlekuž 2009, 275).

Even in movies with more serious social themes, such as the relatively recent movie *Erased* the same narrative can be seen. The plot of the movie shows the way in which erased immigrants were treated by the state during the 1990s. The main character is a woman in her twenties; although she is a young, urban and educated, and has spent her whole life in Slovenia, due to

having been born in another state of the then-federation, becomes erased and thus without any rights. Mlekuž also points out that, in the book *Slovenia Goes Forward (Slovenija gre naprej)*, the role of immigrants and their descendants is probably completely silenced.

On the 130 pages, which present the footballers of the then Slovenian national team, in the wealth of all possible personal data, details, curiosities, we find almost nothing that would suggest that the dream “Slovenian” national football team was composed to a large measure, almost majority, of descendants of immigrants. (Mlekuž 2009, 275)

According to Stankovič (2002), the last names of the football players from immigrant families are mostly written with the letter Č and not with letter Ć, as they are originally written. As he further explains: “From a practical point of view, this can be understood because the letter ć is not in the Slovenian alphabet. However, given that the names of other athletes from the West, performing in Slovenia, are usually written in the original – that is (also) with letters that are not in the Slovenian alphabet – there is something else at work” (Mlekuž 2009, 275).

Likewise, in a media analysis of the threat discourse, Knežević Hočevar (2003) found that in the 1980s the consequences of declining birth rates were already presented in terms of so-called “nation extinction”. By the 1990s there was a marked threat that due to the dwindling population Slovenes endangered their “true national substance”. Blame for the low birth rate of Slovenes during the disintegration of Yugoslavia was placed on immigrants from the area of the former Yugoslavia (ibid.).

When it comes to the function of national media, Makarovič and Rončević (2006, 49 in Kralj 2008b) conclude that immigrants are most frequently featured in the media when they are involved in a conflict, a crisis, or a source of tension. Even if a given group is not openly presented in the media as the cause of the difficulties, a „public image of the problem“ can be developed about it. As Šabec emphasizes, the role of the mass media in dealing with racism and stereotypes is extremely important, as the mass media represent the main “database” and subtly and indirectly determine the agenda of topics that people discuss in their daily conversations (Šabec 2007, 105).

By analyzing newspaper articles in the Slovenian media, Makarovič and Rončević (2006 in Kralj 2008b, 243) have come to the conclusion that members of the above-mentioned ethnic minorities

are mostly treated in the media in two diametrically opposed ways: either as victims (described in terms of discrimination, marginalization, segregation, as deprived of minority rights, or due to intentional measures or lack thereof in Slovenian institutions and / or the remaining Slovene population or for other, impersonal structural reasons) or as causes of problems for the rest of the Slovene population, which implies the opposite situation in which members of the majority are presented as victims of the minority (Makarovič & Rončević 2006, in Kralj 2008b, 244). They conclude that the members of the minority are seven times more likely to be presented as victims than in the case of members of the majority. (ibid) Still, when it comes to ethnic groups such as Roma and to a lesser degree also the nationals of former Yugoslav states, it becomes obvious that they are mostly represented and described not as victims, but as a problem. Pajnik (2003) stresses that when reporting on marginalized groups, the journalist often does not offer alternative options, so it can be concluded that the media establish a stigmatizing and discriminatory discourse. Although they play one of the main roles in that, the media are certainly not the only ones putting forward these negative discourses.

For example, the current Slovenian prime minister Janez Janša<sup>36</sup> introduced on his Twitter account in 2014 the new term *opankarski žurnalizem* (opankar journalism) mainly associated with Slovenian journalists who do not have typical Slovenian last names (e.g. their last names end in -ić). In this way, the term *opanak*, traditionally connected with peasant shoes mostly worn in Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina becomes a pejorative marker of Otherness, as well as the marker of stereotypization, discrimination, and xenophobia. Similarly, the Slovenian politician Tomaž Majer has characterized those who vote for the opposition as “voters with a foreign accent” dressed in tracksuits (*trenirkarji*).

In addressing the dependence of stereotypes on the social context, their connection with political discourse is intentional, at least in a narrower sense. “Stereotypes contain political analyses and are political weapons” (Oakes, Haslam, Turner quoted in Šabec 2007, 107). Thus the discussion of stereotypes is almost always a matter of political conflict. (Šabec 2007, 107) As she further explains, “the stereotypical portrayal of the ‘other’ in political discourse is not unreflected,

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<sup>36</sup> Janez Janša is the current Slovenian Prime Minister, and the leader of the Slovenian Democratic Party (right-wing populist). For more informations about this topic, see:

<https://balkaninsight.com/2021/04/15/terrifying-twitter-slovenias-marshall-twito-and-his-fake-friends/>

unstructured, ill-considered and self-evident, but most often a fully conscious, deliberate, structured and thoughtful ideological means of political actors” (ibid, 108).

Furthermore, the problem of connection between these ethnic groups and the media in Slovenia is visible from the fact that these groups are excluded from the media. “This causes a sense of exclusion from society and the sentiment of their social marginalization, perhaps even ghettoization” (Komac 2007a, 378). Ana Kralj in her article “When Ć becomes Č: discrimination of unrecognized national minorities in Slovenia” (2008b) explains this thesis more in detail, which is further confirmed by a conversation with members of these ethnic groups. She quotes Ivo Garić, of the Union of Croatian Societies in Slovenia: “The worst thing concerning the situation of these national communities is the absence from the media. This is totally blocked, it is virtually impossible to reach the media” (Kralj 2008b, 244).

Certain respondents conclude that these national groups are present in the media only when a certain political goal is to be achieved.

The presence in the media is a very far reaching problem. If we look at our recent history, this is a consequence of the political events around the year 1990, which produced and had to produce this hatred. The hatred was stimulated, of this I am certain. It was intensified back then, but it still exists. This was also a part of that hot political stew – I am talking about the ‘erased’<sup>37</sup>. The ‘erased’ were always present on the political agenda when the politicians tried to achieve something else. Now another discussion about the ‘erased’ is on its way. Why? The elections are coming soon and this topic will be instrumentalized once more. The problem of the ‘erased’ will be used once again. (Živko Banjac, The Society of the Serbian Community quoted in Kralj 2008b, 244-245)

Breznik concludes that prominent Slovenian media encourage the public to hate non-Slovenian ethnic groups, homosexuals, and deprived groups, as the mass media have the power to cover up censorship (2005, 134). Komac, for example, emphasizes that with regards to the “new” ethnic communities or ethnic groups from former Yugoslavia, which are deliberately pushed to the fringes of media interest, leads to their issues being quietly overlooked, ignored, or treated from a negative perspective. He also concludes that this is a very common occurrence in other national

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<sup>37</sup> Definition of the Erased people is explained in chapter „Erasure in Slovenia.“

environments, but that this should not be an excuse for the Slovenian media (Komac et al. 2005, 375).

Here the dichotimization “us” and “them” reappears, for which Pajnik emphasizes that Others become so-called “disturbance in the system” – they are excluded, and everything comes down to a very unambiguous and highly simplified “good/bad”, “normal/abnormal” labels, with positive traits always attributed to the majority group and negative traits to the minority group (2003, 87). “But a foreigner can be individualized. In the new environment where he settled, if he does not live in a group and at least partially avoids group categorization, it forces the environment, so to speak, to look at him as an individual” (Južnič 1993, 169).

## **10.2. From the Balkan scene to turbofolk music**

Velikonja (2002a) says that “Balkan culture” appeared in Slovenia earlier, but gained its specifics in the 1990s. When Slovenian politics was striving for the secession of Slovenia from Yugoslavia and everything that connected them with other South Slavic nations, the Slovenian public and primarily the young people, decided to support and be consumers of so-called Balkan culture. As Stankovič (1999, 46) points out that

this was by no means a political movement, this part of the youth most often expressed indifference to the project of Slovene secession, however, this cultural turn of Slovene youth at the time of independence of this country is more than interesting. In complete contrast to the official discourse, during this time, for a part of urban youth, everything in the Balkans changes from a symbol of bad to a symbol of good. (Stankovič 1999, 46)

In response to the awakening and sudden strengthening of the Slovene national identity, the enthusiasm for Balkan culture found its answer precisely in the so-called Balkan scene, which had a subcultural function and dynamics. It is important to emphasize that the adjective “Balkan” is of autochthonous origin as the first such party was called *balkan žur* (Balkan party). The music that is essential for this scene, however, is actually of Yugoslav rather than wider Balkan origin. The music that revolves around “Balkan parties” was mainly Yugoslav rock and pop production from the late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s; it was not ethnic, nor did it include Romanian, Greek

or, for example, Bulgarian music. There is a fundamental question why the label Balkan was attached to such a scene (Ceglar 1999, 75). For this reason Ceglar (ibid, 76) concludes that the label “Balkan” is also a political provocation. In the times of the new Slovene national identity, the “Balkan party” was provocative in the early 1990s because of its name. The dichotomy between the uncivilized Balkans and cultural Europe is visible, where the balkans as an adjective in the then Slovene national narrative represented all other South Slavic peoples, while (Central) Europe represented the identification point of the Slovene nation. “Putting other nations from the former Yugoslavia under a common denominator and emphasizing the superiority of the Slovene nation gave members of the Balkan scene a good identification point with the term Balkans” (Ceglar 1999, 76).

Tomc (1998, 41) explains that the function of the creation of this dichotomy between Europe and Balkans was in establishing clearer cultural borders with Non-Slovenes, which is another word for foreigners from former Yugoslavia. Furthermore, the provocative excess of the Balkan label also stems from the self-label put on by a group of young people, mostly of Slovene descent. If the Balkan party was organized by a group of immigrants from other republics, it would be a minor stumbling block for most, because in times of stronger national emotions, this phenomenon would simply be written off as something outside the system, outside the Slovenian nation. The problem, however, arose because a group of people opted for the Balkans, who, according to the majority, had no reason to do so. “The basic message of the scene was: the Balkans are among us, we are not ashamed of that, we are actually proud of that.” (Ceglar 1999, 76)

In research concerning everyday nationalism, the dates of the so-called Balkan parties also reveal an interesting pattern. For example, one of the more provocative parties took place on November 29, 1990, which was considered the birthday of socialist Yugoslavia, while the other took place on June 25, 1991, the day of the declaration of Slovenian independence. The parties were organized by a group of individuals named “VIZUM SVIM”<sup>38</sup> – a further provocation to inflamed Slovenian nationalism. Although rock and pop music were primarily played at Balkan parties, they still very often ended with Serbian folk music. As Stankovič (1999, 46) stresses, “at a time when the whole of Slovenia was looking forward to secession from Yugoslavia, a crowd

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<sup>38</sup> Translated it means: visas for everyone.

of young men and women danced and drank to the nostalgic sounds of Yugo rock until the morning, and in the end cheered to the furious rhythms of Serbian folk” (Stankovič 1999, 46). “We were afraid that the Slovenes would become like the Austrians after the secession” (Stankovič quoted in Ceglar 1999, 76). In doing so, the young people expressed their fear of a truncated cultural space and emphasized their opposition to unilateral geographical and cultural focus only on Central Europe (Stankovič 1999, 46). Ceglar (1999, 76) further highlights that in this way, on the “Balkan scene”, they emphasized the opposition to geographical and cultural focus only on Central Europe. The “Balkan scene” thus agreed to the unjust placement of the entire geographical south under the label “Balkans”, but it also achieved a rebellious surplus with its adoption. Duality at the cultural level “Balkans: Europe” did not invent it itself, the practice of the “Balkan scene” has acquired that political provocativeness that can be defined as a subculture (Ceglar 1999, 76).

“Balkan culture” in Slovenia can also be understood and treated as entertainment and provocation, as well as a kind of subcultural resistance against the prevailing cultural values. It is a reaction against Slovene-ness and its European cultural orientation (Velikonja 2002a, 84). In addition, the Balkan scene truly served as a perfect depiction of the dichotomy between so-called civilized European culture and the chaotic and passionate Balkans. “People have thrown away the standard masks, and sculpted and apathetic bloodedness and pathos came to the fore” (Ceglar 1999, 79).

Still, Balkan parties have become very popular and commercialized over time. Sometimes the logic of their organizers was extremely indiscriminate: they included everything that came from former Yugoslavia, be it evergreen Yugoslav pop hits, Yugoslav rock classics, traditional folk music, and modern turbo folk production (Velikonja 2002a, 84). From the original fierce punk and rock subculture, a new subculture entered the scene, primarily presented through music as its main product.

Turbofolk music, as a representative of the development of Serbian newly composed music created in the 1960s, became a primary music product in the 1990s, in Milošević’s Serbia. By estheticizing certain musical elements and adding Western pop urban sounds to traditional music, turbofolk imposed itself as a musical direction and dominated the Serbian music scene as part of Milošević’s policy (see Đurković 2003, Kronja 2004, Čvoro 2014). Critics of this musical

direction very often address it as “an impure mixture of rural and urban” (Simić quoted in Đorđević, 2010). Quickly, turbofolk music crossed the borders of Serbia and became popular in all countries of former Yugoslavia. It is believed that turbofolk music became popular in Slovenia precisely through the migration of the population of Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as the primary consumers of this neofolk culture and thus turbofolk music, as a strategy of “expanding the homeland” (Đorđević 2010, 143). Although turbofolk music is considered a type of music that is listened to in Slovenia primarily by migrants from former Yugoslav states and their descendants, it is also very popular among Slovenes.

Đorđević (2010), doing research on the reception of neofolk music in Slovenia, concludes: “Apparently following the self-orientalizing narrative of ‘wild Balkan music’, which has no place in organized *Mitteleuropa*, at that moment I could not hide my sincere astonishment that this musical direction, when I intimately considered an unbreakable follower of Milošević’s regime, was obviously quite popular among young people in Ljubljana” (Đorđević 2010, 138).

As he continues, “in the case of Slovenia, as the most European of all the states of the former Yugoslavia, and at the time of its existence, there was the classic Occidental narrative of the West as a mechanistic society without a soul” (Buruma and Margalit quoted in Đorđević 2010, 144). Neo- and turbofolk, in fact, perfectly fulfill the purpose of the products of this and such Balkans in this context, reinforcing the typical stereotype that “we Balkans” may be crazy, wild and lazy, but we know how to have fun, unlike Westerners (in this case Slovenes) who are hardworking, and successful, but also cold and calculating, and in no way know how to relax and have fun (Mežnarič 1986; Erdei 2009 quoted in Đorđević, 2010).

The context in which turbo-folk intended for the primary target group functions, therefore, does not differ too much from the classical emigrant concept in other Western countries. It is a distinctive marker that places members of a relatively closed and not fully adapted social group in a familiar, intimate environment, in which they feel “at home”, spending time with their compatriots. (Đorđević 2010, 145)

Still, as he explains, it is interesting that this “nostalgia for the non-existent past” certainly does not and did not have any political potential, in terms of a real possibility or desire to form any new community of South Slavs. Much earlier, it was a reaction of a society that, after a period of certain turbulence, came to a state of stability and prosperity, as happened only in Slovenia with the former Yugoslavia. More or less unencumbered by the legacy of the war, the citizens of the country on the way to the European Union could look back freely on their own past, taking from that “pool of memories” those that were important or dear to them. This “classic” type of nostalgia, embodied in the market for communist relics and the consumption of various products of popular culture, especially those related to Josip Broz Tito, is not, however, the only result of that process. Considering that the youth in question in this paper, at the time when Yugoslavia was falling apart, had mostly not yet been born, there is no way to talk about any memories related to the Yugoslav time (Đorđević 2010, 147). Young Slovenes, who had not had bad experiences with former fellow citizens, accept Balkan culture as the choice offered to them in a democratized society, which no longer imposes (or can no longer impose) a dominant cultural matrix. Thus, Slovenian youth perceive turbofolk as just another option in the wide field of popular music that is offered to them. According to the respondents, most young Slovenes do not even go to places where only folk is played, but it is about clubs where contemporary hip-hop or any other popular music is occasionally “cut by a folk hit” (ibid). This is where the wild and Orientalist nature of the Balkans can be seen, something that completely opposes Slovene culture and mentality.

Turbofolk is actually an ideal example of the functioning of all five dimensions of everyday nationalism. Its political dimension is visible in the strengthening of Serbian nationalism and the use of this musical genre for Milošević’s propaganda machinery. Observing its temporal and spatial dimension, it is more than clear that, with growing nationalisms and ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, turbofolk is one of the few things that has crossed state borders and

eventually spread to all states of the former Yugoslavia, and in some became part of mainstream culture. Considering that turbofolk is most commonly defined as a culture of kitsch, sensation, eroticism, and questionable morality, and also historically linked to primarily rural areas, it is easy to understand the intertwining of the cultural dimension with the Self / Other dimension. It is through the cultural dimension or “non-culture” that the turbofolk direction comes as one of the main signifiers of the division between “us” and “them”. According to Gordy, turbofolk culture is only an expression of the competition between urban and Western-oriented values and nationalism and rural national nostalgia (Gordy 1999, 98). As Baker explains, turbofolk can also be described “more as a conceptual category that aggregates connotations of banality, foreignness, violence and kitsch in order to provide a critical apparatus with a ready-made strategy of distancing” (Baker 2007, 139). It is interesting that something that was developed and served as a primary product of politics and nationalism, over time became apolitical and a-national, and actually potentially became one of the main cultural links of the South Slavic nations. Muršič emphasizes that music is an area of ongoing political battle in the cultural world, and it is both a political and public action. Music is a medium that brings like-minded individuals together, and as a result, it can be harmful for regimes that do not accept differences; additionally, music not only symbolizes the spirit of a group, but it can also arouse national and nationalistic impulses (Muršič 1999, 178-185). Music can speak to different people and groups and allow them not just to listen, but also to be heard.

Music has always played an important part in forming the identities of individuals and of groups of people. It provides a means of defining oneself as an individual belonging to and allied with a certain group, and of defining others as belonging to other groups which are separate from ones own. The development of a musical identity is not only a matter of age, gender, musical taste and other preferences, but is also a result of the cultural, ethnic, religious and national contexts in which people live. Individuals forming their musical identities are part of, influenced by and a product of several such collective musical identities, and these exist in parallel and on several levels—including the local, the regional, the national and the global. (Folkestad 2001, 151)

Precisely for this reason, in the cultural context, we can conclude that the construction of Slovene-ness, probably as a response to the spread of so-called Balkan culture, can be seen through Slovene folk music. Combining a cultural, spatial, and temporal dimension, Slovenian folk music becomes (following Anderson’s thesis of imaginary nations) an imaginary product of national history and old traditional folk music, subalpine space and cultural diversity with other

peoples of the former Yugoslavia. Boštjan Šaver (2005) further explains that there are many markers of the Alpine identity of Sloveneness in folk music. He summarizes his analysis of the lyrics of folk-entertainment songs in seven points (Šaver 2005, 193):

- Folk music uses the classical religious content of the pilgrimage roots of Slovenia, which glorify asceticism and reproduce the value of Christian suffering.
- Folk music constructs and reproduces the basic premises of the beautiful, idyllic and heavenly in Alpine culture.
- The lyrics of folk songs also construct and reproduce the premises of hedonism, wandering, debauchery, and alcoholism.
- The lyrics of folk songs often define the principle of friendship and camaraderie, which indirectly excludes all those who do not agree with such a discourse.
- In the lyrics of folk music, there is a distinct reproduction of the theme of the mountain paradise below Triglav.
- The metaphor of Alpine culture and the mountain paradise of Slovenia is reproduced and repeatedly constructed in many shades in the imaginary of individual landscape identities.

