1. Introduction and Acknowledgements
The event was the third in a series of four conferences within the Changing Orders Research Programme, focusing on strategic challenges for small and middle-sized states. The conference was supported by the Swiss-Hungarian Cooperation programme and co-financed by the Hungarian Government.
The conference was opened by Dr. Orsolya Tamássy-Lénárt, Vice Rector for Teaching and Students at Andrássy University, followed by an introduction from András Hettyey. The conference took as its starting point the rapid acceleration of China’s engagement in Central Europe over the past decade. This began with the “16+1” framework of 2012, later expanded to “17+1” with the inclusion of Greece, and was driven mainly by the Belt and Road Initiative. Countries such as Hungary and Serbia welcomed Chinese investment as a way to accelerate growth and diversify their partnerships beyond the EU. In recent years, however, enthusiasm has cooled considerably because of unmet economic expectations, growing concerns within the EU and rising geopolitical tensions. The risks include financial dependency, a lack of transparency, corruption, doubts about the sustainability of some investments, and political and security concerns in strategic sectors such as telecommunications, energy and digital infrastructure. China’s close relationship with Russia has further increased scepticism, especially since the war in Ukraine.
Hettyey described the development of China-CEE relations in two stages. Starting around 2010, the rise of China heralded in a period where economic and political ties between Beijing and CEE-countries strengthened. Since around 2020, disillusionment and a reassessment of what can be achieved have set in. Despite the political will to reduce dependency, trade with China has not declined, and Chinese foreign direct investment has in some places even risen sharply. He also pointed to the ambiguity of the EU’s China policy since the 2019 Strategic Outlook, which describes China simultaneously as partner, competitor and systemic rival, and to the Merz-Macron non-paper of October 2026. The conference aimed to take stock of the approaches that small and middle-sized states in the region have used over the last decade, with the floor also open to perspectives from other European countries.
2. The Panel Discussions
Panel 1: China and Central Europe I
The first panel, chaired by Dr. Christopher Walsch (Corvinus University Budapest), addressed Hungary and Switzerland.
Dr. Viktor Eszterhai (Ludovika University of Public Service) analysed the consequences of Hungary’s change of government. The new government has announced that Hungary is “rejoining Europe” and intends a pragmatic China policy in which Chinese investors must accept EU rules. Its predecessor had sought to become the most visible actor in EU-China relations, partly to compensate for lost ties elsewhere in Europe. Eszterhai stressed that economic reality limits any reorientation. China is Hungary’s fourth-largest investor and could become the second-largest after Germany if all planned projects materialise. These investments are interlinked in an automotive ecosystem of Chinese, Japanese and German firms, and about 15% of the Hungarian economy is tied to the sector. Instruments such as the EU Foreign Subsidies Regulation will subject Chinese investments to scrutiny. Beijing is currently waiting for the new government’s first policies. Eszterhai expects a more modest “panda-hugging” rhetoric, the completion of the Belgrade-Budapest railway in the near future, and a greater emphasis on the One China policy. Structurally, China will remain mostly a partner for the big, globalised firms in Hungary, while the SMEs tend to see it as a systemic rival.
Dr. Ariane Knüsel (University of Fribourg) showed that Switzerland has moved towards China while the EU has moved away. Neutrality, mediation ambitions and commercial interests shape a policy without de-risking and without the language of systemic rivalry. Switzerland recognised China in 1950, has never sanctioned it (not even after Tiananmen), and has avoided gestures that might offend Beijing since the 1999 visit of the Chinese president. Knüsel identified several problems: a free trade agreement from which China has profited more; strong “El Dorado” expectations among Swiss firms combined with little China expertise; a problematic technology transfer from Swiss to Chinese firms that is often not even illegal due to poor legal oversight; and limited screening, since only state-controlled entities are reviewed and cantonal-level cooperation is largely opaque.
Panel 2: China and Central Europe II
The second panel, chaired by Simon Tafler (Andrássy University), covered Slovakia, Czechia and Poland.
Matej Simalcik (Central European Institute of Asian Studies, CEIAS) distinguished three phases in Slovak-Chinese relations. After intensification around 2000 and accession to the 16+1 format, expectations of Chinese capital were disappointed. From 2020, a more realistic view emerged, reinforced by COVID-19, human rights concerns and the question of China’s stance on Russia. Under Prime Minister Fico, relations were upgraded in November 2024 with a “pragmatic”, economy-first approach centred on the automotive industry. The public opinion in Slovakia is more negative than positive, and the US and EU are preferred partners.