It is from this that the influence of music on ethnic self-perception and the creation of national identity can be seen. Slovenian folk music is not only used for entertainment, but is symbolically defined and bounded by the Alpine geographical area, as well as the (Central-) European cultural space. It contains important national identification symbols such as Mount Triglav, the emphasis on the Christian (Catholic) religion, and all the values that go hand in hand with it. In this way, Slovenian folk music becomes a symbol of demarcation between “us” and “others.”

### 10.3. Non-Slovenes and the language

Language, as one of the fundamental indicators of ethnic identity, plays an important role in the formation and preservation of ethnic groups – both nations and national minorities. Language is important for proving national identity, and language policy is one of the fundamental state-building policies, as it ensures the independence and coherence of the nation that forms a nation-state (Roter 2007a, 302). Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814), for example, argued that a distinct language is the cause of a distinct nation, and that this nation may govern itself independently. As a result, according to Fichte, the Germans had the right to self-government. Furthermore, the German language was not to be valued equally with all other languages spoken in Europe and worldwide. The German language possessed unique characteristics that contributed to the uniqueness of German culture. In comparison to other languages like as French, Italian, Spanish, and English, it was a pure natural language. Fichte felt that the German language is the superior language among other languages, and that it is the language of nations (H. Birch 1989, 19-20). Even though there are no researches or surveys which would show that Slovene think that their language is superior in relation to other former Yugoslav nations, one can agree that it is, together with the Macedonian language, quite different than all the other languages spoken in former federation. This is also one of the reasons why Slovenia, in the late '80s and early '90s, sought its way out of Yugoslavia through the emphasis on the national language. In Slovenia, language played a primary role in creating national consciousness and unification. Slovenia, as the former FRY's westernmost state, had an own geographic position, which had a different impact on language. Linguists believe that the numerous Slavic tribes occupied the Slovene land at one time, and that this original divide was influenced by dialect evolution. Other effects included innovations derived from nearby Slavic languages, as well as Slovenia's topographical structure, which consist primarily of hilly areas, as well as its administrative and ecclesiastical division.

Slovenia, as the westernmost state of the former FRY, had its own geographic position with different impacts on language. Linguists believe that numerous Slavic tribes occupied the Slovene land at one time, and that this original division was influenced by the development of dialects. Other effects included innovations derived from nearby Slavic languages, as well as the

influence of Slovene mountain area and Slovenia's ecclesiastical division. Besides, the Germans settled in Slovene land from the twelfth century onwards, leaving its mark on the language. Also the interaction of Slovene with other languages, such as German, Italian, Friulian, and Hungarian, was very significant. (Logar quoted in Golles 2015, 19) As Dolar states,

in the last thousand years, Slovenia has survived precisely through its reliance on culture, and not in view of its political, economic and military power; that culture appeared precisely in the place of weakness of those other powers and became a cone around which the beginnings of political, economic, etc. could then be formed and could establish programs. (2003, 21)

Thus, on the one hand, one can see the Slovenian language as the primary cultural mark of Slovenian national identity and the foremost symbol of unification; while on the other hand, the Slovenian language has a dichotomous role of separating "us" from "them". Unlike other nations which had a very pronounced military power, or were nationally connected through religion (Velikonja 1996, Vezovnik 2007), in Slovenia the primary artifact of national connection was culture or language.

Novak (2003, 401) claims that the only thing that separates Slovenes from other nations is a culture that is distinctly based on language, by means of literature: "Unlike some other nations, language is the basis of Slovenes' self-justification" (ibid). This is where the distinction between Slovene and other languages of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia comes from. If we compare the Slovene language with the languages of other nations of the former Yugoslavia, it is evident that the Slovene language differs the most, i.e. that other nations of the former Yugoslavia understand each other much more easily due to language similarities, while Slovene and Macedonian are different. For this reason, the pronunciation of a certain letter can become a symbol of identification with or demarcation from others. For example, the letter "l" in the Slovenian alphabet is pronounced much more "softly" than in other countries of the former Yugoslavia, so in this way, this letter becomes an identifier of someone's nationality. The so-called "hard l" is a typical label in Slovenian society for someone who comes from the countries of the former Yugoslavia and who is allegedly unable to master the Slovenian language, and thus this shibboleth also becomes a discriminatory label. For this reason, not to be perceived as foreigners, immigrants from the FYR need to master the Slovene language, because it is used in professionally and in official institutions. "It turned out that those who tried to adapt to the

requirements of the new society (norms, language, values) had the least negative experiences at work” (Kobolt 2002, 120). Still, Pajnik et al. (2010) point to the problems that happen to migrants trying to find work in Slovenia. Not knowing the language is a major obstacle in employment.

In the research (see Toš 1999, Pajnik et al. 2010, Kobolt 2002, and more), it emerges that those who did not speak Slovene became the target of hate speech, and became unwanted. In these studies, it was found that these people were mainly immigrants from other republics of the former Yugoslavia. As such, they are supposed to embody negative stereotypes about the Balkans as the opposite of Europe.

## 11. Minorities in Slovenia<sup>39</sup>

As mentioned in the previous chapter, because of its economic progress and relative proximity to other European countries, Slovenia has always been a very attractive destination for residents of some less developed parts of the former state. Following WWII, and particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, there was a huge emigration of people of various nations from the former state to Slovenia, altering the demographic picture and national structure of the Republic of Slovenia. Former state citizens (in turn, Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Muslims, Macedonians, and Montenegrins) have become the most numerous and numerically significant ethnic minorities in Slovenia as a result of these factors; however, they do not have the status of a national minority and thus do not have all of the rights that national minorities enjoy in Slovenia. (Plantak 2019, 222)

In defining minorities, Slovenia uses the term “autochthonous”, which prevents the ethnic groups mentioned above from obtaining minority status. The status of national minorities in the Slovenian territory has been granted only to the Italian and Hungarian national minorities (according to the criteria of autochthony) and the Roma group, which is defined under certain special rights. While Slovenia is surely not the only European country to treat its migrants as the “process of modern migrations” and therefore is not prepared to give them the status of a legally recognized minority, the main problem which occurs here is the definition of the above terms of “new minorities” and “autochthonous”. Slovenia utilizes the term “autochthonous” to define minorities, which prevents the ethnic groups indicated above from achieving minority status. (Plantak 2019). Minority, according to Francesco Capotorti (1979), is a group that is numerically smaller than the rest of the country's population, is in a non-dominant position, and whose members are nationals of countries with ethnic, religious, or linguistic characteristics that are distinct from the rest of the population, and who demonstrate a sense of solidarity aimed at preserving their culture, customs, religion, or language. This is the most well-known definition, and it also provides the finest description of what minorities are.

In contemporary Europe, Wolff (2008 in Plantak 2019, 223-224) identifies four types of minority communities:

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<sup>39</sup> Parts of the text taken from author's publication „The Case of Unrecognized Minorities in Slovenia“.

- *national minorities* are an ethnic group living in the territory of a particular country, but belonging ethnically to another state, often neighboring;
- *transnational minorities* are an ethnic group whose homeland extends across several states, but does not have the status of the dominant nation in any state; they represent a kind of bridge between immigrant and national minorities and result from the creation and re-crossing of borders;
- *indigenous minorities* are ethnic groups that have lived in a particular country for generations, but do not have the status of a dominant nation; they became part of the nation-states during their inception, and very often under the pressure of assimilation;
- *immigrant minorities* are mainly new immigrants (arriving mostly after 1945) who are often stateless; they usually come to a particular country for various reasons such as post-colonial migration, economic reasons, or political persecution.

As Roter explains, Slovenia is just one of the countries grappling with how to control the condition of so-called new minorities or ethnic communities that have found themselves in a minority position due to migrant flows rather than changing national borders. (Roter 2005, 199). Just as in previous chapters, it can be concluded that Slovenia had not been accustomed to such large-scale mass immigration until then. For this reason, Kržišnik-Bukić further explains that, “although it is possible to assess the state of democracy by how it treats its minorities, in Slovenia, there is a lack of treatment of members of national communities from the former Yugoslavia, who, by international standards, could also receive official minority status” (Kržišnik-Bukić 2014, 7). As the author further stresses (*ibid*, 124), when it comes to these new minority issues, the legal status of Albanians, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, Croats, Macedonians, and Serbs living in Slovenia as citizens is not regulated by international conventions.

For this reason, the following warning from a relevant United Nations body states: “The existence of an ethnic-religious or linguistic minority in a given country is not dependent on the decision of that country, but requires its establishment by objective criteria” (*ibid*). In this regard, the United Nations Working Groups on Minorities (UN WGM) placed Slovenia as one of seven other European nations (together with France, Greece, Turkey, Macedonia, Bulgaria, and Albania) that believe minorities only exist in a country if its laws define them. In the opinion of

the aforementioned authority, such a position, which does not fully or partially acknowledge minorities, "inevitably" leads to discrimination and deprivation of their rights (Kržišnik-Bukić 2008, 124).

The latest report of a special rapporteur on minority issues in Slovenia (2019) proposed the adoption of comprehensive legislation, while respecting the currently established constitutional prominence and status of the Hungarian, Italian and Roma minorities, as well as fair and proportionate funding of cultural and other activities, without distinguishing between autochthonous national communities and immigrant communities. (Report of the Special Rapporteur on minority issues on his visit to Slovenia, 2019)

The Italian and Hungarian communities as autochthonous nationalities are guaranteed the right to use their language, express and develop their national culture, establish organizations for this purpose, use their national symbols, and exercise other constitutionally defined rights, according to the Constitutional Amendments to the Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Slovenia from September 1989 (Samardžija 2011, 5). "This is the first time that the term autochthonous appeared in the Slovenian Constitution, although no legally sustainable definition of this term is written anywhere" (Samardžija 2011; Komac 2007b; Kržišnik-Bukić 2008 in Plantak 2019, 229).

In the eyes of Slovenian politics and the legal profession, the term "autochthonous" refers to the social sub-base of a certain geographical-territorial area inside the national territory. The autochthonous status of a certain segment of the population is tied to territorially defined and restricted areas in Slovenia where the Italian and Hungarian ethnicities have traditionally resided. (Kržišnik- Bukić 2008, 128). Precisely from this statement, the interconnection of spatial, temporal, and political dimensions in terms of everyday nationalism can be seen. Still, Samardžija (2011, 5) states that the concept of autochthonous has been overcome and it is better to use the term "traditional".

Kuzmanić concludes that the laws on immigration, citizenship, minorities, and integration, as well as the functioning of national institutions and policies, reveal the complexity of the relationship between the construction of an "autochthonous nation" and deprived minorities excluded by the racist logic of non-belonging. Especially in times of crisis, imposed policies of "tightening the belt", growing poverty and unemployment, the nationalist search for

“scapegoats” becomes a dangerous populist tactic for mobilizing disillusioned masses (Kuzmanić quoted in Bajt 2015, 154). Regarding the case of the Roma people, Cirila Toplak states that the fact that the majority first recognizes the minority’s special political status and then tries to deny the legality of the free democratic choice of this minority, shows that Slovenia is an ethnocracy that manages minorities because of “blood rights”, where a citizen is defined by birth despite what is otherwise written in the constitution. The other, “non-autochthonous” minorities face similar discrimination (Stankovič quoted in Toplak 2014, 97). As Skey points out, “any individual claims to belong (to this or that group) are not simply asserted, but remain dependent on the judgements and (re) actions of others. The crucial point to emphasise here is that those whose status is recognised without question will not only have a more settled sense of identity, and access to whatever benefits the in-group accrues, but can also make judgements about the status of other people” (Skey 2011, 31).

### **11.1. The Erasure in Slovenia**

It is nation-states that decide who belongs and who does not – that is, who is categorized as a foreigner (Bajt 2016, 49). Like the nationalizing effects of state policies that contribute to maintaining membership in the nation’s exclusionary community, states play a key role in defining foreigners, as they have a key say in shaping migration policy and granting citizenship (ibid).

The erasure from the register of permanent residents implemented by the administrative bodies of the Republic of Slovenia was an arbitrary act that did not have any basis in law, as has been established by the Constitutional Court. The erasure mainly (but not exclusively) affected people born in other republics of the former Yugoslavia who had Yugoslav citizenship and also citizenship of another republic of the former Yugoslavia, but lived in the former Socialist Republic of Slovenia where they had permanent addresses (Dedić et al. 2003). On February 26, 1992, 25,671 persons, or nearly 1% of the country's population, were unlawfully removed from the Slovenian registry of permanent residents. (Amnesty International 2012). According to the

Slovene state administration, the Erased are persons who meet all four of the following conditions:

1. on 25 June 1991 they were citizens of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but did not have the republican citizenship of Slovenia. Instead they held the citizenship of another republic of the former Yugoslavia (this citizenship was then obtained by the citizenship of their parents and not by place of birth);
2. on 23 December 1990 they had registered their permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia;
3. after the independence of the Republic of Slovenia they did not acquire Slovenian citizenship; and
4. they were therefore deleted from the register of permanent residents (their registration of permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia ceased on 26 February 1992, but may also be on another date). (Portal gov.si 2021)

In 2003, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia found that the erasure was illegal. The state has repeatedly tried to regulate the issue of the Erased and in 2009 and 2010 took measures to systematically correct the injustices that happened to the Erased and eliminate the illegal situation in two phases (Portal gov.si 2021).

In a narrower sense, erasure means a material act, with which the administrative body has recorded the termination of the registration of the person's permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia in the relevant records, i.e. in the register of permanent residence. Erasure in a broader sense means an interpretation of the regulations by the representatives of the authorities, which meant for individuals the deprivation of legal status and the creation of a state in which they could no longer exercise their rights either as citizens or as foreigners with a residence permit (Kogovšek Šalamon 2012, 18).

As Kurnik stresses,

erasure is an event that on the one hand lies far in the past, but on the other hand it tells us about very current dilemmas and struggles, as well as the future of liberation struggles and post-national political constructions. On the one hand, we are shocked by the archaism of defining citizenship through the process of mass exclusion. This is how modern nations were formed, which involved the establishment of territorially limited national sovereignty. They achieved internal homogenization through the dialectical definition of otherness, which was excluded, dehumanized and robbed of all rights. (2007, 124)

For this process to be fully understood from a legal and political point of view, it is important to emphasize two Slovenian acts: The Citizenship Act and The Aliens Act. These were adopted after the independence of Slovenia and are responsible for the fate of the Erased people.

After the decision to be independent from Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenia has through the Law on Plebiscite on the Independence and Autonomy of the Republic of Slovenia and in accordance with Article 6 of the same Law, allowed all adults with registered permanent residence in Slovenia the right to vote. In addition to Slovenian citizens and members of the Italian and Hungarian national communities, also included citizens of other former Yugoslav republics, who had registered permanent residence in Slovenia on the day of the plebiscite, including those who were later deleted (Kogovšek 2011, 43-44).

The Slovenian state guarantees Italian and Hungarian nationalities in the independent Republic of Slovenia all the rights as determined by the Constitution and laws and international acts concluded and recognized by the FYR. It also guarantees all members of other nations and nationalities the right to comprehensive cultural and linguistic development, and all those with permanent residence in Slovenia, so that they can acquire Slovenian citizenship if they wish (Petković, 2010).

In other words, the Republic of Slovenia has assured the national communities, Italian and Hungarian, as well as all members of other Yugoslav nations living in Slovenia, that their political status will not change due to the plebiscite decision (Petković 2010, Kogovšek Šalamon 2012, 39). As it is further emphasized, the main reason was to get as many voters as possible to vote in support of independence. As it turned out later, the acquired minority, linguistic, and cultural rights of national communities were then treated at a completely different level and were also recognized by the Constitution, while the authorities consciously decided not to recognize

the acquired rights of citizens of other republics to reside in the Republic of Slovenia (Kogovšek Šalamon 2012, 39).

- In the Citizenship Act, the article 40 sets out the conditions for the acquisition of Slovenian citizenship by persons who had the republican citizenship of other republics of the former FYR.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, Article 2 of the same act determines that citizens of the Republic of Slovenia with citizenship of a foreign country shall be considered citizens of the Republic of Slovenia in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia, unless an international agreement provides otherwise (Citizenship of Republic of Slovenia Act 2020). Furthermore, an individual can acquire Slovenian citizenship through naturalization, by meeting the condition of actual and uninterrupted life in the Republic of Slovenia for a certain period and other legally determined conditions:
- has lived in Slovenia for at least ten years, of which continuously for the last five years before submitting the application,
- has been married to a Slovenian citizen for at least three years and lives in Slovenia continuously for at least one year before submitting the application,
- has lost Slovenian citizenship on the basis of remission or renunciation and actually lives in Slovenia continuously for at least six months before submitting the application,
- the Slovenian emigrant or his/her descendant up to the fourth generation in a straight line and actually lives in Slovenia for at least one year before submitting the application,
- is stateless and actually lives in Slovenia as a stateless person for a continuous period of five years before submitting the application,
- has a recognized refugee status and actually lives in Slovenia continuously for five years before submitting the application,

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<sup>40</sup> A citizen of another republic who, on the day of the plebiscite on the independence and autonomy of the Republic of Slovenia on 23 December 1990, registered permanent residence in the Republic of Slovenia and actually lives there, acquires the citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia if he submits an application to the for internal affairs to the competent administrative body of the municipality in whose territory he has his permanent residence. (Citizenship Act, article 40)

- has attended and successfully completed at least higher education in Slovenia and has actually lived in Slovenia for at least seven years, of which continuously for at least one year before submitting the application,
- was born and actually lives in the Republic of Slovenia since birth,
- is a minor, lives in Slovenia and his / her parents who have acquired the citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia apply for him / her to acquire Slovenian citizenship. (Ministrstvo za notranje zadeve, 2010)

It is important to highlight that in the FYR, the individual was granted republican citizenship at birth on the basis of the republican citizenship of the parents and not on the basis of the place of birth or the country in which they were born (Ministry of the Interior 2010, 7).

For the above mentioned reasons, citizens of the remaining republics with Yugoslav citizenship had the same rights in Slovenia before independence as individuals with Slovenian republican citizenship. It was only important that they have registered permanent residence in Slovenia. With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, individuals with the republican citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and with previous permanent residence in Slovenia thus had the same rights to acquire citizenship in the newly-formed Republic of Slovenia as those with Slovenian citizenship. The deadline for submitting an application for citizenship lasted six months, until 26 December 1991. Persons who did not submit this application and previously held republican citizenship, which was not Slovene, were marked as foreigners two months after this deadline. Individuals whose application for citizenship of the Republic of Slovenia was rejected, were also marked as foreigners (Dedić et al. 2003, 42-43).

The second Act that was crucial for the Erased people was the Aliens Act. This act determined the conditions for the entry of aliens into the territory of Slovenia, the conditions for obtaining a visa, the conditions for obtaining a residence permit, the conditions for termination of residence, the provisions on the forced removal of an alien from the country, etc. (Kogovšek Šalamon, 2012, 85–86). Dedić points out that the Aliens Act did not regulate the previous legal status of FYR citizens who did not opt for Slovenian citizenship or were denied it, as a result of which

they became *de facto* aliens residing illegally in the territory of the Republic of Slovenia and “subject to forced expulsion” (Dedić et al. 2003, 43; Jalušič 2008, 108).

The status of an alien, which was suddenly assigned to individuals after 26 February 1992, was controversial for these individuals, as they were not informed about it, or many of them were not aware of the real consequences that this would bring for them. Deleted individuals had their personal documents confiscated and destroyed by the administrative authorities, which resulted in some of them being left without all the documents they could identify themselves with, such as an identity card, passport, and driver’s license. As a result, their employment ended, they no longer had the opportunity to exercise their social rights, they also lost their rights to own and rent property. They were suddenly faced with housing problems and also had problems with the police (Bratož et al. 2004, 8). Kogovšek explains that a lot of people who were born in Slovenia, were expecting an automatic acquisition of citizenship, for in this way citizenship was acquired by siblings born to the same parents. Similarly, many applied for citizenship, but were rejected for certain reasons (such as threats to public order and peace) or were too late with their application. For this reason, many of them were not able to regularize their citizenship in any other country and became stateless (Kogovšek et al. 2010, 109). It was especially difficult in circumstances where a person was born in the Republic of Slovenia to a non-Slovene father. These individuals should have automatically gained the nationality of another republic, but due to war and ethnic cleansing in the region, many were not officially registered in the other republic’s registry. (Dedić et al. 2003, 60-61).

Not only their socio-economic rights, such as the right to work, social security, and health care, housing and pensions, etc., but also other fundamental rights, such as the right to respect for private and family life, freedom of movement, the right to personal liberty and security, the right not to be subjected to torture or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to inherent human dignity, etc., were violated. Many of the Erased lost the right to housing and their jobs, and, as a consequence of becoming foreigners without settled legal status, could not be legally employed. This meant that they were not able to contribute to their future pensions, and some were even prevented from receiving their pensions. In some cases, the Erasure led to serious consequences for the health of these individuals, or even to death. Children were deprived of a secondary education; some of the Erased lost years of education or experienced serious delays in finishing their studies. There have even been cases of torture and expulsion (Dedić and others 2003, 147–148).

The example of the Erased thus shows the extreme importance of national citizenship, which, as a paradigm for the reason for the balance of power between a citizen and an individual in a non-citizen political community, presupposes that civil rights overlap or over-determine human rights (Tuccillo Castaldo quoted in Učakar 2012, 60).

The same thing happened with the media. As Marković stresses, stories about the Erased were rarely presented in the media in the few years after independence, without any greater emphasis on this topic. In consonance with the problem of only a small and, above all, insufficient coverage of the Erasure is the problematic, and especially negative atmosphere against everything that is not Slovenian, which was also visible in Slovenian media (Marković 2015, 30). As she further highlights, after the independence of Slovenia, the citizens of FYR were exposed to discrimination everywhere, including in Slovenian media.

Even today, it is full of stereotypes related to the “Balkans”, but in the time of the newly independent Republic of Slovenia, stereotypes and discrimination in the media were particularly characteristic and can be verified in the archives of media articles created at the time. The prevailing xenophobic discourse at the time presented all those who were not children of a purebred Slovene family as a potential threat, if not to the physical and material condition, then at least to culture. On the one hand, we have uncultured criminals, and on the other, honest locals, autochthonous Slovenes, diligent and hard-working people who do not want anything bad for anyone, but have fought for their land and will not let it just pollute it. (Marković 2015, 31-32)<sup>41</sup>

Kogovšek Šalamon (2012) stresses that the motives for the Erasure were often attributed to nationalism and racism. In order to understand why the media remained silent about what happened to these people, it is also necessary to understand the ideology of the time in Slovenia. As Zorn (2003, 90) explains, “in 1993, 1994 and 1995, there were several public proposals for the revision and revocation of citizenship to those who had acquired it under section 40 of the Citizenship Act. It was even proposed to call a referendum on this issue. These proposals were discussed twice in the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia. Such discussions are part of the discourse that contributed to the construction of the cultural Other, that is, the groups of people called Non-Slovenes” (Zorn 2003, 90).

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<sup>41</sup> Translation made by author.

After independence, a patriotic rhetoric emerged in Slovenia, which in some places was nationalist. Nationalist discourse often revolves around the essentialist question of what a true and genuine Slovene identity should be, what builds the Slovene national substance, and what continuity of Slovene identity must be preserved. In doing so, the authors often fall into discrimination, stereotypes, nationalisms, and marginalization when the questions refer to the role of the Other (Vezovnik 2009, 168). Following Štiks (2010 quoted in Učakar 2012, 63-64), after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, ethno-national definition of citizenship prevailed in the newly formed countries, which was understood as a tool for establishing a nation-state for the dominant ethnic group. He calls this process “ethnic engineering”, which he understands as a deliberate policy of influencing the ethnic composition of the state population in favor of the dominant ethnic group through legal means and administrative procedures.

The basic norm, which had the goal of removing the Other from society, was realized with the help not only of executing lawyers, but also of the entire intellectual and political elite with rare exceptions. The latter made its knowledge and experience available when independence legislation and relevant internal instructions had to be written, while the same “intellectual elite” assisted the authorities whenever the public had to be persuaded, justified, or delayed by correction of the iniquities (Kogovšek Šalamon 2012, 167).

Victims of Erasure were separated from the rest of the population and, in being treated as foreigners, were also dehumanized. Bureaucratic procedures have led to individuals not being treated as people, but as objects, when processing documentation. When performing their bureaucratic procedures, the employees had a humiliating attitude towards the Erased individuals and did not listen to the personal hardships in which they found themselves (not so much through their own fault), as the Erased had no influence on the act (Dedić et al. 2003, 101-102). Regardless of the various excuses, defenses, and possible actual reasons, we can say that a lot of weight is given to nationalism in erasure. “[...] in the case of erasure, the most important role was played by a category that is neither legal nor political, but emotional, namely ‘loyalty’ to the Slovenian nation and state at the time of its independence” (Zdravković 2008, 140).

The Erased became excluded from society, dehumanized, and deprived of rights. The citizenship of the newly formed Republic of Slovenia was based on and characterized through the process of mass exclusion. Independence is thus proof that someone gets the opportunity to identify as a

patriot and strive to co-create and achieve some kind of national goals, it is not enough for them to be advocates of national ideas. After the creation of the new state, many archaically identified themselves and excluded others instead of striving to increase solidarity in society (Kurnik 2007, 124). Učakar (2012, 65) emphasizes that the political argument primarily on the center-right option was based on the belief that there was no erasure, and if there was already, they believed that injustice happened only to individuals, who are to blame for it, because were characterized as “aggressors and speculators who did not believe in a new state.”

Zorn, reviewing the chronological documents that spoke of Slovenia’s independence, emphasizes that there has been a “shift from initial political egalitarianism to state ethnocentrism” (2007, 22). In addition, she further stresses that the Slovene Constitution shows signs of ethno-centrism because the term “Slovenian nation” appears in it, despite the principled civic definition of Slovenia and the warnings of some that this national definition of statehood puts in a different position the minority national community and citizens who are not Slovenes. For this reason, she concludes that the Erased have been placed in the position of Others – anti-citizens who stand against the citizens, and in this way the administration shapes and determines them. Thus, Erasure meant producing a symbolic value for those involved – that is, for the citizens (Zorn 2007).

The Erased actually become that mythical internal enemy that must have arisen by state policy after the secession from Yugoslavia. They become someone close enough to be compared to Slovenes, but still far enough to prove their inferiority, and consequently for Slovenes to demonstrate their superiority through them. In the context of “cultural Europeanization” and historical belonging to the Central European cultural and geographical area, Slovenia had to find the Other, who is

insufficiently European, with different cultural habits, different language and religion, and thus with a different mentality, in order to more easily transform from the so-called socialist and backward ‘Balkan’ countries into a democratic and privileged Europe. Furthermore, the erased could often be characterized as ‘those who do not believe in Slovenia’, ‘people from the south’, ‘Serbs’, i.e. all those who are not ‘we’, ‘Slovenes’, ‘civilized’, ‘loyal’. (Stojić 2007, 154)

The temporal and spatial dimension can also be seen here, having in mind “the erased were marked in public discourse as foreigners connected with the past, and not as a constitutive part of

Slovenian society, although they belonged to the state and actively co-created it” (Učakar 2012, 64). Furthermore, she concludes that their non-acquisition of Slovenian citizenship significantly affected their status also on a symbolic level since citizenship meant membership and belonging to a new state, the Erased remained outside this or the newly set symbolic boundaries. The consequences of this symbolic separation were personified into legal consequences, as the Erased were left without any rights in the territorial area to which they once belonged (ibid., 64-65).

The unconstitutionality of the Erasure was publicly recognized by a ruling of the Constitutional Court in 1999. The Erased founded their first association in 2002 and began to warn the public of violations through regular appeals to the authorities and the media. After that, they organized numerous protests and manifestations, hunger strikes, round tables, and public tribunals, which also intervened in the field of art, where through exhibitions, street actions, film, literary and theatrical creation they drew attention to their situation in a different way (Učakar 2010; Zorn 2007 quoted in Učakar 2021, 75).

Furthermore, the movement of the Erased was later divided into two parts, where one part remained focused on repairing the damage within state borders through legal channels, while the other part spread beyond national borders and decided to include various political, social, and artistic cultural practices, among which the most resounding actions were the lawsuit of eleven Erased people at the European Court of Human Rights and the Caravan of the Erased, which presented the issue of Erasure to some MEPs and the European Commission, and called on the European institutions to demand a solution from Slovenia (Učakar 2010; Beznec 2007 quoted in Učakar 2012, 75).

It is also important to note that the Erased were active in other areas as well, so in 2006 they supported a protest under the slogan “We are all gypsies under Janša”, which was intended to express disagreement with the relocation of a Roma family from their home (Učakar 2010 quoted in Učakar 2012, 76).

## 12. Preliminary summary of literary research on case study

An overview of the discussed issues according to the academic literature can be summarized with the following important findings. Slovenia, as the most developed state of the former Yugoslavia, over time became the immigration target of members of many nations from less developed areas of the federation. Judging by Slovenian public opinion (1981-2008), migration was generally not desirable. Only immigration from the old EU Member States should be maintained at the same level, which at the very beginning of the dissertation indicates how much the nations of Central and Western Europe are perceived in a positive context in the Slovenian national narrative.

After the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Slovenia had to reawaken and emphasize its national identity, in order to get rid of the negative connotations of the socialist and Balkan countries as painlessly as possible and to show its European affiliation. Under the theories and dimensions of the concept of everyday nationalism, the state apparatus with its political actors played a major role in the rather perfidious promotion of nationalism disguised as patriotism, love of country, through the prism of national myths, holidays, symbols, etc.

The political dimension of everyday nationalism in the example of Slovenia showed how strong the role of state institutions is in promoting nationalism. While other states of the former Yugoslavia had the misfortune to prove their ethnicity and independence through terrible wars, Slovenia, except for the ten-day war, successfully and relatively quickly transitioned from the post-socialist state of the Balkans, to a capitalist country of Central Europe. Although a large part of Slovene history and culture, including its geographical area, certainly at least partially seems to be a part of Central European nations, the seventy-year period of history spent under the auspices of the so-called South Slavic Federation must certainly not be neglected. But going back to the theory of everyday nationalism, in order to further confirm its European identity, the country had to find those Others. As has been emphasized several times in this dissertation, each country has its Others, so there is nothing exceptional in the fact that this emerged in Slovenia as well. But it is certainly interesting that in the renewed Slovene patriotism, the Others were members of the ethnic groups of the former Yugoslav states. The question that arises is, why did this not happen, for example, to some other ethnic groups living in Slovenia, such as Italians or

Hungarians who, according to the criteria of autochthony, are recognized as national minorities? Or, why were the neighboring Austrians not characterized as Others? It is interesting that the Slovenes, who, judging by the definitions written in the theoretical part, connect nationally precisely through language, see much more similarities with nations with which they have no linguistic similarities. Judging by the theories, it can be concluded that in Slovenia after the declaration of independence there was both a strong nationalist and a European narrative, which manifested itself through Yugoslav Others.

To sum up, the interconnection of all five dimensions of everyday nationalism proved to be achievable in the Slovenian example. Following the political dimension, after 1991 and independence Slovenia managed to turn into a political community through all the elements that make it so, namely: to have its own self-government, as well as the territory, language, and culture, which can be controlled (Kymlicka 1995). But in order for these elements to be implanted in the nation's consciousness as something they felt connected to, they had to be rooted in the consciousness of the citizens, which was done precisely through national symbols and myths. As the main identifier of Slovenehood and Slovene territory, Mount Triglav was imposed, which already during Communism and Yugoslavia established itself as the state symbol and secularized pilgrimage center of Slovenia (Šaver 2005, 49). Mount Triglav has a great mythological power and is a primary marker for the Alpine (meaning European) culture of Slovenia.

With the revival of Slovene national and literary heroes, which is mentioned in everyday life and taught in schools as one of the primary devices for spreading everyday nationalism, the sense of national unity and national identification is only further established in the minds of ordinary people. National culture rises on a pedestal as something peculiar only to "us", as something that is implanted in "us" and which distinguishes "us" from all others. The primary focus is on certain cultural components such as language, traditions, folk customs, and the value system. While the political dimension of everyday nationalism defined its determination of nationality and national identity through the example of the Erased people and non-recognition of the status of national minorities of the ethnic communities of the former Yugoslavia, the cultural dimension also had the task of emphasizing all important cultural elements. But since even the most liberal kinds of nationalism rely on a shared identity that values particular cultural,

linguistic, and symbolic characteristics that define the insider-outsider divide (see Tamir 2019), there must always be others who by their culture, behavior, and different value system, in the consciousness of the majority population are perceived as something negative, from which the “native” people are completely different. In the Slovenian case, they are “former Yugoslav Others”.

The question that arises again is, why are the nations of the former Yugoslavia, although they have different ethnic backgrounds, speak different languages and differ in terms of religion, treated as one group in Slovenia? Furthermore, it is precisely these primary national components such as ethnicity, language and religion in their home countries that separate them and, after all bloody wars were fought in the former Yugoslavia, what exactly connects them in another country?

The theoretical part showed and at the same time confirmed, through all five dimensions, the functioning of everyday nationalism in Slovenia after 1991 and independence. It is evident that the Slovenian state apparatus, in order to promote its own national identity, had the task of strengthening not only national but also European identity by highlighting its own history, myths and national symbols and segregating the nation from those undesirable Others.

A key point in the empirical part of the dissertation is how the Slovenian national identity is perceived by people born just before the independence of Slovenia, that is, after 1991. Since most of them do not remember Yugoslavia, and spent their childhood and youth in an atmosphere of heightened national identification, it will be interesting to see how much this influenced their perception of themselves through the prism of Slovene nationality, Slovene European-ness and, on the other hand, Slovenia belonging to the Balkans. Through the analysis of interviews conducted with members of the second generation of migrants from the FYR, who belong to the same generational circle as the first group of respondents and were also born or arrived in Slovenia in early childhood, I will seek an answer as to how important the Slovenian national narrative is to them, whether they define themselves also as Others, and if they have ever felt discriminated against because of their ethnical heritage.

## 13. The Analysis of the Interviews

### 13.1. Spatial and temporal dimensions

At the very beginning of the interview, in order to start the conversation easily and simply, the first question that was asked was, how would the respondents describe a typical Slovene. In this sense, one could see how much the answers are connected with the five dimensions of everyday nationalism, especially with the elements of territory, language, and ethnicity. I wondered if there were differences in responses between these two groups. When asked to define Slovenes, most respondents from both groups agreed that Slovenes as a nation are quite closed and reserved. They were mostly defined in relation to neighboring states.

- *Slovenia is a small, beautiful, subalpine country that was a part of Yugoslavia. As a nation, we are still quite closed and distrustful. We are not enough stubborn and persistent. Even though we are closed towards foreigners, for our friends or acquaintances, we would do everything. At least I would. One can see some sort of impact from Balkans, but we are not so open, as for example, Serbs are. On the one hand, I think we want to be some stubborn and energetic people from the Balkans, but on the other hand, we are always just the same old Janezs. We hold back and give up quickly. (inf 3)*
- *We want to be open-minded, but at the same time, we are really limited. We seemed to be open, and we like to hang out with strangers, but on the other side we are petty bourgeois. I mean, through history we were always some kind of peasants, and never the rulers, and this is still reflected today. Respecting the hierarchy, we are strictly adhering to the rules... We find it hard to bring about change in our lives, because we stick very much to some traditional values, such as diligence and honesty, all that once applied to peasants. That would be an example of the typically Slovene. A peasant who is always nodding his head, working, never complaining... If I compare us with Croats, one can see that Croats have this national pride which holds them together, while we do not have it. We Slovenes are more each for himself, we don't have that "we" are Slovenes feeling, unless there is some kind of*

*match, and we are proud of our athletes. But we are also always willing to help, which I think is the most beautiful Slovenian characteristic. (inf 8)*

- *Slovenes are reserved people, they are much colder than people from the Balkans, they can sometimes be envious, but you can always find nice people among them. (inf 9)*
- *Slovenes are in general nice people, but can be a little reserved. They are strange combine of openness and closeness. (inf 2)*

Some respondents highlighted the difference between the Slovenes living in cities and Slovenes living in villages. They have also agreed that tradition is very important to them.