Kara Nemeckova (CEIAS) described China as a highly polarising issue in Czechia. The 2021-25 coalition showed strong interest in relations with Taiwan, while the current government seeks to “normalise” and “rationalise” ties with Beijing. Czech public opinion is the most negative in the V4, which limits how far any government can approach China. Kara Nemeckova highlighted that Czechia’s state-of -the-art cyber expertise strengthens its defensive position and lets the country punch above its weight in discussions on China.
Dr. Justyna Szczudlik (Polish Institute of International Affairs) presented Poland’s comparatively consensual and coherent approach towards China. While initially embracing the 16+1 cooperation, Poland’s stance shifted from around 2017 influenced partly by joint Chinese-Russian military activities in the Baltic Sea. COVID-19 and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine then showed that China is not neutral. The Chinese economic model is seen as a threat to Polish jobs, and only 39% of Poles hold a positive view of China.
Panel 3: Slovenia, Serbia and Romania
The third panel, chaired by Dr. Viktor Eszterhai (Ludovika University of Public Service), turned to Slovenia, Serbia and Romania.
Dr. Anastas Vangeli (University of Ljubljana) described a Slovenian business sector that sees China overwhelmingly as an opportunity, with Hisense-Gorenje and the Port of Koper as showcases. Janez Janša’s government is more China-critical, while politicians of a “small” country such as Slovenia question their capacity (or even the need) to change China.
Stefan Vladisavljev (Foundation BFPE for a Responsible Society) presented Serbia as the opposite end of the spectrum. Serbia has never aligned with EU tariffs against China despite pressure from the USA. High public trust in China (56%) coexists with economic reliance on the EU. China was not a major topic in the mass student protests, although their trigger, the deadly collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in 2022, was linked to a major China-backed infrastructure project. Vladisavljev expects that Chinese companies will not be expelled but held more consistently accountable, for example on environmental impact and human rights.
Andreea Brinza (Romanian Institute for the Study of the Asia-Pacific) provided the contrast. Romania was the first country to ban Huawei from 5G and excluded Chinese firms from public infrastructure and the nuclear power plant project. She argued, however, that this was meant to signal alignment with the US and EU rather than to address security concerns. Chinese cameras still watch over public infrastructure and the military, and the 14+1 is a “zombie mechanism” that survives formally but has lost its substance.
Panel 4: China and Central Europe: Cross-Cutting Developments
The fourth panel was chaired by András Hettyey (Andrássy University).
Dr. Ágnes Szunomár (Corvinus University) emphasised the role of Chinese capital in CEE infrastructure, electric vehicle production and battery manufacturing. The European approach should be understood as de-risking rather than decoupling. De-risking, introduced by Ursula von der Leyen in 2023, aims to reduce strategic vulnerabilities through diversification, economic security and technological sovereignty without severing economic relations. The localisation of Chinese EV and battery producers, with Hungary as the most attractive destination, can reduce risks related to tariffs and distant supply chains. It can also create new vulnerabilities, including technological dependency, foreign ownership and local social and environmental conflicts. CEE’s established automotive industry, skilled workforce, supplier networks and EU market access explain its appeal for Chinese firms. Szunomár identified three waves of East Asian investment: the 1990s, the period after EU accession in 2004, and the period after 2022, focused on EVs, batteries and green technologies. She stressed that dependence becomes problematic mainly when it is asymmetrical, and described a “paradox of de-risking”: reducing dependence on China may create new dependencies through Chinese investment.
Dr. Richard Turcsányi (CEIAS) surveyed perceptions of China in the region. Attitudes are generally negative, as in Western Europe, but differ between countries and are shaped by domestic politics, elections and national China strategies. The Czech Republic is highly polarised, Poland coherent and transatlantically oriented but economically pragmatic, and Serbia more positive, partly due to the 1999 NATO bombing. The communist past fosters an association of China with authoritarianism. Turcsányi introduced the concept of “Sino-romanticism”, an overly optimistic attitude that overlooks risks and dependencies. He warned that CEE could become a production base for Chinese firms, as Spain’s automotive industry has. He called for moving beyond an exclusively threat-based view and understanding China simultaneously as partner, competitor and systemic rival.
3. Closing Remarks
In his closing remarks, András Hettyey emphasised the diversity of approaches across the region and the uncertainty about their future. There is no uniform China strategy, and national political developments significantly shape relations with Beijing. He stressed the distinction between de-risking and decoupling, since cutting economic ties entirely is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable. The focus should be on managing dependencies with security considerations in mind. Global supply chains are as important as domestic production capacities. Finally, he asked whether China’s willingness and capacity to remain engaged in the region will grow or shrink in the coming years.
Fruzsina TÓTH, Fruzsina Germuska, Antonia KAUERT, Simon TAFLER
This event was organised as part of the “Changing Orders Research Programme”, a comprehensive project supported by the Swiss Contribution, with national co-financing from the Hungarian Government.