- *There is a difference between Slovenes who live in villages, and Slovenes who live in cities. In general, Slovenes have big houses, and they are always working around them. Several generations live in the same house or have houses close to each other. (inf 4)*
- *There is a big difference between the people who live in villages, and people who live in bigger cities. The families are still mostly traditional, meaning that the whole family lives in the same house. In villages, religion is probably more important than in the cities. As a society in general, we are trying to be more open, but often we are pretty reserved towards strangers, because Slovenia is not such an international environment, as some other bigger countries are. I do not consider Ljubljana to be a multinational place. (inf 1)*
- *In my opinion, these are the people who consider themselves to be Westerners, Northerners, but in their soul they are čefurs, probably just a bit more fancy čefurs. They like to hike, they are cultural nations, they preserve nature, and are quite traditional, meaning that the whole family lives in one house. (inf 11)*

Some informants connected Slovenes with national markers, such as territory, ethnicity, and language.

- *A Slovene is every person who lives here, regardless of whether he was born here, and feels like a Slovene. (inf 5)*
- *I think it is important to be born in Slovenia, that you have grown up here and are still living here. Maybe also which football team you support. (inf 13)*
- *I think you need to have your family here, that you depend on the state, meaning that you are working here, paying your taxes here. That all of your interests are connected with Slovenia. (inf 15)*
- *Slovenians are the ones who have at least one parent from Slovenia. Someone who has been connected with Slovenia before he was even born. (inf 12)*
- *In my opinion, the biggest indicator of Slovenehood is the language. For example, Carinthian Slovenes are Austrians but they preserved their language. Socialization and the environment also play a role here. (inf 7)*

When trying to define how much the national symbols have importance to them, the respondents were asked to explain us how they perceive Triglav and Martin Krpan<sup>42</sup>. When asked what they represent to them, the answers received were different. All respondents from the group of descendants of migrants concluded they had no meaning to them. Even though most of them are aware that they are symbols of Slovene nationhood, they are not particularly attached to them.

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<sup>42</sup> Martin Krpan is a fictional character of a Slovene peasant and smuggler created on the basis of oral tradition.

- *Even though there is a saying that every Slovene goes to Triglav at least once in their lifetime, I still have not been there, which probably does not make me a proper Slovene. (laugh) I would like to go, but just because of hiking, nothing else. Martin Krpan also means nothing to me. I do not identify myself based on nationality. (inf 9)*
- *Triglav is the biggest mountain in Slovenia, and I went there, but not because every Slovene needs to go there. It does not have any meaning for me. On the other hand, for my father, who is ethnically Slovene, Triglav is a symbol of Slovenia. (inf 14)*
- *I have not visited Triglav, because I am afraid of heights, while Martin Krpan has no meaning for me. I know they are Slovenian symbols, but, to be honest, I do not care about that. (inf 16)*
- *I think Triglav is one of the biggest differences which separates me from Slovenes. I am not emotionally attached to that place, while they are. (inf 12)*
- *To me, Martin Krpan is a story which reminds me of my childhood and school years. Triglav is a mountain, and the symbol on the Slovene flag. There is a saying: "Until you have been on Triglav, you are not a proper Slovene." (inf 13)*

In the Slovenian group, opinions differ. While they are of great importance to some, they do not mean too much to others. Nevertheless, everyone agrees that Martin Krpan, and especially Triglav, are symbols of Slovenia.

- *In school we were taught that Martin Krpan is a representative of Slovenia and Slovenehood. Triglav does not have any meaning to me, except that it is the highest mountain in Slovenia, and I know they are trying to impose this on us as an icon of Slovene-ness, but like I said, it does not represent anything to me. (inf 8)*
- *Both are symbols of Slovene-ness, especially Triglav. We have it on our emblem, and everyone knows this expression that every true Slovene must at least once visit Triglav. Hills are something that has a great importance to Slovenes. For me personally, except that it is the highest mountain in Slovenia, Triglav does not have any particular meaning. I would like to go hiking there once, but not for the reason that after that I will be a true Slovene. But Triglav is surely in the consciousness of Slovenes. (inf 1)*
- *There is an expression that every true Slovene needs to visit Triglav at least once in their life, and I also went there. (laughs) It has a big meaning for us, because it is the highest mountain, and we Slovenes like to hike. Martin Krpan also has a big importance for us. He is something like a Slovene superhero. (inf 2)*
- *Triglav tells me more about Slovenia than Martin Krpan. I would also mention Triglav as a symbol of Slovenia, because Triglav is mythologically colored. (inf 7)*
- *Triglav is a symbol of Slovenia, and also many people are interested in what represents these three hills on our emblem. Triglav is probably already a tourist destination. On the other hand, I did not get the impression that Martin Krpan would be a symbol of Slovenia. It is just a story that I remember from school days. (inf 4)*
- *Triglav has a great importance to me. Even in school they taught us that, when it comes to nature, we have everything, and that we should be proud of our mountains. They didn't exaggerate in that, but it seems to me that we still got some awareness of what it means to be Slovenian. I always say to foreigners that I am a proud Slovene. (inf 3)*

The next question they were asked was about spatial and the temporal dimensions and theories of demarcation. When asked which countries they consider to be Balkans, and whether Slovenia is also part of the Balkans, the answers were different. Most of the interlocutors from both groups agreed that the countries of the former Yugoslavia are the Balkans, with a few neighboring countries. While some of them also put Slovenia in Balkans, others think Slovenia is not part of the Balkans, because of the great historical Central European influence. Opinions were quite similar in both groups. Most of the informants agree Slovenia is somewhere in the middle.

- *In my opinion, the Balkans are all former Yugoslav countries together with Albania. I am not sure if Slovenia is a part of the Balkans, because of its historical connection with Austria and Hungary. But on the other hand, we were in the same country as other South Slavic nations, and following this logic, of course, that we are strongly connected with these lands to this day. In general, I think that there is a very strong belief that Slovenia is something more than the Balkans, that we are more Western as a country and more similar to Central Europe than to the Balkans. Still, in some of the older people, who lived during Yugoslav times, these yugonostalgic feelings are still very strong. Also, because of many migrants here, the connections with the Balkans are still very visible. But when it comes to mentality, we are much more closed and colder than they are. These are the characteristics that divide us from the Balkans. (inf 1)*
- *It depends on the subject. We surely have some characteristic of Balkan-ness, but I would not put Slovenia completely in the Balkans, because we have a lot of Central-European influence because of our history. When it comes to defining which countries should be a part of the Balkans, I would say all the other countries from the former Yugoslavia plus Albania. (inf 4)*
- *For me, the Balkans are all countries from the former Yugoslavia, including Slovenia geographically, but there are a lot of differences. Slovenia leans towards Austria. (inf12)*

- *I would say that all countries from the former Yugoslavia are a part of the Balkans, and also Bulgaria. Maybe also Greece, while Slovenia is somewhere in between. On the border with the Balkans and Europe. (inf 2)*
- *For me, Slovenia is undefined. We are not Austria, but we are also not Croatia or Bosnia. We want to be Westerners, but we are not. (inf 9)*

On the other hand, three informants from different groups have a strong feeling that Slovenia is a part of the Balkans.

- *I have experiences from sport. My brother played sport in Switzerland, Austria, Hungary... And he was always defined as someone who is from the Balkans. We are also mentally more connected with the Balkans because of our characters, customs... In my opinion, Slovenia is definitely a part of the Balkans or probably better to say, the northern border of the Balkans, because Austrians are a completely different nation. The Balkans starts with Slovenia and ends with Albania. (inf 3)*
- *Slovenia is also part of the Balkans because of its historical and cultural connections. We may be on the edge of the Balkans, but we are part of it nonetheless. Albania is also in the Balkans. (inf 14)*
- *Slovenia is part of the Balkans because we are connected historically and there are a lot of people from the FYR living here. We cannot break those connections. (inf 15)*

Two of the informants agreed that not all the former Yugoslav states are a part of the Balkans.

- *I would not say that Slovenes are a part of the Balkans, especially if you consider geography. In my opinion, Romania and Bulgaria are hardcore Balkan. Maybe I would include here also Serbia and Bosnia. For Croatia, I am not sure. (inf 16)*
- *For me, the Balkans is everything that was once part of the Ottoman Empire. For example, we know one part of Croatia was under the Ottoman Empire, while the other one, the northern part of the country, was not. For this reason, I would say that Slovenia is not a part of the Balkans, but neither are some parts of neighboring Croatia, which can also be seen in their similar customs and mentality. (inf 7)*

One informant mentioned a negative connotation that the Balkans has in everyday life.

- *Other Balkan countries are more phlegmatic and pragmatic. It can be very awkward, trying to explain which countries are Balkan countries, because if you classify certain countries as the Balkans, it does not mean that you have geographically classified them as Balkan countries, but some will take this as a negative connotation. (inf 6)*

When asked if they think that Slovenia should have been part of Yugoslavia, all the informants from both groups agreed that it should. The most common answers emphasized the small Slovenian territory, for which they have always been victims of larger and stronger nations. Most of the informants do not remember the Yugoslav times, but because of their parents' stories, they have positive opinion about Yugoslavia.

- *Historically, if these nations did not unite, Hungarian, Italians or Germans would destroy them. Economically, Slovenia also had this pragmatical function in Yugoslavia, and also profited greatly from it, because the whole of Slovenia and some parts of Croatia, based on the experience of Austro-Hungarian Empire, had already developed industry. Especially if*

*you compare this with Serbia or Bosnia. There was no competition, so everything that was made quite cheap in those countries, was then sold very expensively to other parts of Yugoslavia. I have nothing against the former Yugoslavia, but I am not a supporter of that communist experience. (inf 7)*

- *I am too young to have my own opinion about this topic, but I always hear positive stories about Yugoslavia, such as that we had everything back then, and that everything was fairer. But I also know that Slovenia was something like “the golden pit” for Yugoslavia, and it is evident that Yugoslavia needed to disintegrate. (inf 9)*
- *I think it is good that Slovenia was a part of Yugoslavia, because it was better then. We are not doing very well today. (inf 10)*
- *Sometimes it can be hard to be a small country opposed to great powers. Yugoslavia was a powerful country, while Slovenia was not, and will never be. Mostly because of its small territory, and some other things as well. For example, we can not compete with Germany. Still, if you look at the referendum back then, it is obvious that we as a nation really wanted an independent country. (inf 1)*
- *I am not sure if it would be better to be independent in that time. It would be a different thing if we were annexed to Austria. It would probably be better for us. (laughs) Being a part of Yugoslavia is still pretty much alive in our consciousness. If I had to choose between being independent at that time or a part of Yugoslavia, I would choose Yugoslavia. But if I need to choose between Yugoslavia or Austria, Austria sounds like a better option. (laughs) (inf 5)*
- *My parents have always said that Yugoslav times were the best times for Slovenes. For example, housing policy was much better than nowadays. It was much easier to get an apartment. Mom and dad have always emphasized that they felt Yugoslav, united with other South Slavic nations. They worked a lot, but the quality of life was much better than nowadays. (inf 3)*

- *If you listen to older people, most of them will say that it was better back then. I cannot imagine how would it be, if Slovenia had not been a part of Yugoslavia. (inf 15)*

### **13.2. The Political Dimension**

I examined the political dimension of everyday nationalism through questions about national minorities and the erased people in Slovenia. I was interested in whether the informants believe that the ethnic minorities of the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, who live in Slovenia, and since they are the largest, should have received the status of national minorities. Most of the respondents talked about the problems that could happen if these ethnic groups get the status of minorities. They also highlighted the reasons and conditions for someone becoming a minority.

- *Here in our country, the minorities are defined by geography, meaning that they have existed here before, and they differ from people who have just migrated to Slovenia. For this reason, I think that it is fine that they do not have the same status. But this does not mean that some other ethnic groups should not be allowed to organize themselves in some cultural associations, for example. (inf 4)*
- *It is a really difficult question. There is really a lot of these people living here, but if you give them all the rights, it may happen that the whole state becomes bilingual, meaning that both Slovenian and Serbian language will become official, having in mind that officially recognized minorities have bilingual schools and inscriptions. Because of the small Slovenian territory, and for some preservation of Slovenian culture and language, it is probably better not to give them the minority status. They should have a possibility to use their native languages, but I would not give them minority status, because minorities are defined in a different way. They are living on that territory for centuries, and at one point in history, they just made a border across them, while the people who have migrated here made a decision to leave their home states. It is one thing if some political decision separates you*

*from your own state where you have lived for decades or centuries, and another thing to purposely move to another country, and then to demand to have your own rights. (inf 1)*

- *Historically, a part of the Croatian minority in Istria and a part of the Bosnian minority in Velenje, where the mines are located, could demand to become minorities. The bottom line is that in the 1970s, there were migratory movements to the north in search of better earnings. Based on this, it makes no sense to demand minority status. After that, for example, all Croats in Germany could claim the status of an ethnic minority, or Slovenes in Austria who are not Carinthian Slovenes. (inf 7)*

It is interesting that most of the descendants of migrants gave similar answers.

- *I have never thought about this. I think that they already have some rights, such as broadcasting shows in their languages on TV or financial support. Changing their status would probably just further complicate things. (inf 9)*
- *They should not have all the rights, like Slovenes. I do not see the point in giving them all the rights. Some rights sure, but not all. Slovenia should first take care of their own people. That goes for all foreigners, not only people from the former Yugoslavia. (inf 14)*
- *They should not have the same rights, mostly because they need to respect the fact that they live here. They are stubborn and most of them do not want to learn how to speak Slovenian. (inf 11)*

Only two of the respondents from both groups think that these ethnic groups should have minority status.

- *Considering that most of them are numerically the largest ethnic groups in Slovenia, they should have the status of a minority. (inf 12)*
- *It would be fair for them to have the same rights as the Italian and Hungarian minorities have, especially because they are surely the largest ethnic groups here. I think this is the consequence of Slovenian attempts to assimilate them. It is a Slovenian conviction that whoever comes to us, needs to become us. That is why their right to receive minority status has been postponed for so long. (inf 8)*

When asked about their opinion towards Erased people, all the respondents from both groups agreed that the Erasure should not have happened to them. Also, among 16 informants, only one of them was well-acquainted with this topic, while most agree that they were too young or too little interested in it. Most of them emphasized the role that the state and state institutions together with media had in the Erasure.

- *As a Slovenian intellectual, I should probably know more about this topic, but what I know is, that it was shameful. Especially shameful is because, when there was a referendum about Slovenian independency, almost all the Erased voted for the independence of Slovenia. And that then later, the same country erases them... That was a bureaucrat-ethnic erasure. Maybe it can be a little contextualized, because of the rise of the nationalism in the former Yugoslavia, so this erasure was probably a consequence of a small and blind Slovenian nationalism. Sometimes this can also happen. Maybe not with the gun, as in other Yugoslav countries, but with the bureaucratic erasure. This is a really negative thing in Slovenian history. (inf 7)*
- *I do not know much about this topic, but I can affirm that it is a difficult obstacle to human dignity. I do not think that Slovenia is here only one to be blamed, but also the so-called*

*home countries of these people. They needed to find some compromise in order to fix the status of these people. (inf 6)*

- *It seems to me that the matter could be much clearer than it is. I have heard so many stories about this topic. Some say that the erased people had enough time to fix their status, but they did not want to, while the others say that this is not true. I think the truth is somewhere in between. Someone should be responsible for this, and in fact, it seems to me that this is all going on for too long. I'm horrified that this has been dragging on for over 30 years and nothing has changed yet. When it comes to the media, I think that in general in Slovenia, it is always the same. Two camps are always formed, one for and one against, while no one wants to know more in detail what is really happening. (inf 4)*
- *As soon as Janez Janša and his people are behind it all, you know it cannot be ok. They were erased from pure malice. It will never be resolved. (inf 16)*

While one informant does not find this to be important for Slovenia, another one is well acquainted with this topic.

- *I am aware of this situation, but I do not have any opinion about it. It is not a domestic thing. (inf 10)*
- *I'm a little biased because of my former job, where I was also dealing with this topic, so I am probably not the best person to give an answer to this question. I know what it is written, but I do not know how this deal worked in praxis. According to laws, as they were passed, there was enough time for them to decide to take citizenship. And those who did not respond, maybe did not want to or they had not heard about it. I see the troubles and difficulties on both sides. For example, problems in terms of how the state regulated it. I can not imagine how would someone from some village on a border with Croatia, many kilometers from the capital, even knew what he needed to do. Especially if these people were older, and did not*

*have a television or radio. I do not know how in 1991 this information would have reached them in the first place. I can understand the state, that they wanted somehow to regulate their status. You need to decide if you are a national, or a foreigner, you cannot be neither. But I am still asking myself, what was the reason that so many people were erased, and left somewhere in the void. If I compare it to the current situation with the pandemic, and how the laws and regulation on borders are changing almost everyday, I can assume that it was really stressful for these people, being bombed with so much information in such a short period. (inf 5)*

### **13.3. The Cultural Dimension**

When asked how would they describe Slovenian culture, and which elements would they emphasize, most of the respondents stressed the importance of tradition, and compared themselves with neighboring nations. The elements they highlighted were most often music, sports, and food.

- *The most important element is Slovenian folk music. A lot of it is played on national television and radio. If you are in Slovenia, there is a big chance that you will hear yodeling. To be honest, their pop music is not particularly good (maybe just a couple of bands), and their cinematography is also not much. If I were to explain to a foreigner what Slovenian culture is, I would probably highlight their need to go for a walk after lunch, cycling, mountain boots, hiking on Triglav, beef soup... And I think they are a little envious. Still, I think they are not bad people. They are not so mean that they would not help a man in need. (inf 11)*
  
- *For me personally, mountaineering represents Slovenian culture. I think that nowhere is mountaineering and this connection as strong as in Slovenia. One of the important elements is Slovenian folk music. Slovenian culture is also associated with envy and competition, but*

*also traditionalism passed down from generation to generation. Tradition is rooted in every Slovenian family. (inf 6)*

- *Slovenes attach great importance to literature, for example, they are really proud of France Prešern. In most countries, national heroes are those who fought, and not poets. Besides that, as for the nation, they are very much connected to nature. Hills are their national pride. I would also mention the role of festivities, the accordion, and polka, which are probably more connected with Austrian culture. (inf 12)*

Some respondents highlighted the role that politics has in defining Slovenian culture.

- *I do not see any difference in comparison with other cultures. If I should define it, I would say it is a peasant culture. Accordion, braces, rural parts, festivities... Even though it is a part of Slovene culture, I can not identify with it, because I personally cannot stand it. It is connected with rightwing people and lower education. But Slovenia has a lot of quality music and good writers. When comparing with Croatia or Bosnia, I think that, what is part of the native culture is much better there. Here in Slovenia, everything is borrowed, nothing is authentic. (inf 9)*
- *The first thing that pops in my mind are the accordion, meadows, mountains, braces ... The current political party wants these things to be treated as Slovenian culture or, probably more accurately put, non-culture. I think there is more to Slovenian culture than just these elements. Slovenia is a small country with a lot of different things. I surely hope there is more to this than just the accordion or traditional folk music. (inf 16)*

One respondent highlighted the role of Slovenian language.

- *Slovenian culture is some mixture of Italy and Austria. But, you know how I put Slovenian culture? I always say that is the peculiarity of Slovene-ness that we can say some things in dvojnica. This is also quite romantic, because, if I sit with a girl on a bench, I can verbally define that only the two of us sit there, and no one else. No other language has dvojnica. I always sell this dvojnica as a symbol of Slovenia. (inf 7)*

When asked whether they consider Slovenia a part of Balkan culture and with which country they would be compared in terms of similarities, the answers were different. Most informants in both groups think that Slovenia leans more towards Austrian culture, and cannot find similarities with other countries from former Yugoslavia.

- *Slovenian culture is more similar to Austrian culture, probably because of the mentality. Slovenes are a nation that is quite different the other nations of former Yugoslavia. We, who have come here have somehow introduced that “our people”<sup>43</sup> mentality. For me, Slovenia is something like a small America. A melting pot for all the nations from Yugoslavia. Each and every one of us has brought something unique here. (inf 16)*
- *We Slovenes ourselves admit that we are more culturally connected with the Austrians, we just don’t speak German. But the emphasis is still on Austrian culture, bearing in mind that we wear lederhosen, we play accordion... I would not say that this is culturally conditioned, but I would rather emphasize the similar ethnological patterns of this Alpine area. When it comes to former Yugoslavia, I would highlight only Croatia, because after all, it was exposed to the same Austro-Hungarian influence as we were. For example, when Yugoslavia was being established, Ivan Cankar<sup>44</sup> said that we can unite on a political and economic level,*

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<sup>43</sup> Among nations from former Yugoslavia, there is an expression “our people (naši ljudi)” which goes hand in hand with the theory of banal and everyday nationalism, and can be found in the media and everyday speech. The term itself, although it does not define specific nations, makes it clear to every inhabitant of these areas to which nations it refers.

<sup>44</sup> Ivan Cankar is considered to be the greatest writer in Slovene. Besides that, he was also politically active.

*but not on the cultural level, because the Slovenian peasant has more in common with the Tyrolean peasant, than with a peasant from Serbia. And I agree with this. (inf 7)*

- *In my opinion, the biggest difference is the attitude towards nature, which I think is great. When you are traveling from Slovenia to Macedonia, you can see a lot of garbage. The further south you go, the more garbage there is. The northern part of Slovenia is more similar to Austria. People in Slovenia tend to be inspired by Austrians. They want to be like them. (inf 11)*
- *I do not see any similarities with other Balkan nations. Southerners are more relaxed and phlegmatic, here we are not. We are more used to work all the time, and to have monotonous days. We go to the south to relax ourselves. Slovenian culture is more about working, having a family and a house... In my opinion, we are divided into Slovenes and Non-Slovenes. But still, Balkan music is really important here. I cannot imagine going to a party without Balkan music being played there. (inf 15)*
- *It is more similar to Austrian culture. The accordion, the outfits of those people, more like the ones up there. The impact is more visibly from the north. (inf 9)*
- *A lot of Slovenes visit theaters, cycle, and hike. These are probably the most important elements of our culture. I think it is similar to Austrian culture because of all of the accordions. And also because we stick to the rules more. In the Balkans, you are more on your own, you are not so subordinated to politics. And here, we are pretty scared. We do not dare to raise our voices. We are chickens following some institutions or parties that are above us. In the Balkans, it is not like that. (inf 10)*

On the other hand, some informants in both groups can see more similarities with former Yugoslav countries.

- *Look at the way we drive cars here. Of course we are Balkan people. Because here are so many young people who grew up with Croatian or Serbian parents, it seems to me that there was always some mixing or that you had more contact with these people, with such people that come from Balkans. I am from Fužine<sup>45</sup>, and in our class, we were half Slovenes, and half the descendants of migrants. So we were always mixing with them, we were also listening to their kind of music. You were also invited when they had their “Slavas<sup>46</sup>”. And because they are in direct contact with us, Slovenes, who are at home here, we are surely more connected with Balkan culture than with Austrian, for example. (inf 3)*
- *There are some differences, but in my opinion, Slovene culture is most similar to Croatian culture. Of course, it depends on which part of Slovenia you are talking about. But still, the majority of Slovenes visits Croatia, and are consumers of Croatian music and TV programs. (inf 13)*

Some of the informants agree that Slovenian culture is a mixture between the cultures of former Yugoslav states and an Austrian element, focusing on some items and customs which separate them from one culture, and bringing them closer to other cultures. It is interesting that almost only respondents from the Slovenian group saw these customs and similarities.

- *It is similar to Croatian culture because of the same religion. For example, I am more similar to my mom and her Bosnian side, while my sister shares more similarities with my Slovene dad. My father cannot understand how in Bosnia, one can drink coffee for such a long time. Mom and I are more open, while my dad and my sister are a more closed type of*

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<sup>45</sup> A district in Ljubljana, considered to be a part of the city with the most people from the former Yugoslavia living there.

<sup>46</sup> The Orthodox custom of celebrating a family saint, most often associated with Serbs.

people. However, I think that Slovenian culture is more similar to Austrian culture, because Croats are more open. (inf 14)

- *We like everything that is German. There is still nowadays an expression in villages: "How are you? As though I were in Germany." That means that you are feeling really great. I experience us as a culture in half. On the one side, we would like to be Germans and Europe, and on the other side, if you tell a Slovene to pay taxes, he will first think how to deceive the state. You know, that is not the first thought that pops in mind to someone from Sweden, for example. This can be a representation of Balkan culture, where there are not so many rules, everything is more domestic, you can go to the doctor if you have some connection there... We would like to have all the splendor and comfort of Europe, but we would not like to have any responsibility. These things we would like to do the Balkan way. When comparing Austria and the Balkans, I would probably emphasize the role of humor. I think that here in the Balkans we have developed some special sort of humor. For example, what is fascinating for me is that in Bosnia, after so many years of war, they are still able to laugh, and they have developed their own special type of humor. Jokes are the thing that saves them from war traumas and harsh reality. (inf 5)*
- *If I compare Slovenian culture with Serbian, you can see that in Serbia the atmosphere is more relaxed. In Slovenia there is no relaxed atmosphere or, rather, only those who reach for alcohol are relaxed, which I do not approve of. In Serbia, it seems to me that everyone is relaxed regardless of alcohol. If I need to find similarities with some other countries, I would connect Slovenia with the northern part of Croatia. This part of Croatia is relatively similar to Slovenia in the field of dance, music, festivities, and traditions. I can only compare this part of Croatia with us, and maybe part of Istria, which is similar to the southern part of our country. But with Bosnia, Serbia, and all other former Yugoslav countries, it is impossible to compare. In these other countries, they have bigger valves<sup>47</sup>, if you know what I mean. They are more relaxed. In Slovenia, the culture is much closer to Central European countries, to the so-called refined culture. (inf 6)*

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<sup>47</sup> Meaning that they are more open-minded and rebellious.

- *It is a combination of Balkan and Austrian culture, but it is more similar to Austria. For example, the way of cooking is more similar to the Austrian way. Of course we also have Balkan cuisine, but it is brought here by migrants. Another element is Christian culture, which we share with both Austrians and Croats. We like to compare ourselves with Austria, and are trying to be similar to Austria, much more than to any Balkan nation. Even our traditional culture, such as polka, festivities, waltz... This is not Croatia, or anything further south. But it also depends on which part of Slovenia you live in. (inf 1)*
  
- *We are not so open and relaxed as other Balkan nations are. It seems to me that we are a little more uptight, a little more Austrian. (laughs) But we are still not completely Austrian, doing everything according to the rules. If we are able to find some hole in the law, we will take advantage of it. The Balkan kind of way. (laughs) (inf 4)*
  
- *Slovenian culture is built around alcohol and anything connected with it, such as celebrations and festivities, because even at high culture events, drunkenness eventually occurs. Slovenian culture is a primitive culture. When comparing with other cultures, our culture is stretched between the Balkans and Austria. As I like to call it, this more primitive part, such as festivities and drunkenness is more connected with the Balkans, while on the other side, we have this one part that wants to be similar to Austrian culture, but it is failing. I think that some cultural events begin at the level of Austrian culture, maybe a little more refined culture, but in the end it results in Balkan festivities and drunkenness. Although this is a very simplistic view. Maybe it is more similar to Bosnian culture and their festivities, but I do not mean that in a bad way. (inf 8)*
  
- *Slovenian culture revolves around alcohol. Any opportunity is an excuse to get drunk. Here I can see both the connection to and distinction from neighboring nations. In the Balkans, people drink in company, in Austria they probably drink alone, and here we like to drink both in company and alone. (inf 2)*

When asked if there is a common Balkan culture, and what it should represent, most of the respondents agree that this culture exists. A lot of them have emphasized the role of the tradition, language, and music, as the most important denominators of this culture.

- *One of the common denominators is the importance of family. In Slovenia probably even more than in other former Yugoslav countries. Children leave their parents' houses very late in their life. The music is also one of the common denominators. Turbofolk music, to be precise. (laughs) It is the most representative element of this culture, but not the only one that exists. I also need to highlight the role of the accordion, as the symbol of interconnection of all post-Yugoslav countries. (inf 13)*
- *In my opinion, the common denominator is the language. Wherever you go, someone will probably speak Serbo-Croatian. The music is also a huge element of Balkan culture. Again, wherever you go in the world, you will always find at least one club where turbofolk music is played. (inf 15)*
- *Music is a connecting element for the whole Balkans. Also, big weddings and celebrations. Turbofolk is a genre that connects the Balkans. Music defines you in society, and it is really important what you listen to. Based on what you listen to, you fall directly into a group or subculture. (inf 3)*
- *Of course it exists. Elements of Balkan culture are food, music, festivities, temperament... And it goes for the whole Balkan geographical area, because, if you look at Greeks, who are not Slavs, you can see that they still have a lot of things similar to Southern Slavs. For example, turbofolk music is probably the most important element of Balkan culture. Everyone, including Slovenes, listens to this music. Even at the Slovene festivities, people are listening to both Slovenian folk music, and turbofolk music. (inf 2)*

- *I think there is this common Balkan culture. There is folklore everywhere, a rich tradition that Slovenia has as part of the Balkans. They are still bound by something. From Triglav to Vardar. Songs connect these nations. (inf 11)*

Some informants have highlighted some common characteristic of Balkan culture. All the respondents were from Slovene group.

- *Balkan culture exists, and especially when some kind of decision needs to be made in a pragmatic and relaxed way. In Slovenia, we can hear that with various Balkan proverbs, such as “Kako čemo? Lako čemo!” (How to do it? Without a problem) <sup>48</sup>. This is the typical example of Balkan culture. When it comes to some activities that someone does not want to put an effort in, or to do it the easy way, is also a part of Balkan culture. But when we want to prove our achievements, then Balkan culture is not present. (inf 6)*
- *Based on my experiences, there is a common Balkan culture. It will sound really harsh, but it is probably a more primitive type of culture. Not in the negative way, but as a culture which is more individual-oriented, and is more focused on the regular man, and it does not strive for some ideals, such as French culture for example. The center of Balkan culture is the everyday man, who does not strive to be at some higher level of culture. (inf 8)*
- *Of course there is a common Balkan culture! Especially for people who have no complexes. “Vedno si naš!” (You are always ours!) <sup>49</sup> “Language connects these people, and for this reason, keeping in mind that the Slovenian language is quite different, language becomes an element which separates us from them, respectively, Slovenia from the Balkans. When you look at the migrants living here, you can see that this unifying Balkan culture is present among them. They are connected through music, events... If you exclude Slovenia, the other*

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<sup>48</sup> Translation by author.

<sup>49</sup> Translation by author.

*countries are very interconnected. They know a lot about each other's cultures, and have similar customs. (inf 1)*

- *I would say there is a common Balkan culture, but Slovenia is not part of it. (inf 9)*

While all the respondents from the Slovenian group think there is a common Balkan culture, two of the respondents from the other group stated that there is no Balkan culture, or, if there is one, it exists mostly because of the negative connotations it has.

- *There is no Balkan culture. I would generalize everything too much. It would turn out too ugly. I would automatically think of primitivism, wild celebrations, ugly behavior, swearing, breaking glasses... (inf 10)*
- *Balkan culture is a mix of tradition and everything from the west that comes with it. But I don't like going back in time. We are known in the world for more bad things than for our folklore, dances, football... (inf 16)*
- *It always has a negative connotation. It was imposed on us that Slovenia is not Balkan. Everyone has their own opinion about what Balkan culture is or should be. But in general, Balkan culture is always associated with chaos, eastern-ness, bloodthirstiness, uncertainty, savagery, freedom... Also, because we Slovenes stereotypically consider ourselves to be diligent and hardworking, the Balkans become associated with laziness. Do you know where you should hide the money from a Montenegrin? Under the shovel. (laughs) This is funny, but it also represents a problem with clichés. Still, if you are looking at young people from the Balkans, we are extremely open-minded, innovative people. I would not associate young people, at least not the more educated ones whom I have met, with typical stereotypes about the Balkans. The Balkans represents chaos, and their mindset is different. (inf 7)*

### 13.4. The Self/Other Dimension

The last set of questions was focused on the Self/Other dimension, in order to examine the opinions around terms such as “Non-Slovene” and “Čefur”. All the respondents from both groups agreed that these terms do not have the same meaning, because the term represents only people from former Yugoslavia. Most of the informants agreed that čefurs can also be Slovenians.

- *For me, čefurs are Slovenes, while Non-Slovenes are all other nations. Čefurs are a subculture mostly connected with someone who has roots in former Yugoslav states. But even Slovenes can be čefurs, if they wear precisely defined clothes, listen to precisely defined music, and go to special bars or clubs with turbofolk music. (inf 1)*
- *It is a big difference. Non-Slovene refers to where you are from and what your nationality is, while čefur is a subculture. It originates from the Balkan culture, language, and music, together with the way of dressing, the way of speaking or behavior... I can explain my experience because, in grammar school I was hanging out with čefurs, so I was also a little bit čefur. I have dressed in the same way as them, I was listening to the same type of music, I even talked as they do. I started using this “harsh l”, which is typical for čefurs. I remember it still, because my mom was always complaining about the way I spoke. I also cursed a lot more back then. (laugh) But there was a big difference regarding your nationality, respectively, if you are from Bosnia or Serbia, because not all Bosniaks or Serb dressed this way or listened to turbofolk music. (inf 2)*
- *There were a lot of Slovenes who were čefurs, because they were listening to Balkan music or hung out with friends from the Balkans. Čefur always had a negative connotation. If your parents came from Bosnia, for example, you were identified as čefur. Non-Slovene sounds strange to me. We never used this word. (inf 3)*

Some respondents highlighted that the term “čefur” is mostly used only in Ljubljana.

- *Non-Slovene is anyone who is not Slovene, but is also not from the Balkans. Čefur is definitely a member of some Balkan nation. If someone says Non-Slovene, it is evident that this person is not čefur. But I think this is more common in Ljubljana. Here where I live, the members of these nations have assimilated so well that we live here completely normally, even if they do not speak Slovenian. You get used to having him as your neighbor and being equal to you, and you do not perceive him as čefur. Maybe in Velenje or some other towns where a lot of them are living, there can be this čefur subculture, because Slovenes feel threatened by them. (inf 8)*
- *Čefur is someone who came to the Slovenian territory from a former Yugoslav state, while Non-Slovene can be someone who is born in Austria, and lives in Slovenia. Non-Slovenes can be everyone, while čefur is a colloquial term. The fact that someone is labeled a čefur is not present in the whole of Slovenia, but it mainly refers to Ljubljana. This developed in those parts of Ljubljana where there were those large block settlements, because of the migrants who were living there. Here where I live, you will never say to someone that he is čefur. You always say that this person is from Bosnia or from Serbia. (inf 6)*
- *Non-Slovene can also be someone who migrated for example from Hungary, Italy, or Austria, while čefur is also not Slovene, but he comes strictly from some former Yugoslav state. But you need to know that the word čefur is mostly connected with Ljubljana. Here where I am from, I have friends from both Croatia and Bosnia, and I have never perceived them as čefurs. You also need to know that čefurs are not present in Maribor, as the second biggest Slovenian city, or in Celje, this is only typical for Ljubljana, or some nearby towns. It exists only in the capital, and maybe in some mining towns to which they immigrated. They are perceived as some cool guys who do not want to assimilate, and are always on the street looking for a fight. If we are completely honest, this is the truth. When I came to Ljubljana to*

*study, you already knew from afar who is a čefur. They had a specific way of dressing and were aggressive. They themselves behaved in such a way that it was easy to marginalize them. I also need to emphasize the role of the “harsh l” because, based on the pronunciation of this letter, you could know who is one of us and who is not. (inf 7)*

When asking about this term, all the members from the second generation of migrants explained it through their personal experience.

- *I never wanted to feel myself as čefur. Čefurs are people who are not from Slovenia and have a terrible attitude. Mostly they come from Bosnia. Čefurs are people who use “harsh l”. They began to call themselves čefurs. Even though I do not consider myself to be čefur, I do not have any problems if some call me that. Society has become more open towards these people. (inf 12)*
- *You ask yourself what you are and what you are not. I consider myself to be čefur, and I am not ashamed of that. It was funny in school, because I was great in Slovenian classes. Probably the best in the class. And there is this stereotype that people from former Yugoslavia have a hard time learning Slovenian, and especially pronouncing some letters, such as the letter “l”. My Macedonian heritage is a part of me that makes me rich, and I am honored to have it. I am a Slovene with čefur roots. When I was younger, I felt ashamed because of this. But now I can proudly say that I have this dual identity. It intertwines in me. I consider myself to be Slovenian, but sometimes it can be harsh because of my last name. But then, when I go to Macedonia, they consider me to be Slovenian. I think I am Slovene, but not completely. You are always from “down there”. (inf 11)*
- *Čefurs are part of Slovenia, they are also Slovenes, even though they deviate from the traditional Slovenian society. Most of them have Slovenian citizenship. I consider myself to be half and half. I do not feel myself to be a real Slovenian, even though I was born here.*

*Maybe because I am more attached to my mother, who is from Bosnia, and I took a part in this identity. At home, we speak a mix of languages. With my dad I speak Slovenian, and with my mom I mostly speak Bosnian. Because my mom taught me things in the household, for me still nowadays it is strange to say the Slovenian word for the pillow or blanket. I always use Bosnian words. (inf 14)*

- *When I was younger, I had a really hard time trying to decide who I was. I did not feel Slovene, and nor did I feel Macedonian because I do not know Macedonian folk tradition. I probably have not read enough Macedonian books, and do not know enough about their customs, traditions, and history. For this reason, I am not equal to my cousins who were born there. I discussed these matters more inwardly. I still have hard time defining myself, so I always say that I am Macedonian, who was born in Slovenia. (inf 12)*

Some respondents never struggled with this dual identity.

- *I feel like a Slovene. My mom studied in Slovenia, and she has integrated much of Slovene culture and religion. We still celebrate Orthodox Christmas, but greater emphasis is placed on Catholic Christmas. For example, I understand the Macedonian language, but I do not speak it. Macedonia is a foreign country to me. (inf 10)*
- *I never had any problems with dual identity. I always knew that I am Bosnian. At home I speak Bosnian with my parents, I speak Bosnian with my friends who are also descendants of migrants from Yugoslavia. I always knew who I was. (inf 15)*

Two of the respondents do not want to express themselves through nationality.

- *Čefur is someone who wears a tracksuit, white tennis shoes, white socks, a lot of chains around the neck, and their primary characteristic is turbofolk music. They all listen to it. For*

*example, I do not consider myself to be čefur. I would rather say that I am Bosniak. But then again, a problem occurs because my name is a typical Croatian name, and not a Muslim one. But my dad is a Bosnian Croat, and my mother is some mixture of Serbian and Slovenian heritage, I have cousins in Macedonia... I prefer to say that I am some sort of Balkan cocktail. But I was never raised to despise or hate some other nation or culture. If everyone were like my parents, there would never have been a war. (inf 16)*

- *Nationality is a really problematic topic for me because I do not define myself based on it. Even at home I was never raised in a religious way, or presented with my “home” culture. Probably for this reason, I always feel strange when I go to Bosnia. I do not feel that I am like them. Even in our household, we mostly use Slovenian. We speak Bosnian only when we fight because you can not fight in Slovenian. (laughs) But I have a tendency to use Bosnian or Croatian when there is opportunity, just so I will not forget them. Anyway, I am quite assimilated here in Slovenia, and I think that a big focus on nationality can only lead to bad things. (inf 9)*

The second question was for the members of second generation of migrants, asking if they have ever felt discriminated against because of their heritage. Most of the respondents declare that they have not felt discrimination.

- *Most of my peers at primary school were from Serbia and Bosnia, so it was quite normal. No one had a problem with it. But in general, these people are discriminated against. However, it is connected with status, what these people do, and where they work. For example, because most of the people from Bosnia and other countries work as construction workers here, people treat them as though they were less worthy. On the other hand, čefurs who work in higher positions, are not so discriminated against. But I think the situation is getting better. Nowadays, there are so many people whose names end in –IĆ living in Slovenia, that discrimination is not so visible anymore. Our generation is already working, has finished*

*education... There are really a lot of us, children of migrants. This discrimination was more visible when we were younger. (inf 12)*

- *In my primary school, there were a lot of descendants of migrants, and it was only 7 of us Slovenes in a class of 33 pupils. So we were actually in the minority, but I never had a feeling that neither we nor they would be discriminated against. But I noticed that with certain immigrant families, they didn't have such well-arranged family conditions, the children were a little more problematic. But exactly because we were so mixed in the class, I really noticed no discrimination towards them. The same was in highschool. There was even less discrimination. I do not know how it was for them on the other side, but sometimes you could notice a bit of aggression or arrogance, as if they had some kind of complex because of their heritage. I believe they put up some kind of resistance to those who are not like them. The more threatened you feel, the more aggressive you act towards others. (inf 1)*
- *When I was young, for my parents and their generations it was really important if your last name ends in -IĆ or -IČ. And having a suffix -IĆ in your last name was a problem, because everyone knew where you were from. Still, when I look at my generation or even younger generations, I do not see this problem anymore. I have noticed that the descendants of migrants from Yugoslavia do not care particularly if their last name is written with Ć or Č. (inf 8)*
- *You first come across the word čefur in primary school when your classmates use this nickname for pupils whose parent come from former Yugoslav states. Also, when I was in elementary school, things were probably much different from today, because there was still a war going on in the Balkans. It was believed that these troubled, problematic children were always čefurs. And then you kind of grow up with this perception that they are the ones always making problems, like being very loud in buses, stealing mobile phones... Of course, these are all matters that have some reasons behind them which we did not know. When I was growing up, I knew little about the war in the Balkans, and why these people came here,*

*they were just čefurs. But if I compare it with the current situation, I do not think that these people are discriminated against anymore. (inf 4)*

- *There were always two groups in school. Those who were Slovenes, and those who were čefurs, but there was no discrimination, because they knew how to stand up for themselves. But there was never a mixing between us, we were always separated. But I always say to people, because I live in Fužine<sup>50</sup>, that this is not a dangerous neighborhood. Many people still live here or have moved back to this neighborhood. We had a really beautiful childhood here. In my opinion, through some famous singers or writers who are descendants of migrants, the people here have accepted that these people are just ordinary people, just as anyone else is. Maybe it is different in villages, but here in the city, I believe there is no discrimination towards these people anymore. Or at least I do not feel it, because my last name does not end in –IĆ. Still, I believe that after the war, it was really hard for them to integrate into Slovenian society. (inf 3)*
- *It depends how much people have assimilated. For example, my parents speak Slovenian, and when they go to the bank or to the post office, if they didn't look at the surname, no one would know that they are not Slovenes. But this is maybe because we live in a smaller town, where there are not so many families from former Yugoslav states. This may also be one factor why my parents have assimilated. If all of your neighbors are Slovenes, of course you have to assimilate. That does not mean that my parents do not use Serbo-Croatian anymore, both languages are important to them, because both me and my sisters use both of the languages. If you assimilate, then the discrimination is not required, because people do not notice that you come from somewhere else. (inf 13)*
- *I am not sure. Like I said, I went to school with many people who came from former Yugoslavia. Maybe teachers were a bit strict to them, but just because these pupils were*

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<sup>50</sup> Fužine is considered to be the typical 'čefur' neighborhood. Most of the immigrant population from FYR live in this part of Ljubljana.

*mostly making trouble. Still, I think that discrimination is not visible anymore. I do not see this dividing line between Slovenes and čefurs anymore. (inf 2)*

- *Even though I am ethnic Slovene, I have a Montenegrin surname because my ancestors immigrated to Slovenia a very long time ago. And my last name ends with the suffix –IČ. But for some reason, I was always perceived as someone from that other group. Just because of my last name. I do not recall that someone who migrated to my town ever had any problems with discrimination. There were always some jokes about last names ending in –IČ, but they were just jokes. They were never discriminatory. (inf 5)*

Some respondents explained that discrimination is not typical only for Slovenia, but that every country has some ethnic group against which they discriminate. Some of them also do not consider all the nations from former Yugoslavia to be described as čefurs.

- *When I lived in Vienna, I was marked as 'tschusch', which is Austrian version for čefur. When I was degraded as 'tschusch', I told myself that I will marginalize no one again. All the negative attributes that Slovenes had about other countries of the former South were reflected in the čefurs. And here I speak about the nations south of Croatia, because Croats are not perceived as čefurs, but I do not know why. I think that this common experience from the Austro-Hungarian Empire makes us culturally closer than with other former Yugoslav nations. I have a feeling that Croats are seen as equals, because after Slovenia, Croatia was the second most industrially developed state in Yugoslavia. When I speak with other Slovenes, even Croats who have migrated here are not treated as čefurs. There are no negative connotations connected with them, maybe only that people from Dalmatia are lazy.(laughs) (inf 7)*

- *There is a common stereotype that čefurs are people who wear tracksuits, use 'harsh l' , listen to really loud music, and gather in backyards where they have parties. It is also a common name for all the nations from former Yugoslavia, but I think it is mostly used for Serbs and Bosniaks. I would never say for someone from Croatia that he is čefur. It is also a common name for all the nations from former Yugoslavia, but I think it is mostly used for Serbs and Bosniaks. I would never say for someone from Croatia that he is čefur. (inf 5)*
- *Non-Slovenes are people who have come to Slovenia in some period of their lives. Although we like to appropriate those Argentines and Canadians who came here. They are Slovenes. It seems to me that no one would say for an Austrian that he is čefur. Once we had a debate, and a colleague said something I really liked. "Every state has their own čefurs." For example, we are čefurs for the Swiss. Or Estonians for Finns. All those who come from some poorer countries to one country to do some work that is much better paid than in their own countries, are perceived as čefurs. It is the same as Slovenes who go to work in Germany, because salaries are better there. (inf 4)*

One respondent has connected this problematic with the current political situation in Slovenia or the state institutions.

- *I have never felt discriminated against because of my heritage or my last name. I think that people who are discriminating for example us from former Yugoslavia, or nowadays migrants from Middle East, are in the minority, but they are loud. But these are the people who would rarely say something to your face. Mostly they are just hiding behind fake Facebook profiles in forums on the internet. But the current political climate in the country is dividing people in two parts: these who are for Janez Janša, and us who are against him. The current government wants to implement the ridiculous idea, which primarily refers to Bosnians, that, if someone wants to work here, they are not allowed to bring their family with*

*them. They want to separate families, as Trump has separated Mexicans. And they are presenting it as how these people will steal our jobs, take bread from our mouths... And these people are mostly working as construction workers. (inf 16)*

- *What I find interesting is, when Croats, Serbs and Bosniaks live abroad, they all love each other, but when you put them in their natural environment, they cannot stand each other. It is important to know that when they immigrated to Slovenia, they were ghettoized. So if you have one group per couple of square feet, of course they will stick together. One part of the marginalization by the Slovenes was certainly noticeable, and with Slovenes I think from the municipality of Ljubljana. On the other hand, these people surely felt some kind of pride connected with their heritage, especially because they were marginalized and forced to assimilate. Something like “you are not ours. You are sitting somewhere in the corner, and if you want to become one of us, you need to assimilate completely.” So you have just two options. Either you assimilate, or you become defensive. But even if they wanted to assimilate, and were trying to pronounce that letter “l” in the Slovenian way, it was again not good, meaning that you are never good enough. (inf 7)*

On the other hand, one informant has felt discriminated because of her heritage.

- *I have felt discriminated against. When I was younger, people in school would tell me I am a refugee, like my mother. Even though my mother came to Slovenia before the war. Some people were telling me, and a couple of my friends whose parents are also not from Slovenia, that we do not have the right to speak or to vote, because we are čefurs. For this reason and out of defiance, even though our last names are Slovene, we have decided, on our Facebook profiles, to add our mothers' last names, which end in –IČ. (inf 14)*

## 14. Interpretation and Critical Discourse Analysis

The discourse analysis of the informants involved in the survey will be most transparent and functional with the help of the typology of their statements. As a reference point for analysis, the year 1991 and the independence of Slovenia was taken. The analyzed criteria were closely related to the five dimensions of everyday nationalism, namely:

- a) Territory and ethnicity
- b) Symbols and myths
- c) Political parties and state institutions
- d) Elements of culture
- e) Discrimination

For the discourse analysis, beside the Fairclough's and van Dijk's critical analysis of discourse, I will be also using Michael Billig's typology of discourse, respectively, the symbols and *deixes*, a term that includes words such as *we*, *our*, *this*, *here*, *nation*, and are "continually pointing to the national homeland" (Billig 1995, 11).

By combining the above analyses, one can get the most precise overview of the typology of the statements of participants, and thus more detailed insight into the understanding and functionality of everyday nationalism in Slovenia. One can roughly distinguish at least two dominant and at the same time opposite discourses. These are the discourse on Europe and the discourse on the Balkans. The first is a discourse that advocates for the European identification of Slovene-ness, while the second discourse identifies Slovenia with the Balkans and at the same time demarcates it from it. However, if the theory of everyday nationalism is used, it can be concluded that both discourses are nationalistic in nature because they use all five dimensions of everyday nationalism in order to emphasize national identification. In the following text, I will analyze the obtained answers using critical discourse analysis through the above criteria and try to determine whether the hypotheses are correct.

### 14.1. Ethnicity and territory

Hypothesis1: Slovene national identity is primarily defined through ethnicity and territory.

The first considered criterion was that of territory and ethnicity. When asked what it means to be a Slovene, most of the answers were related primarily to the Slovene character and to a lesser extent to the territory or ethnicity. Among the 16 answers, only three participants emphasized the role of ethnicity, by which at least one parent is Slovenian. According to the criterion of territories, only one respondent expressed the idea that a Slovene is anyone who has lived in Slovenia for a long time. All other answers were mostly based on tradition and character differences compared to other nations.

- *On the one hand, I think **we** want to be some stubborn and energetic **people from the Balkans**, but on the other hand, we are always just the same old **Janezs**. (inf 3)*

In the sentence above, the dichotomy between ‘us’ and ‘them’, together with the stereotypes is shown. Janez, as a highly common Slovenian name, is a stereotype of a typical Slovene who is, in the eyes of most of the respondents, reserved, closed and envious, which confirms the research on the opinion of ‘Non-Slovenes’ regarding Slovenes (see Baltić, 2002). However, what is interesting is that mostly the ethnic Slovenes, i.e. the first group of respondents, compared themselves to other nations, emphasizing the above characteristics. On the other hand, for the most part, the responses of the second group of respondents were more related to ethnicity and territory.

- *Slovenes are the ones who have at least **one parent from Slovenia**. Someone who was **connected with Slovenia before he was even born**. (inf12)*

- *I think you **need to have your family here, that you depend on the state**, meaning that you are working here, **paying your taxes here**. That all of your interests are connected with **Slovenia**. (inf15)*
- *I think it is important to **be born in Slovenia**, that you **have grown up here and are still living here**. (inf 13)*

Still, the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’ could be seen in most of the answers. The participants have most often compared themselves with the Austrians and the peoples of the former Yugoslavia, with the Austrians being defined mostly in positive context, while the peoples of the former Yugoslavia were most often marked as ‘Balkan Others’. Still, they do not fall completely into the category of negative Others because, besides certain negative characteristics attributed to them, they still have certain characteristics that participants indicated that they like.

- *If I compare us with Croats, one can see that **Croats have this national pride which holds them together**, while we do not have it. (inf 8)*
- *Slovenes are reserved as a people, **and are much colder than people from the Balkans...** (inf 9)*
- *One can see some sort of impact from the Balkans, **but we are not so open**, as for example, **Serbs are**. (inf 3)*
- *In my opinion, these are the people who consider themselves to be **Westerners, Northerners**, but in their soul they are **čefurs**, probably more fancy čefurs. (inf 11)*

- But when it comes to mentality, **we are much more closed and colder than they are.** These are the characteristic that **divide us from the Balkans.** (inf 1)

The very words ‘colder’, ‘reserved’, ‘not so open’, show stereotyping and division between ‘us’ and ‘them’, because members of other nations of the former Yugoslavia are said to be much more open and direct. While most of the answers compared Slovenes to other nations, some answers pointed to the importance of tradition and the peasant way of life, which, as noted in the theoretical part, is still very important in the Slovene national narrative.

- *They like to hike, they are cultural nations, they preserve nature, **and are quite traditional, meaning that the whole family lives in one house.*** (inf11)
- *There is a difference between Slovenes who live in villages, and Slovenes who live in cities. In general, Slovenes have **big houses**, and they are always working around them. **More generations live in the same house or have houses close to each other.*** (inf 4)
- *The families are still mostly traditional, meaning **that the whole family lives in the same house.** In villages, religion is probably more important than in the cities.* (inf 1)
- *Slovenian culture is also associated with envy and competition, but **also traditionalism passed down from generation to generation.** Slovenia is an extremely traditional country, where worldviews and behaviors are passed down from generation to generation. **The tradition is rooted in every Slovenian family.*** (inf 6)
- *We seemed to be open, and we like to hang out with strangers, but on the other side we are petty bourgeois. I mean, **through history we were always some kind of peasants, and never the rulers, and this is still reflected today.** Respecting the hierarchy, we are strictly adhering to the rules... We find it hard to bring about change in our lives, **because we stick very much to some traditional values, such as diligence and honesty, all that once applied to peasants.***

*That would be an example of typical Slovene. A peasant who is always nodding his head, working, never complaining...* (inf 8)

While the Slovene language is the biggest marker of unification between Slovenes (see Južnič 1993, Velikonja 2002, Vezovnik, 2007, and more), only one respondent highlighted the role of the language as an element of Slovenehood.

- In my opinion, **the biggest indicator of Slovenehood is the language**. For example, Carinthian Slovenes are Austrians but they preserved their language. Socialization and the environment also play a role here. [...] *No other language has dvojina. I always mention this dvojina as a symbol of Slovenia.* (inf 7)

On the other hand, language can also become a symbol of the separation of 'us' from 'them'.

- *The language is connecting these people, and for this reason, having in mind that Slovenian language is quite different, language becomes an element which separates us from them, respectively, Slovenia from the Balkans. When you look at the migrants living here, you can see that this unifying Balkan culture is present among them. They are connected through music, events... If you exclude Slovenia, the other countries are very interconnected. They know a lot about each other's cultures, and have similar customs.* (inf 1)

The next criterion for studying the territorial and temporal dimension of everyday nationalism was the geographical understanding of the Balkans. I was interested in which countries belong to the Balkans and whether, in their opinion, Slovenia is part of the Balkans. That geographical space, together with the temporal dimension, plays a major role is clear from the statements

below. Most informants agreed Slovenia is somewhere on the border between the Balkans and Europe.

- *We surely have some characteristic of **Balkan-ness**, but I would not put Slovenia completely in Balkans, because we have a lot of **Central-European influence due to our history**. (inf 4)*
- *... while Slovenia is somewhere in between. On the **border** with the **Balkans** and **Europe**. (inf 2)*
- *... the **northern border of the Balkans**, because Austrians are a completely different nation. (inf 3)*
- *Slovenia is also part of the Balkans because of its **historical and cultural connections**. We may be on the **edge of the Balkans**, but we are [part of it] nonetheless. (inf 14)*
- *In general, I think that there is a very strong belief that **Slovenia is something more than the Balkans**, that we are more of a **western country** and more similar to **Central Europe than to the Balkans**. [...] **These are the characteristics that divide us from the Balkans**. (inf 1)*
- *Because of the **small Slovenian territory**, and for some preservation of Slovenian culture and language, it is probably better not to give them minority status. (inf 1)*

Therefore, it confirms the thesis that territory and borders play a major role in demarcating themselves from other nations and cultures, and creating a common national culture and unity. It is precisely from the above quotations that the threat to the small Slovenian territory and the importance of borders can be seen. This is true even in the imaginary sense, where Slovenia becomes the line separating the so-called backward Balkans from civilized Europe. Skey stresses that the significance of national territory is in the boundary between those who do and do not

belong (see Skey 2011, 24). From the replies below it can be seen that, when understanding different cultures, i.e. European vs. Balkan, it is the territory of Slovenia that serves as the dividing line between those who belong to Europe and those who do not. While most of the respondents classified Slovenia as European country (primarily because of history, culture, territory and religion), some respondents consider it part of the Balkans, although primarily historically, temporally, and culturally. In this way, in most of the answers, Slovenia becomes a symbol of the demarcation of two geographical units and two opposing cultures.

## 14.2. Symbols and myths

### Hypothesis 2: Slovene myths and symbols are important in the self-identification of the respondents

The second criterion was the attitude towards Martin Krpan and Triglav as national symbols. All informants of the group of descendants of migrants agreed these symbols had no meaning for them, while opinions in the group of Slovenes differed. While some emphasized the importance of primarily Triglav as a symbol of Slovenia, for others it had no meaning on a personal level; however, all agreed that these are the primary symbols of Slovenia, as seen from the following:

- ... and I know they are trying to impose this on us as an **icon of Slovene-ness**.. (inf 8)
- Both are **symbols of Slovene-ness**, especially Triglav. (inf 1)
- I would also put forward Triglav as a **symbol of Slovenia**, because Triglav is **mythologically colored**. (inf 7)
- Martin Krpan also has a big importance for us. He is something like a **Slovene superhero**. (inf 2)

- *Both are symbols of Slovene-ness, especially Triglav. **We have it on our emblem.** (...) Hills are something that have a great importance to Slovenes. (inf 1)*
- *Triglav is the biggest mountain in Slovenia, and I went there, but not because every Slovene needs to go there. It does not have any meaning for me. **On the other hand, for my father, who is ethnically Slovene, Triglav is a symbol of Slovenia.** (inf 14)*
- ***In school we were taught that Martin Krpan is a representative of Slovenia and Slovenehood.** (inf 8)*

It is precisely from the last answer that the connection of myths and symbols with state institutions and the political dimension can be seen. Pupils are taught in schools about Triglav and Martin Krpan, and Triglav even figures on the national coat of arms. Interestingly, almost all the respondents used the same sentence when giving an answer to this question. Even though it was used in different contexts, fifteen of the respondents used the sentence below:

- ***You are not a true Slovene if you have not been to Triglav at least once.***

From this sentence it is seen that Triglav is deeply rooted in the consciousness of Slovenes, not only as the highest mountain, but as the primary symbol of Slovene-ness. At the same time, Triglav can also become a symbol of distinction. Here again the demarcation between ethnic Slovenes and a group of second-generation migrants can be seen, where Mount Triglav becomes both a geographical and a symbolic element of separation.

- ***I think Triglav is one of the biggest differences which separates me from Slovenes. I am not emotionally attached to that place, while they are.** (inf 12)*

As part of the research on spatial and temporal dimensions, respondents were asked if they thought it was good that Slovenia was once part of Yugoslavia and to explain their answers. From the answers given, it can be seen that most respondents consider Yugoslavia a ‘necessary evil’, and in the answers there is a narrative of a small Slovenian territory and a consequent threat from larger and stronger nations.

- ***Sometimes it's hard to be a small country opposed to greater powers. Yugoslavia was a powerful country, while Slovenia was not, and will never be. Mostly because of its small territory, and some other things as well. (inf 1)***
- ***It is great that Slovenia was a part of Yugoslavia. Slovenia was too small to be independent back then. Also, from the economical and social aspect, being a part of a much bigger country was a big plus for us. (inf 3)***
- ***Historically, if these nations did not unite, Hungarian, Italians or Germans would destroy them. Economically speaking, Slovenia also had this pragmatical function in Yugoslavia, and she also profited greatly from it, because the whole Slovenia and some parts of Croatia, based on the experience of Austro-Hungarian Empire, already had developed industry. Especially if you compare this with Serbia or Bosnia. (inf 7)***

However, the same pattern of comparison with more developed neighboring countries, such as Austria, reappears, which reaffirms Slovenia's aspirations towards Central Europe. While some respondents see Austria as an economic and cultural role model, others support Slovenian independence. But even this independence shows a division between Europe and the Balkans, because, according the answers, the Slovenes were under the rule of the Germanic nations for so long that they took over their way of working, which is the complete opposite of the so-called Balkan way of work.

- *I am not sure if it would be better to be independent in that time. **It would be a different thing if we were annexed to Austria. It would probably be better for us.** (laughs) Being a part of Yugoslavia is still still pretty much alive in our consciousness. If I have to choose between being independent at that time or a part of Yugoslavia, I would choose Yugoslavia. **But if I need to choose between Yugoslavia or Austria, Austria sounds like a better option.** (laughs) (inf 5)*
- *It would be better if it was independent. **We were so long under Austria and Germany, that we have taken over their way of working, which is not in line with the Balkan way of working. If we were independent already before, we would not have this mentality of servants; that we feel as somebody is always telling us what we need to do.** Before it was Yugoslavia, before Yugoslavia it was the Austro-Hungarian Empire, nowadays it is the European Union. We are independent today, but in reality we are not.* (inf 8)

### 14.3. State and political institutions

Hypothesis 3: The state and state institutions are the primary culprits for the Erasure and the non-recognition of minority status of FYR ethnic groups.

The next set of questions referred to the political dimension of everyday nationalism in Slovenia, which was primarily studied through the issues of minorities and the erased people. When asked for their opinion about the Erasure that happened in 1992 in Slovenia, fifteen of the respondents stated that they are not well informed about this topic, but can agree that both the state and the national media had a big role in the Erasure.

- *That was a **bureaucratic-ethnic erasure.** [...] probably a consequence of small and blind Slovenian **nationalism.** (inf 7)*

- *I do not think that Slovenia is the only one to be blamed here, but also the so-called **home countries** of these people. They needed to find some compromise in order to fix the status of these people. (inf 6)*
- *As soon as **Janez Janša and his people** are behind it all, you know it cannot be OK. (inf 16)*
- *The **media** were silent. The media are creating our reality, and they have been under political pressure. It was in the interest of all political parties to hide it. (inf 9)*
- *With **media**, I think that in general in Slovenia it is always the same. Two camps are always formed, one for and one against, while no one wants to know more detail about what is really happening. (inf 4)*

From the answers above, it is clear most of the respondents have connected these topics with state politics, and the role of the state institutions. Unfortunately, because of insufficient knowledge of this topic, the respondents emphasized it was the state institutions that were to blame, but they could not better explain their reasons and the interpretation of these statements. One of the respondents from the second generation group concludes that this is not a domestic topic, which shows both disinterest and ignorance of the matter. Also, this can be observed through the prism of Others, that is, 'it happened to them, not to us, so it doesn't matter'.

- *I am aware of this situation, but I do not have any opinion about it. **It is not a domestic thing.** (inf 10)*

#### 14.4. Elements of culture

Hypothesis 4: Slovenia is seen as (Central) European culture, because of similar traditions and customs, while music is the primary element of self-identification.

The cultural dimension of everyday nationalism was researched through the elements which are the most characteristic for Slovenian culture. The informants were asked: if they were to explain Slovenian culture to a foreigner, which elements would they emphasize? Most of the respondents highlighted the elements of tradition and music. A majority pointed to the role that music has in defining Slovenian culture, as well as being a connector to other neighboring countries. Compared to the Balkan nations, it was the turbofolk music genre that is at the same time culturally dividing them, but also bringing them closer.

- *But still, **Balkan music** is really important here. I cannot imagine going to a party without Balkan music being played there. (inf 15)*
- ***The music is also a huge element of Balkan culture.** Again, wherever in the world you go, you will always find at least one club where **turbofolk music** is played. (inf 15)*
- ***The music is also one of the common denominators. Turbofolk music**, to be precise. (laughs) *It is the most representative element of this culture, but not the only one that exists... I also need to highlight the role of **accordion**, as the symbol of interconnection of all post-Yugoslav countries. (inf 13)**
- ***Music is a connecting element for the whole Balkans.** Also, big weddings and celebrations. **Turbofolk** is a genre that is connecting Balkans. (inf 3)*
- *For example, **turbofok music** is probably the most important element of Balkan culture. (inf 2)*

- *They are still bound by something. **From Triglav to Vardar. Songs connect these nations.** (inf 11)*
- *But still, a sizeable number of Slovenes visits Croatia, and are consumers of **Croatian music** and TV programs. (inf 13)*

Here one can see the power of music that Muršič (1999) talks about. Almost all the respondents have highlighted the role of music, where the dualistic nature of music is seen. Turbofolk music is always associated with the connotation of the Balkans; it both connects Slovenes with the Balkans, and separates them. Interestingly, almost all the respondents emphasized the role of the accordion as the primary element connecting Slovenes with both Austria, and former Yugoslav states. The accordion, together with music in general, is something that, according to answers of most of the informants, are the elements which primarily connect them with Austrians.

- *I would also mention the role of festivities, **accordion and polka**, which are probably more connected with Austrian culture. (inf 12)*
- *The first thing that pops into my mind are **accordion**, meadows, mountains, girders... (inf 16)*
- *But emphasis is still on Austrian culture, bearing in mind that we wear lederhosen, we play the **accordion...** (inf 7)*
- *It is more similar to Austrian culture. The **accordion**, the outfits of those people... (inf 9)*
- *I think it is like Austrian culture because of all of **the accordions.** (inf 10)*

For some respondents, alcohol was also an element which separates them, on the one hand, while at the same time connecting them with other cultures. Also, in most of the answers, alcohol was most often associated with Slovenian folk parties where Slovenian folk music is played, which conforms with one of the seven criteria of Slovenian folk music in creating a national identity (see Šaver, 2005).

- *In the Balkans, people drink in company, in Austria they probably drink alone, and here we like to drink both in company and alone. (inf 2)*
- *If I compare Slovenian culture with Serbian, you can see that in Serbia the atmosphere is more relaxed. In Slovenia there is no relaxed atmosphere or, rather, only those who reach for alcohol are relaxed, which I do not approve of. (inf 6)*
- ***Slovenian culture is built around alcohol** and anything connected with it, such as celebrations and festivities, because even at high culture events, drunkenness eventually occurs. Slovenian culture is a primitive culture. When comparing with other cultures, **our culture is stretched between the Balkans and Austria. As I like to call it, this more primitive part, such as festivities and drunkenness is more connected with the Balkans, while on the other side, we have this one part who wants to be like Austrian culture, but it is failing.** I think that some cultural event begins at the level of Austrian culture, maybe a little more sublime culture, but then it ends up in Balkan festivities and drunkenness. Although this is a very simplistic view. Maybe it is more similar to Bosnian culture and their festivities, but I do not mean that in a bad way. (inf 8)*

Still, most of the informants expressed their similarities with Austrians, as the nation which they strive to emulate. The spatial dimension can also be seen here if one looks at the small words that are signifiers of the territory, such as ‘from down there’, ‘from up there’, ‘from the above’. In the

answers of all the respondents who were using these words as markers of geographical area, 'down there' was used in negative and discriminatory context, while describing the nations of former Yugoslavia.

- *It is more similar to Austrian culture. The accordion, the outfits of those people, more like the ones **up there**. The impact is more visible from **the above**. (inf 9)*
- *I would not say that this is culturally conditioned, but I would rather emphasize the similar ethnological patterns of this **Alpine area**. (inf 7)*
- *We like to compare ourselves with Austria, and are trying to be like Austrian, much more than to any nation from Balkans. Even our traditional culture, such as polka, festivities, waltz... This is not Croatia, or anything more **below**. (inf 1)*
- *You are always from **down there**. (inf 11)*

Some of them have also highlighted the impact of Central European culture. While Austria is still seen as something Slovenes strive to be, and compare themselves with, most of them agree, that Slovenes still have a lot of Balkan characteristic, which are mostly described negatively.

- ***People in Slovenia tend to be inspired by Austrians. They want to be like them.** (inf 11)*
- *In Slovenia, the culture is much closer to Central European countries, to the so-called **elegant culture**. (inf 6)*
- *We are not so **open and relaxed** as other Balkan nations are. It seems to me that we are a bit more **uptight, a little more Austrian**. (laughs) But we are still not completely Austrian, doing*

*everything according to the rules. If we are able to find some hole in the law, we will take advantage of it. **The Balkan kind of way.** (laughs) (inf 4)*

Still, the Balkans as an imaginary cultural area, also has positive characteristics for some respondents.

- *In the Balkans, **you are more on your own, you are not so subordinated to politics.** And here, we are pretty scared. **We do not dare to raise our voices. We are chickens following some institutions or parties that are above us.** In the Balkans, it is not like that. (inf 10)*
- ***The center of Balkan culture is everyday man,** who does not strive to be at some higher level of culture. (inf 8)*

Although some have emphasized Central European affiliation, it is clear from later responses that they consider themselves a Balkan nation – that is, they personify and identify themselves and their own nation with the imaginary concept of the Balkans. Precisely through these small words, which Billig (1995) calls *deixes*, such as “we”, “here”, “our”, one can see the unconscious identification with a particular cultural and geographical area.

- *When comparing Austria and Balkans, I would probably emphasize the role of humor. I think that **here in Balkans we** have developed some special sort of humor. (inf 5)*
- *Still, if you are looking at young people from the Balkans, **we** are extremely open-minded, innovative people. I would not associate young people, at least not the more educated who I have met, with typical stereotypes about the Balkans. Balkans is chaos, and their mindset is different. (inf 7)*

- *“Vedno si naš! (You are always ours!) “(inf 1)*

From this it can be seen that the Slovene notions of the Balkans as the Other are not fixed, but are prone to change. It can be concluded that, although the Balkans are negatively characterized as an area of chaos and backwardness, it still has characteristics that make it similar to the Slovenes, either in a positive or negative context. While geographically and culturally all respondents emphasize the difference between Europe and the Balkans (with Slovenia as a dividing line that has the characteristics of both Europe and the Balkans within its national discourse), members of the nations of the former Yugoslavia certainly fall into the category of ‘nearer’ Otherness. That there remains a difference between them can be seen in the example of Croatia, which, if we compare in the Slovenian discourse, with other nations of FYR, definitely is a closer Other, if not equal.

- *I would not say that Slovenes are a part of the Balkans, especially if you consider geography. In my opinion, Romania and Bulgaria are hardcore Balkan. Maybe I would include here also Serbia and Bosnia. For Croatia, I am not sure. (inf 16)*
- *I would say that Slovenia is not a part of Balkans, but neither are some parts of neighboring Croatia, which can also be seen in their similar customs and mentality. (inf 7)*
- *When it comes to former Yugoslavia, I would highlight only Croatia, because after all, it was exposed to the same Austro-Hungarian influence as we were. (inf 8)*
- *There are some differences, but in my opinion, Slovene culture is most similar to Croatian culture. Of course, it depends on which part of Slovenia. But still, the majority of Slovenes visits Croatia, and are consumers of Croatian music and TV programs. (inf 13)*
- *It is like Croatian culture because of the same religion. (inf 14)*

- *If I need to find similarities with some other countries, I would connect Slovenia with the northern part of Croatia. This part of Croatia is relatively similar to Slovenia in the field of dance, music, festivities and traditions. I can only compare this part of Croatia with us, and maybe part of Istria, which is like the southern part of our country. (inf 6)*
- *And here I speak about the nations south of Croatia, because Croats are not perceived as čefurs, but I do not know why. I think that this common experience from the Austro-Hungarian Empire makes us culturally closer than with other former Yugoslav nations. I have a feeling that Croats are seen as equals, because after Slovenia, Croatia was the second most industrially developed state in Yugoslavia. When I speak with other Slovenes, even Croats who have migrated here, are not treated as čefurs. There are no negative connotations connected with them, maybe only that people from Dalmatia are lazy. (inf 7)*

Also, the fact that the cultural dimension is always closely related to other dimensions of everyday nationalism and especially to the political dimension can be seen from the statements below. As already emphasized in the theoretical part, it is the state that, together with its institutions, creates a certain culture and imposes it as a national one by means of symbols and myths, schools, and the media. Some of the respondents noticed this.

- *The current **political party** wants these things to be treated as a Slovenian culture or, probably better to say, non-culture. (inf 16)*
- *It is connected with the **rightwing oriented people** and lower education. (inf 9)*

## 14.5. Discrimination

Hypothesis 5: Members of the second generation of migrants from FYR are discriminated against because of their ethnicity.

When asked if they see any differences between the terms ‘Non-Slovene’ and ‘čefur’, all the respondents agreed that the word *čefur* represents someone who comes from former Yugoslav countries, while Non-Slovene can be anyone who came to Slovenia, regardless of nationality. Most of the respondents emphasized that *čefur* is a subculture in Slovenia, pointing out the most salient elements of this subculture. Also, respondents agreed that, since this is a subculture, Slovenes can also be *čefurs*. In the responses, *turbofolk* music reappeared as one of the main elements of demarcation and identification.

- *But even Slovenes can be čefurs, if they wear precisely defined clothes, listen to precisely defined music, and go to special bars or clubs with **turbofolk music**. (inf 1)*
- *A Čefur is someone who wears tracksuit, white tennis shoes, white socks, a lot of chains around the neck, and their primary characteristic is **turbofolk music**. (inf 16)*

It is interesting that on the issues of delimitation and identification, the most of the respondents used examples of ‘harsh l’ and the suffix -lČ in last names.

- *I started using this ‘**harsh l**’, which is typical for čefurs. (inf 2)*
- *I also need to emphasize the role of the ‘**harsh l**’, because, based on the pronunciation of this letter, you could know **who is ours and who is not ours**. (inf 7)*

- Čefurs are people who use *'harsh l'*. (inf 12)
- And there is this stereotype that people from former Yugoslavia have hard time learning Slovenian, and especially pronouncing some letters, such as the **letter "l"**. (inf 11)
- There is a common stereotype that čefurs are people who wear tracksuits, use *'harsh l'*, listen to really loud music, and gather in backyards where they have parties. (inf 5)
- But even if they wanted to assimilate, and were trying to pronounce **that letter "l"** in the Slovenian way, it was again not good, meaning that you are never good enough. (inf 7)
- When I was young, for my parents and their generations it was important if your last name ends **in -IČ or -IČ**. And having a suffix **-IČ in** your last name was a problem, because everyone knew where you are from. (inf 8)
- Maybe is different in villages, but here in the city, I personally believe there is no discrimination towards these people anymore. Or at least I do not feel it, because my last name does not end on **-IČ**. (inf 3)
- There were always some jokes about last names ending in **-IČ**, but they were just jokes. They were never discriminatory. (inf 5)

It is from these sentences that the very core of the everyday nationalism approach can be seen, i.e. how a single letter can create and at the same time strengthen one's national affiliation and identification, while on the other hand, it automatically separates those who do not belong. Nevertheless, there are still differences even in this context, because society can again separate these people in the categories of 'positive' and 'negative' Others, where Western nations are characterized in a positive light, while the countries of the former Yugoslavia are the 'negative Others'.

- When some other nations living in Slovenia, such as for example Americans, have different pronunciation of some words or letters, we find it cute. When people from FYR pronounce some letter differently, we marginalize them. (inf 11)

When asking if they have ever felt discriminated against because of their roots, most of the respondents from the group of descendants of migrants have agreed that they have not felt this way, while respondents from both of the groups stated that discrimination existed previously, but nowadays is not visible anymore.

- It was believed that **these** troubled, problematic children were always čefurs. And then you kind of grow up with this perception that they are the ones always making problems, like being very loud in buses, stealing mobile phones... Of course, these are all matters that have some underlying reasons which we did not know. **When I was growing up, I knew little about the war in the Balkans, and why these people came here. They were just čefurs. But if I compare it with the current situation, I do not think that these people are discriminated against anymore.** (inf 4)
- Even though I do not consider myself to be čefur, I do not have any problems if some call me that. **Society has become more open towards these people.** (inf 12)
- But exactly because we were so mixed in the class, I really have noticed no discrimination towards them. It was the same in highschool. There was even less discrimination. I do not know how it was for them on the other side, but sometimes you could notice a bit of aggression or arrogance, **as if they had some kind of complex because of their heritage. I believe they put up some kind of resistance to those who are not like them. The more threatened you feel, the more aggressive you act towards others.** (inf 1)
- There were always two groups in school. **Those who were Slovenes, and those who were čefurs, but there was no discrimination, because they knew how to stand up for themselves.**

*But there was never a mixing between us, we were always separated. Still, I believe that after the war, it was really hard for them to integrate into Slovenian society. (inf 3)*

- *Nowadays, they are so many people [whose names end] in –IČ, living in Slovenia, that discrimination is not so visible anymore. Our generation is already working, has finished education... There are really a lot of **us, children of migrants.** This discrimination was **more visible when we were younger.** (inf 12)*
- *But if I compare it with the current situations, I do not think **that these people are discriminated anymore.** (inf 4)*
- *It is important to know that when they immigrated to Slovenia, **they were ghettoized.** So if you have one group per couple of square feet, of course they will stick together. One part of the marginalization by the Slovenes was certainly noticeable, and with Slovenes I think from the municipality of Ljubljana.*
- *Maybe is different in villages, but here in the city, **I personally believe there is no discrimination towards these people anymore.** (inf 3)*
- *Still, I think that discrimination is not visible anymore. I do not see this **dividing line** between Slovenes and čefurs anymore. (inf 2)*
- *I do not see this problem anymore. I have noticed that the descendants of migrants from Yugoslavia do not care particularly if their last name is written with **Č or Ć.** (inf 8)*

In so far as all the answers show that discrimination once existed, but that it no longer does, following Fairclough's critical discourse analysis, and combining it with Billig's *deixes*, it becomes apparent that in almost every answer the words "those" or "these" emerge, showing that discrimination still exists. Although it may not be emphasized as much as it used to be, precisely

through these pronouns, it is evident that in Slovenian society they are treated as Others despite the fact that most of them were born in Slovenia.

Also, many respondents emphasized that the term *čefur* and discrimination based on heritage is most visible in the capital, Ljubljana, while in smaller towns and places this discrimination was never too visible because there were not so many migrants and they more or less successfully assimilated.

- *But you need to know **that the word čefur is mostly connected with Ljubljana. Here where I am from, I have friends both from Croatia and Bosnia, and I have never perceived them as čefurs.** You also need to know that čefurs are not present in Maribor, as the second biggest Slovenian city, or in Celje, this is only typical for Ljubljana, or some nearby towns.* (inf 7)
- ***-The fact that someone is labeled a čefur is not present in the whole of Slovenia, but it mainly refers to Ljubljana. Here where I live, you will never say to someone that he is čefur. You always say that this person is from Bosnia or from Serbia.*** (inf 6)
- *Here where I live, the members of these nations have assimilated so well, that we live here completely normally, even if they do not speak Slovenian. **You get used to having him as your neighbor and being equal to you, and you do not perceive him as čefur.*** (inf 8)

From this it can be concluded that in Slovenia and in the analyzed discourse, a strong spatial identification can be noticed. All respondents who are not from the capital, emphasized in their answers the same turn of phrase “here where I live / where I am from”, in order to highlight that there is no discrimination in other parts of Slovenia. For this reason, the everyday nationalism approach could also be researched through the discourse of regional identity.

Table 13 - Results of the tested hypotheses

|                                                                                                                                                                                                        |           |
|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----------|
| H1: To move away from the connotation and discourse of backwardness of Yugoslavia and the Balkans, post-1991 Slovene politics had to present Slovenes as a people of Central Europe.                   | Verified  |
| H2: Slovene national identity is primarily defined through ethnicity and territory.                                                                                                                    | Undecided |
| H3: Slovene myths and symbols are important in the self-identification of the respondents from the group of ethnic Slovenes, but not important to the group of second generation of migrants from FYR. | Verified  |
| H4: The state and state institutions are the prime culprits for the Erasure.                                                                                                                           | Verified  |
| H5.1: Slovenia is seen as belonging to (Central) European culture, due to similar traditions and customs.                                                                                              | Undecided |
| H5.2.: Music is the primary element of self-identification of the respondents.                                                                                                                         | Verified  |
| H6: Members of the second generation of immigrants from the FYR are discriminated against because of their ethnicity.                                                                                  | Undecided |
| H7: Identification with the Slovene (cultural) space is much stronger in the group of ethnic Slovenes, but in the group of second generation of nations from FYR.                                      | Verified  |

## 15. Conclusion

*We like everything that is German. There is still nowadays an expression in villages: “How are you? As though I were in Germany.” That means that you are feeling really great. I experience us as a culture [split] in half. On the one side, we would like to be Germans and Europeans, and on the other side, if you tell some Slovene to pay taxes, he will first think how to deceive the state. You know, that is not the first thought that pops into the mind of someone from Sweden, for example. This can be a representation of Balkan culture, where there are not so many rules, everything is more informal, you can go to the doctor only if you have some connection there... We would like to have all the splendor and comfort of Europe, but we would not like to have any responsibility. These things we would like to do the Balkan way. (inf 5)*

The above quotation encompasses the theory of everyday nationalism from several perspectives, using all five dimensions of this direction. At the same time, one can see the duality of the Slovenian national narrative as a state in which two diametrically opposed cultures, European and Balkan, intertwine.

If we look at the primary hypothesis set out in the introductory part of the dissertation – that Slovene politics after 1991, in order to move away from the connotation and discourse of backwardness of Yugoslavia and the Balkans, had to present Slovenes as a people of Central Europe, through insurmountable differences setting them apart from other nations of the former Yugoslavia – we find that the theoretical part of the dissertation showed this hypothesis is correct. After 1991, Slovene politics tried to reaffirm Slovene national identity through the discourse of belonging to the European cultural circle. By reviving old national and literary heroes, changing the dates of national holidays and emphasizing the subalpine space and Mount Triglav as the primary geographical symbol of Slovenian national identity, the Slovenian state leadership wanted to separate itself from stereotypes and negative connotations associated with the Balkans.

In order to succeed in this, it was also important to find the Others, who would serve to further confirm Slovene nationality, and Slovenia's belonging to Europe. In Slovenia, these Others were

identified in the group of members of former Yugoslav nations. Following Petersoo's definition of Others (2007), we can divide them into two groups: the Balkan external other, and Balkan internal other, i.e. members of other nations of the former Yugoslavia living in Slovenia. While the Balkan external others served the purpose of distinguishing the Slovene national identity and culture from the identity and culture of other peoples of the former Yugoslavia, the Balkan internal others served as an additional reaffirmation of the establishment of the Slovene identity within state borders. Also, in order to more visibly separate the Slovene Central European culture from the Balkan one, the nations of the former Yugoslavia were reduced to one denominator: Non-Slovenes. Regardless of the fact that these are different ethnic groups, which have different religions, languages and scripts, which are considered the primary features, in Slovenian case, of creating the national identity of a particular community. The theoretical part of the dissertation showed that state policy through the historiographical awakening and reaffirmation of the Central European identity, and through the Balkan others, successfully confirmed its own Slovenian identity.

However, on the other hand, the empirical part of the dissertation showed that the hypotheses set out in the introductory part of the dissertation are not entirely correct. These are discussed below.

The first hypothesis, that Slovene national identity is primarily defined through ethnicity and territory, proved to be incorrect. Most respondents explained Slovene national identity through personal characteristics, using comparisons with other nations. In most of the answers, one can notice a comparison with the nations of the former Yugoslavia and Austria, which again speaks in favor of the duality of Slovenia as a meeting point between two diametrically opposed cultures. However, it is interesting that the members of the second generation of migrants mostly identified the Slovenian national identity with territory and ethnicity, which indicates a much greater objectivity in understanding Slovenia as a state and nation. It was ethnic Slovenes who primarily pointed out the negative characteristics related to the Slovene identity, considering the Slovene nation to be reserved, envious, and not open-minded enough. From this we conclude that Tajfel and Turner's theory of social identity on the example of our respondents is not completely applicable, precisely because a large part of the respondents from the first group (ethnic Slovenes), is very self-critical and does not perceive Slovenian national identity in a completely positive context.

However, given that most of the answers yielded a comparison between the respondents and members of other nations, the dimension of self / other is confirmed; that is, in order to establish and emphasize our national identity, we need a category of Others (see Skey 2011, Kralj 2008a, Luketić 2013, and more).

The second hypothesis, that Slovene myths and symbols are important in the self-identification of the respondents, turned out to be half correct because the opinions were different. While none of the respondents from the group of the second generation of migrants considered myths and symbols to be particularly important in their self-identification, in the first group of respondents, i.e. in the group of ethnic Slovenes, opinions diverged. While for some myths and symbols are very important in self-identification, for others they play no role. Nevertheless, everyone agreed that in the general Slovene national narrative, symbols and myths (especially Mount Triglav) represent an important source of national identification. In this way, Triglav becomes both an expansive and inclusive symbol, ‘spreading outwards’, segregating other nations from Slovenia, while also inclusive, uniting, connecting and being the so-called centripetal symbol, directed towards the center and uniting a certain fragmented being into a coherent whole (Velikonja 2003, 34-38). The answers obtained in the interviews confirm the importance of the ‘rural marker’ in producing so-called purified national space (see Edensor 2002, Toplak 2014), as well as the threat due to the small Slovenian territory (Šumi, 2004). There is a great emphasis on tradition and the dichotomy between two opposing ways of life in Slovenia: the traditional one in the countryside, and the urban one in the city.

The third hypothesis, that the state and state institutions are the main culprits for the Erasure, proved to be correct. Although all respondents emphasized that they knew little about these topics, they agreed that state policy and the media were the main ones responsible for the erasure in Slovenia. In this way, the Slovenian state truly becomes “the political expression of a common life and (most often) of a national family” (Walzer quoted in Tamir 2019, 421). Furthermore, particularly in their formative years, democratic states have to “actively foster the formation of a unifying consciousness grounded in a historical narrative, a common language, norms, culture, and symbols.” (Tamir 2019, 428) This is exactly what happened in those formative years in Slovenia, where the state apparatus, by emphasizing Slovenian culture, customs and especially language, wanted to strengthen national and European identity at the same time. Nevertheless,

while in the entire theoretical part of the dissertation the role of the Slovene language as the primary identifier of the Slovene national identity is the leitmotif, only one respondent mentioned language as the primary signifier of Slovene national identity. Slovene *dvojina* (grammatical dual), as it is linguistically truly special, since it is not possessed by any language in the region other than Slovene, and thus, could serve as an important element of self-identification, was mentioned in only one answer.

As Bonikowski (2016, 432-433) explains, precisely through the territorialization of the nation (census and citizenship law), the production of national history through school textbooks and media, the promotion of national culture, “the state continually reasserts the primacy of the national community in its citizen’s thinking and behavior. Plus, formal exclusion of those judged not to hold appropriate traits or credentials for national membership.” (ibid, 432-433) Judging by the answers received, which primarily emphasize the role of the state and the media in the example of the Erased, as well as schools, which teach about national and literary heroes, it can be concluded that the Slovenian state apparatus has successfully established Slovenian national identity through the discourse regarding ‘Balkan others’ and the discourse of belonging to Europe.

The fourth hypothesis claims that Slovenia is seen as (Central) European culture, due to similar traditions and customs, while music is the primary element of self-identification.

The hypothesis proved to be correct, confirming the importance of music as the primary identifier of the cultural component of everyday nationalism. As Folkestad stresses, “the development of a musical identity is also a result of the cultural, ethnic, religious and national contexts in which people live” (2001, 151). This is evident from the answers obtained. Almost all of the respondents mentioned turbofolk music, perceived as Balkan music, as an element that simultaneously connects and separates them from the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Music is also what connects them with neighboring Austrians.

Moreover, respondents primarily compared themselves with the cultures of neighboring nations, where Central European culture was understood as the Austrian, refined culture, while concluding that Balkan culture is primarily reflected in tradition, folklore and focused on the

everyday man. In the eyes of the respondents, Balkan culture is much more direct, open and chaotic, which is in stark contrast to civilized and more restrained European culture. This confirms the definitions presented in the theoretical part of the dissertation (see Todorova 2015, Bakić-Hayden 1999, Džigal 2002, and others).

The sixth hypothesis tested whether members of the second generation of migrants from FYR are discriminated due to their ethnicity. From the answers obtained, it can be concluded that migrants from FYR used to be discriminated against, especially on the basis of their surnames and pronunciations of certain letters and words, but today this discrimination is no longer visible. All respondents agreed that, precisely because of the large number of members of the second generation of migrants, this discrimination is no longer visible, which points to successful integration into Slovenian society. However, it is still not possible to speak of complete assimilation because, using a critical analysis of discourse, the ‘us’ and ‘them’ division is still visible in the answers.

The last hypothesis tested whether the identification with the Slovene (cultural) space is much stronger in the group of ethnic Slovenes, than in the group of second generation of nations from FYR. From the answers obtained, it can be concluded that the hypothesis set is correct, because the obtained answers show that in most members of the second group of respondents, despite being born and having spent their entire lives in Slovenia, identification with the Slovenian (cultural) space is not complete, that is, there are elements of parental cultures that intertwine with the Slovenian ones and make it difficult for them to self-identify. It can be concluded that their identities are individualized, complex and fluid, and that they originated in the developmental phase of the respondents in the discursive space of pronounced Slovene nationalism.

As a relatively new concept, everyday nationalism has proved successful in both the theoretical and empirical parts of the dissertation because it uses both bottom-up and top-down approaches. Although on a relatively small representative sample, through its five dimensions, it managed to show the similarities and differences in the opinions of scholars and ‘ordinary people’. And that is exactly what makes everyday nationalism particularly interesting. It also respects the opinions of other or wider masses, so this dissertation hopes to be a guide to other researches of everyday

nationalism in Slovenia and other countries of the former Yugoslavia, which will later expand its representative sample. At the very end, it needs to be stressed for further researches, that the empirical part indicated a missing element in the research on everyday nationalism in Slovenia, and that is regionalization. According to the answers obtained, the 'Self / Other' dimension cannot be researched from the national point of view, because there are great differences in treating those 'Others' in different parts of the country.

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## 17. Annex

### A. Tables with the description of respondents by given criteria:

#### 1) Group 1: Ethnic Slovenes

|       | Age | Place of birth |
|-------|-----|----------------|
| Inf 1 | 32  | Ljubljana      |
| Inf 2 | 35  | Kranj          |
| Inf 3 | 33  | Ljubljana      |
| Inf 4 | 28  | Ljubljana      |
| Inf 5 | 33  | Ptuj           |
| Inf 6 | 33  | Krško          |
| Inf 7 | 29  | Ptuj           |
| Inf 8 | 41  | Novo Mesto     |

2) Group 2: Members of the second generation of migrants from FYR

|        | Age | Place of birth   | Parents country                 |
|--------|-----|------------------|---------------------------------|
| Inf 9  | 33  | Ljubljana        | BIH, Croatia                    |
| Inf 10 | 28  | Ljubljana        | Slovenia,<br>North<br>Macedonia |
| Inf 11 | 32  | Ljubljana        | North<br>Macedonia              |
| Inf 12 | 30  | Ljubljana        | North<br>Macedonia              |
| Inf 13 | 34  | Ptuj             | BIH                             |
| Inf 14 | 28  | Postojna         | Slovenia,<br>BIH                |
| Inf 15 | 30  | Novo<br>Mesto    | BIH                             |
| Inf 16 | 33  | Sarajevo,<br>BIH | BIH                             |

## B. Questionnaire for structured interviews

### SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DIMENSIONS

- How would you define Slovenes?
- What is the significance of Triglav and Martin Krpan<sup>51</sup> for you?
- Which countries do you consider to be Balkan countries? Is Slovenia also a Balkan country and why?

### POLITICAL DIMENSION

- Do you think that it was good that Slovenia was part of Yugoslavia?
- Do you think that ethnic groups such as Serbs / Croats / Bosnians should be granted minority status?
- Did the Erased people deserved to be erased?

### CULTURAL DIMENSION

- If you were to tell a foreigner about Slovenian culture, how would you describe it? What would you point out?
- Do you think that Slovenian culture differs from the cultures of neighboring nations? Which culture is most similar to it and why?
- In your opinion, is there a Balkan culture? How would you describe it?

### DIMENSION OF SELF/OTHER

- Who are Non-Slovenes? Are there any differences between the terms 'čefur' and 'Non-Slovene'?
- Do you think they are discriminated against? If so, why? Based on what?
- Do you consider yourself to be Non-Slovene and why? Have you ever felt discriminated against because of your origins? (question for second generation)

## **List of Abbreviations**

|              |                                    |
|--------------|------------------------------------|
| <b>BIH</b>   | <b>Bosnia and Herzegovina</b>      |
| <b>CDA</b>   | <b>Critical Discourse Analysis</b> |
| <b>FYR</b>   | <b>Former Yugoslav Republics</b>   |
| <b>Ph.D.</b> | <b>Doctor of Philosophy</b>        |
| <b>WW II</b> | <b>Second World War</b>            |